fix: prevent path traversal in websocket handle_data file reads - #438
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painbaba wants to merge 1 commit into
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fix: prevent path traversal in websocket handle_data file reads#438painbaba wants to merge 1 commit into
painbaba wants to merge 1 commit into
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file_name stored in raw records is client-influenced (it can be polluted via /conv/community), but handle_data() joined it into root_dir/workspace and read the file without any containment check, allowing relative traversal and absolute-path overrides to read arbitrary files as base64 on the /ws/base websocket. Resolve the candidate path and require it to stay inside the interaction workspace before reading. Fixes OpenBMB#437
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Fixes #437
Root cause
handle_data()inXAgentServer/application/websockets/common.pytreatsfile_namefrom storedRawrecords as a trusted workspace-relative path. Record data can be polluted through/conv/community(as described in #437), soos.path.join(root_dir, "workspace", file_name)followed byopen()reads files outside the workspace — relative traversal (../x) and absolute-path overrides both escape — and the content is returned base64-encoded to the/ws/base/{interaction_id}websocket client.Fix
os.path.realpath(), and only read the file when the resolved path stays inside the workspace (file_path.startswith(workspace_dir + os.sep)).os.path.existstoos.path.isfileso only regular files are read.Verification
Repro harness running the
handle_dataimplementation from before/after this change against the same fixture:../secret.txt(outside workspace)plot.pnginside workspace