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feat: sign in through the browser with a bare 'tolgee login' - #210
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Browser login needs a second kind of user-level credential next to the personal access token, and a place to put an OS-keychain backend later without rewriting the callers a second time. The store is now addressed per host, which is the unit a keychain entry would hold. The user slot becomes a union: a slot with no `type` is a personal access token, so files written by earlier versions keep parsing and the files we write stay readable by them. Project API keys are untouched — a browser session only ever occupies the user slot.
PKCE, the authorize URL, and the calls to the authorization server: discovery, code exchange, refresh and revocation. Nothing is wired to a command yet. Endpoints come from /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server rather than being built from the api url, so an instance that runs no authorization server is recognised as such instead of producing a 404 mid-flow. The scope set is derived from what the commands actually call, with the scopes the server implies left out: translations.edit covers translations.view, which covers keys.view. The token endpoint refuses a request carrying any query string, so every parameter goes in the body.
WalkthroughThe CLI adds browser-based OAuth login with PKCE, host-scoped session storage, token refresh, and session support for API requests and pull watches. Login, logout, project selection, credential listing, documentation, and tests are updated to support OAuth sessions alongside API keys. ChangesOAuth authentication
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~60 minutes Change: Feature Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant CLI
participant browserLogin
participant AuthServer
participant Browser
participant LoopbackServer
CLI->>browserLogin: Start OAuth login
browserLogin->>AuthServer: Discover OAuth metadata
browserLogin->>LoopbackServer: Start callback listener
browserLogin->>Browser: Open authorization URL
Browser->>AuthServer: Send authorization request
AuthServer->>LoopbackServer: Redirect with code and state
browserLogin->>AuthServer: Exchange code and PKCE verifier for tokens
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The title clearly and concisely describes the primary change: browser-based sign-in through a bare tolgee login command. |
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A rabbit taps the login door
PKCE keys hop safely through
Tokens rest in host-bound burrows
Freshened when the watch wakes too
API keys still know the way
The CLI greets the dawn anew
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In `@src/config/credentials.ts`:
- Around line 113-118: In the expired-token path in getStoredCredentials, use
store.update to remove the credential only if the stored credential is still the
same expired PAT; preserve any newer credential. Apply the same conditional
removal in usableProjectKey so removeProjectKey does not delete a replacement
project key.
- Around line 95-97: Reformat the StoredCredentials union in
src/config/credentials.ts, lines 95–97, as a single-line union without a leading
separator. Reformat the destructuring in test/unit/credentialStore.test.ts,
lines 46–48, so the await import expression starts on the line after the
assignment.
In `@src/config/credentialStore.ts`:
- Around line 142-151: Update writeAll to retry the rename for transient EPERM,
EACCES, or EBUSY errors with a bounded delay and attempt count. On success,
return; on a non-retriable error or exhausted retries, remove the pending temp
file before rethrowing the error.
In `@src/config/storeLock.ts`:
- Around line 45-50: Update stale-lock removal in isAbandoned and the lock
release path in the surrounding store-lock function to verify ownership before
deleting LOCK_FILE. Atomically rename a stale lock to a unique name, confirm the
renamed file still belongs to the stale owner before removing it, and remove a
released lock only if its contents still identify process.pid.
In `@src/oauth/loopback.ts`:
- Around line 53-56: Update the request handling in the request listener around
read() so an invalid request target cannot throw out of the listener: catch URL
construction failures and handle them as an ignored request, preserving the
existing behavior for valid URLs.
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HACKING.mdREADME.mdpackage.jsonscripts/tolgee.envsrc/cli.tssrc/client/ApiClient.tssrc/client/WebsocketClient.tssrc/client/credential.tssrc/commands/login.tssrc/commands/pull.tssrc/config/credentialStore.tssrc/config/credentials.tssrc/config/projectId.tssrc/config/storeLock.tssrc/constants.tssrc/oauth/authServer.tssrc/oauth/authorizeUrl.tssrc/oauth/browser.tssrc/oauth/browserEnvironment.tssrc/oauth/browserLogin.tssrc/oauth/constants.tssrc/oauth/loopback.tssrc/oauth/loopbackPages.tssrc/oauth/pkce.tssrc/oauth/revoke.tssrc/oauth/session.tssrc/options.tssrc/utils/apiKeyList.tssrc/utils/pullWatch/AuthErrorHandler.tssrc/utils/pullWatch/pullScheduler.tssrc/utils/pullWatch/watchHandler.tssrc/utils/reportError.tssrc/utils/url.tstest/e2e/merge.test.tstest/e2e/oauthLogin.test.tstest/e2e/utils/api/oauth.tstest/e2e/utils/run.tstest/unit/apiClient.test.tstest/unit/credential.test.tstest/unit/credentialStore.test.tstest/unit/credentials.test.tstest/unit/login.test.tstest/unit/oauth/authServer.test.tstest/unit/oauth/authorizeUrl.test.tstest/unit/oauth/browserEnvironment.test.tstest/unit/oauth/browserLogin.test.tstest/unit/oauth/loopback.test.tstest/unit/oauth/pkce.test.tstest/unit/oauth/revoke.test.tstest/unit/oauth/session.test.tstest/unit/oauth/stubHttp.tstest/unit/projectId.test.tstest/unit/pullWatch/AuthErrorHandler.renewal.test.tstest/unit/pullWatch/AuthErrorHandler.test.tstest/unit/pullWatch/pullScheduler.test.tstest/unit/pullWatch/watchHandler.test.tstest/unit/reportError.test.tstest/unit/storeLock.test.tstest/unit/websocketReconnect.test.ts
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The authorization code comes back as a browser navigation to a local address, so the CLI listens on 127.0.0.1 with an OS-assigned port. The server never connects here; it only puts the address in a Location header, which is why any port will do (RFC 8252 section 7.3) and why the IP literal is used rather than localhost, whose resolution can put the listener on another interface. A request that does not carry this authorization's state is answered like an unknown path rather than as an error: the port is reachable by any local program, and the real callback must still be able to arrive after one. The issuer the server names is checked against the one discovery returned. Keep-alive sockets outlive close(), so they are destroyed with it - otherwise the command hangs after a successful login. Opening the browser goes through a seam the tests replace with a browser of their own.
…wser Both places the CLI authenticates take the token from a getter rather than a captured string: the REST client reads it per request in middleware, and the websocket reads it on every connect, so a token rotated mid-command is the one that gets sent and a reconnect after a rotation carries the new one. An authorization header passed with --extra-header still wins over a stored session, the same precedence --api-key already has. Project api keys and personal access tokens keep their x-api-key path untouched.
Without an api key argument the command now runs the authorization code flow and stores the pair as a browser session, greeting the user by the name /v2/user reports. Passing an api key behaves as before. The loopback listener is started before the browser is pointed at the authorize URL: the callback can arrive before the call to open it returns. --no-browser prints the URL instead of opening one. It is not an out-of-band flow: the redirect still has to reach the listener on this machine, which is what an ssh -L forward makes possible. Where a browser looks unreachable the launch is skipped and the URL printed instead. A CI run is the exception and refuses outright, before a port is even bound: nobody is there to approve the consent screen, and waiting out the window only burns the job.
Two triggers, one path: the token is rotated before a command starts if it is nearly expired, and a request refused with 401 is sent again once with the token the rotation produced. Concurrent tolgee processes share one grant, so the rotation happens under a lockfile - and the store is read again after the lock is taken. That re-read is the part that matters: without it the process that lost the race replays a refresh token the server has already retired. Both halves are pinned by a test that fails if either is removed. The access token is applied in the client's fetch rather than in middleware, so the replayed request carries the new token instead of the one that was just refused. A server that refuses the refresh token ends the session: only the user-level credential is cleared, leaving project api keys for that host in place.
Revoking either token drops the whole grant, so the refresh token alone ends the session. It is best effort throughout: an unreachable instance or a refused revocation still clears the machine, because a logout that fails to clear locally is worse than a grant that expires on its own. The session records the instance URL it was issued by. The store is keyed by hostname, which cannot say whether a host was reached over http or https or on which port, so without it `logout --all` would clear the machine while leaving live grants everywhere but the current host.
The store is keyed by hostname, so one slot can hold a session issued by a different instance on that host. Handing it out put that instance's access token on the wire as a bearer, and the 401 that followed sent the refresh token to its token endpoint. `usableSession` and `issuedBy` are now the single rule, used wherever a credential is read, adopted or renamed. Revocation is the one deliberate exception: it acts on a foreign session at its own issuer, which is what stops a grant being orphaned when the record is replaced. Every change to the store now runs through `update(host, change)` under the lock and is written to a temp file and renamed over the target, so a crash cannot truncate the file and two processes cannot rotate over each other. A host record holding nothing is dropped instead of kept. Only a stated RFC 6749 section 5.2 error means the grant is gone. A 502, a 429 or an unparseable body used to delete the session, which signed the user out over a blip. A project API key for the project at hand now outranks a browser session, because the session covers the projects chosen on the consent screen and the CLI is never told which those are. `tolgee logout --project` drops that key alone, and says so when there was none. `login <API key>` revokes the session it replaces only after the key validates, and only for a personal access token; a project key replaces no session. `logout --all` sends an instance's custom headers only to that instance: they are usually gateway credentials.
…d one stompjs reuses the headers it was handed on every reconnect, so a watch outliving its access token reconnected with an expired one. The token is refreshed and re-read in `beforeConnect`, which is the only point where a live one can still reach the wire. A refusal is answered by renewing the credential at most once every five minutes. Tolgee accepts every CONNECT and refuses at SUBSCRIBE, so nothing about the connection says whether the credential was taken, and a renewal that cannot reach the token endpoint does not spend the allowance. Without a bound the watch rotated a refresh token every three seconds forever, printing only "reconnecting". A dead session ends the watch with its own message and exit 1, on the pull path as well as the websocket; it used to reconnect forever behind "Invalid credentials?", or stop with "Bye!" and exit 0. Ctrl+C still exits 0: the signal handler passed the signal name where the exit code belongs. The frames stompjs logs are redacted, since `-v` printed the access token, and printed API keys before this feature existed.
The merge endpoints require branch.management, which DEFAULT_SCOPES does not carry, so the key this suite built could not reach them and both tests failed with 403. Its sibling branch.test.ts asks for the same scope; these two arrived in the same change and only one of them did.
The test plays the browser: it reads the authorize URL the CLI prints, drives the same /v2/oauth2 API the consent screen drives, and follows the code redirect into the listener the CLI is waiting on. Everything on the CLI side is real - discovery, PKCE, the code exchange, bearer requests, rotation and revocation - so no browser is needed to reach the parts a browser could not prove anyway. Logout is checked by sending the access token afterwards and expecting it to be refused, and the refresh by bringing the stored expiry forward rather than pinning a short token lifetime for every other suite. The backend needs an issuer for the OAuth endpoints to come up at all, and a redirect URI for the CLI client to be registered.
The README gains the two constraints that actually bite: the browser has to reach this machine, because the sign-in finishes on a local address, and CI should use an api key rather than waiting for an approval that cannot come. HACKING describes the credential store's per-host interface, the rule that a user slot with no type is an api key, and what src/oauth does.
`tolgee login` for a single project now names that project for every command, the way a project API key does, so `pull` and `push` need neither `--project-id` nor `projectId` in `.tolgeerc`. The id comes from the `project_id` the token response carries, and is stored with the session, so a refresh and a reconnect keep it. Naming another project is refused before the request goes out, saying which project the approval covers, rather than collecting a 403 from the server. An approval covering every project names no project, so those commands take the id as before. A stored project API key no longer outranks a session bound to the project at hand. That rule existed because the CLI could not tell which projects a session covered; for a bound session it now can, so the key wins only where the session has no binding - an all-projects approval, or an instance older than `project_id`. The decision moved out of `cli.ts` into `config/projectId.ts`: `cli.ts` parses argv as it is imported, so nothing in it can be unit tested.
`tolgee logout` printed "You're now logged out of <host>" whatever the store held. A logout aimed at the wrong instance - the default app.tolgee.io, when `--api-url` or `.tolgeerc` named another one - then looked like it worked, while the session the user meant stayed where it was. The store now reports whether the host, or for `--all` anything at all, was there, and the command says which of the two happened. The empty case also names `--api-url`, since aiming at the wrong instance is how you get there. Nothing is written when there was nothing to remove.
A command aimed at an instance you are not logged in to was reported as "No Project ID have been specified", because that check ran first. The project id is one of the things a credential names - a project API key carries it, and so does a browser login approved for one project - so a missing credential is the earlier fact, and the list of instances you are logged in to is what shows the mistake. The not-authenticated message no longer prints "and project -1" when no project was named, and it says how to aim at another instance.
The page the loopback server showed after a login was plain browser text, and the one shown after a failed login was plainer still. Both now use the same card as the platform: the Tolgee logo, a status badge, a heading and one line saying what to do next. The failed page keeps its wording and gets a red "Not connected" badge where the successful one is green. The colours are copied from the webapp theme (webapp/src/colors.tsx and figmaTheme.ts in tolgee-platform): the page background, the card border, the text colours, the green and red badge colours and the logo fills are the theme's own values, written as the same hex. The CLI cannot import that theme, so a change there has to be copied here by hand. The sizes and spacing (card width and top margin, paddings, the pill radius, the badge and heading font sizes) are this page's own layout for a single card on an empty page; they are not theme values. The markup moved out of loopback.ts into loopbackPages.ts, where one template builds both pages, so the server file is about the server again.
A browser login is granted the scopes the CLI asks for on the day of the consent. When a later release adds a command that needs a scope the earlier release never asked for, the stored grant does not have it, and the command gets a 403 that reads like a permissions problem while the fix is to log in again. The session now records the scopes the CLI asked for at login, next to the ones it was granted. On a 403 the client compares the CLI's scope list with what the login asked for, and prints a hint to run `tolgee login` again only when the CLI has grown since. A scope the user unchecked on the consent screen, a scope an older instance never offered, or a refusal that comes from the user's project role leaves the difference empty, so none of those trigger the hint. Sessions stored before this change carry no request list and never trigger it either.
…s dropped A command that finds an expired personal access token or project API key drops it from the store. The read happened without the lock, and the write cleared the slot whatever it held by then. A `tolgee login` finishing in another terminal between the two lost its fresh credential. The drop now runs inside the store's update and only removes the slot while it still holds the expired token that was read. A different credential in the slot is left alone. This is older than browser login: the same unconditional write was there for API keys. The lock this branch added is what makes the conditional write possible.
…dged Breaking a stale lock was two steps, a judgement and a delete, with nothing tying them together. Two waiters that both found a dead holder both deleted the file and created their own, and the second delete removed the first waiter's live lock. Release had the mirror problem: the holder deleted the lock file without checking it was still its own, so a holder that ran past the staleness bound deleted the lock a waiter had since taken. Either way two processes ran the guarded section at once, which is the concurrent refresh-token rotation the lock exists to stop, and the server answers that by revoking the grant. Three checks close it. A waiter breaks the lock only while the file still holds the content it judged abandoned. A process that has just created the lock reads it back and treats it as lost when the pid is not its own. Release removes the file only while it still holds this process's pid. Plain files offer no atomic "delete if unchanged", so a window of a few microseconds remains between a waiter's last read and its delete. It takes a dead holder and two waiters racing inside that window at once, and the cost is one re-login.
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Inline comments:
In `@src/config/storeLock.ts`:
- Around line 61-73: Replace the PID/mtime lock protocol used by create and run
with a cross-platform kernel-held advisory lock that remains held for the entire
run call; do not recover stale locks by renaming or deleting the lock path.
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Good job ^^
Same as the other PR - mostly readability notes.
Have a look at the comments where I reference my PRs - those are things which I'd like to se implemented same here as I've implemented them in the tolgee-js/chrome-plugin.
… a refused refresh Two processes sharing a grant can refresh at the same time. The server accepts the first refresh and refuses the second one inside its grace window, so a lockfile only guarded against a refused request. The refused process now re-reads the store a few times and adopts the pair the first one stored. A refresh that succeeds while a new login landed in the store adopts that login instead of overwriting it.
…orted The server drops the scopes it does not know, so the client no longer has to read the published list and narrow the request itself.
…cording the requested scopes current-permissions now returns userScopes, so at a 403 the CLI asks the server which CLI scopes the account has that the session lacks, and names them. The login no longer records the scopes it asked for. The generated schema gains the optional userScopes field by hand; an instance older than the field does not send it.
Whether the launch reaches a browser cannot be told from SSH or display variables, so those guesses are gone. The URL is printed before every launch, and a failed launch only warns.
authServer keeps the OAuth logic: discovery, the token grants, revocation and the response checks. The fetch wrapper with its timeout, user agent and network error mapping lives in transport, and OAuthError in its own module so the transport can throw it without a cycle.
loopbackHttp owns listening, closing, URL parsing and the HTML reply. loopback keeps what is OAuth: the redirect URI, the wait for the code and classifyCallback, which decides whether a request is this login's callback and what it carries.
A change returns what to store in the host's slot, or nothing to keep it, and the value update hands back to its caller.
Logout calls it for a session that is still stored, so the old name and its note about a session no longer stored were wrong.
It drops the whole host slot, the browser session included, so logout now reads as: revoke on the server, forget everything for this host.
withoutReservedHeaders drops the headers the CLI owns, and sessionUnlessAuthorizationOverridden says where a custom authorization header turns the browser login off.
The name now says what happens where beforeConnect is wired: the session may rotate tokens on disk, and the headers are written onto the client.
configuredProject moves below logoutHandler, next to its other caller.
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- 🪄 Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @src/config/credentialStore.ts:
- Around line 78-87: Restore cross-process locking around the read-modify-write
operations in update, delete, and clear in the credential store, using the
existing withStoreLock mechanism and its stale-lock timeout. Ensure each
operation reads and writes the store while holding the lock so concurrent
updates cannot overwrite one another.
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HACKING.mdsrc/client/ApiClient.tssrc/client/WebsocketClient.tssrc/commands/login.tssrc/config/credentialStore.tssrc/config/credentials.tssrc/oauth/authServer.tssrc/oauth/browserEnvironment.tssrc/oauth/browserLogin.tssrc/oauth/loopback.tssrc/oauth/loopbackHttp.tssrc/oauth/oauthError.tssrc/oauth/revoke.tssrc/oauth/session.tssrc/oauth/transport.tssrc/utils/pullWatch/pullScheduler.tssrc/utils/reportError.tstest/unit/apiClient.test.tstest/unit/credential.test.tstest/unit/credentialStore.test.tstest/unit/login.test.tstest/unit/oauth/authServer.test.tstest/unit/oauth/browserEnvironment.test.tstest/unit/oauth/browserLogin.test.tstest/unit/oauth/session.test.tstest/unit/pullWatch/watchHandler.test.tstest/unit/reportError.test.tstest/unit/websocketReconnect.test.ts
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…a documents and SSRF hardening (#3944) ## What this does This branch makes the OAuth 2.1 authorization server usable by **MCP clients and other apps we do not know in advance**, and hardens it. Three things carry most of the weight: - **Audience binding (RFC 8707).** There are now two resource servers, the REST API and the MCP endpoint. Every grant and every access token is bound to exactly one of them. A token minted for MCP is rejected by the REST API, and the other way round. - **Client ID Metadata Documents (CIMD).** A client we have never registered can present an HTTPS URL as its `client_id`. Tolgee reads the JSON document at that URL and builds an **unverified** client from it. The consent screen says clearly that the app is unverified. - **SSRF hardening.** Reading a document from a URL an attacker chose is a new outbound request, so the outbound path is pinned to the address it resolved, refuses redirects, and blocks the address ranges it should. The same fix covers webhooks, SSO and custom LLM providers. `docs/oauth/README.md` is the place to start. It explains the flow in plain words, what each term means, which decisions were made and why, and what is deliberately left out. ## How to read the commits They are ordered so each one can be read on its own, oldest first: | Commit | What it is | |---|---| | `910c21b20` | chore: caffeine version moved into the version catalog | | `293cb40d3` | SSRF: DNS pinning, no redirects, address blocklist; the proxy host is exempt only for the proxy hop | | `595cabbc5` | refresh token replay: grace window and theft detection | | `02a9cbd9c` | CIMD: resolve unknown clients from their document | | `0c0806dbd` | RFC 8707 audience binding for grants and tokens; a resource with a query or fragment is refused | | `38421b1de` | MCP `tools/call` without credentials answers 401, so clients start login | | `74015b990` | consent screen warns about an unverified client | | `a907662bf` | docs for the four above | | `092fdd437` | the Tolgee CLI is registered on every instance running the auth server | | `2695da85a` | consent screen says when the code goes to a local application | | `ea529d111` | the token response carries `project_id` when the consent bound the grant to one project | | `73016739f` | query-string credentials are read the way the filter that consumes them does | | `bb451eb2d` | a publisher retiring a client is noticed, recorded and bounded | | `9839153fe` | docs: what the security review changed and what it left standing | | `d0c79e029` | consent screen: "All permissions" per complete resource, a "Global" group first, "Deselect all" instead of "Done", one banner for an unverified local app | | `931d328c9` | refactor: the CIMD client lifecycle moves into its own service; the fetch lane is a type | | `7354f2621` | refactor: host resolution splits out of the CIMD document fetcher | The two `fix:` commits in the middle and the docs commit after them come from an adversarial security review run over the whole branch. `9839153fe` records what it found, what was changed, and which findings were deliberately not acted on, with the reason. The two `refactor:` commits after it are the structural moves that review asked for; they change no behaviour. Everything after `7354f2621` answers this PR's review. The larger ones: the document check moved from a scheduled job to the refresh path; the withdrawal mark moved to the client's row; the browser extension got an on/off flag with the published redirect URIs built in; the audience became an enum column; negative answers are no longer cached; the MCP challenge stays silent when authentication is off; CIMD client ids are checked against draft section 3. The rest are renames and splits the review asked for. ## Notes for the reviewer - **`tolgee.oauth2.cimd-enabled` exists and is true.** The docs on `main` say OAuth has no switch on purpose. CIMD keeps one anyway, because it is the part that makes outbound requests to addresses an attacker picks, and an operator may want it off. - **No scope narrowing on account-level endpoints.** An OAuth token is gated there the way a Personal Access Token is. Narrowing it was tried during the review and backed out; the reason is under "Account-level endpoints" in `docs/oauth/README.md`. - **Where the branch differs from the pitch.** #3907 gained a section 7 listing each deviation with its reason and the README section that explains it: the CLI registered by default, the extension flag, the challenge filter as an allowlist, the document re-read on the refresh path with its withdrawal, 7-day and 25-clients bounds, no negative cache, the `cimd-enabled` flag, the dropped audience default, the grace window covering every rotated-away token, no `logo_uri`, and `--no-browser` in the CLI. - **`logo_uri` is not read at all.** A client's document cannot put a picture on the consent screen. The two ways to bring logos back safely are written down in the docs. - **Migrations.** Six changesets, all on OAuth tables: three columns on `oauth2_grant` (`audience`, `client_metadata_hash`, `refresh_token_rotated_at`), the `oauth2_superseded_refresh_token` table with an index, an index on `oauth2_grant.client_id`, and the `oauth2_client_document_check` table (`checked_at`, `previous_checked_at`, `failing_since`, `withdrawn_at`). The `audience` default is dropped after the backfill on purpose; the schema thread has the reason. - **Translation keys.** The consent screen adds five keys against `main`: `oauth2_consent_deselect_all`, `oauth2_consent_local_app_notice`, `oauth2_consent_scope_all`, `oauth2_consent_scope_group_global` and `oauth2_consent_unverified_warning`. It drops `oauth2_consent_modify_done`, which still exists in the Tolgee project from an earlier round and can be removed there. Keys that are not yet in the project fall back to their default values. ## Known limitations - There is no per-grant revoke screen for the user yet. Revoking is possible through the API. - Refresh tokens use a history table rather than generation numbers. The trade-off is in the docs. ## Status Draft. The CLI side is tolgee/tolgee-cli#210, which needs this branch for the project binding and the CLI client registration. <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * OAuth clients can register through hosted metadata documents. Consent screens identify unverified apps, show their origin, and clarify when authorization returns to a local app. * Consent screens make it easier to review permissions, including deselecting optional scopes while retaining required ones. * OAuth authorization supports resource-specific tokens and includes the selected project ID in token responses. * MCP requests receive an authentication challenge when credentials are missing; initialization, tool listing, ping, and notifications remain available without authentication. * **Security** * OAuth tokens are restricted to their intended API or MCP audience. * Refresh-token replay handling distinguishes recent retries from older reuse, and outbound requests no longer follow redirects. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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# [3.230.0](v3.229.0...v3.230.0) (2026-10-09) ### Features * OAuth 2.1 for MCP clients — audience binding, client ID metadata documents and SSRF hardening ([#3944](#3944)) ([bd3d71e](bd3d71e)), closes [#3907](#3907) [tolgee/tolgee-cli#210](tolgee/tolgee-cli#210)
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# [2.21.0](v2.20.0...v2.21.0) (2026-10-11) ### Features * sign in through the browser with a bare 'tolgee login' ([#210](#210)) ([2d82b96](2d82b96))
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🎉 This PR is included in version 2.21.0 🎉 The release is available on: Your semantic-release bot 📦🚀 |
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…n and MCP clients (#1151) ## What this does Tolgee can now sign apps in with the user's account instead of a copied API key. The platform acts as an OAuth 2.1 authorization server, the Tolgee CLI, the Tolgee Tools browser extension and MCP clients use it. The docs said nothing about this yet. This PR adds the missing pages and updates the ones that only knew API keys. Platform docs are written for users, the CLI and JS SDK docs for developers. Simple English throughout. ## New pages - **Platform › Account Settings › Sign in with Tolgee (OAuth)**: which apps use it, what the consent screen asks (unverified app warning, local app notice, single project vs all projects, permissions), how long access lasts, how to end it, a comparison with API keys, common questions. - **Platform › Self-hosting › Sign-in for apps (OAuth)**: what is on by default after an upgrade, why `back-end-url` matters on a split-origin setup, how to register the browser extension, the switches `cli-enabled`, `cimd-enabled` and `cimd-allowed-hosts`, token lifetimes, the two metrics to watch. ## Updated pages - **MCP server** (about, setup, usage): signing in with a Tolgee account is now the first option, with Claude Code and VS Code steps. API keys stay as the second option. Notes on the tools that still need a PAT, and new troubleshooting rows with the real error codes. - **API keys and PAT tokens**: a tip pointing at the new sign-in page. - **CLI › Usage**: the "Logging in" section is rewritten around a bare `tolgee login`: `--no-browser`, CI behaviour, the project taken from the approval, `login --list`, the three `logout` forms, the credential priority order, where the store lives. **Introduction** and **Project configuration** got short notes. - **JS SDK › In-context translating**, **options**, **plugins**: the extension sign-in path, what a site must provide (`projectId`, `@tolgee/web` 7.2.0), how requests are relayed through the extension, the API key fallback. ## Depends on - tolgee/tolgee-platform#3944 (MCP client sign-in, CLI client registration, unverified-app consent screen). - tolgee/tolgee-cli#210 (`tolgee login` through the browser). - `@tolgee/web` 7.2.0 and Tolgee Tools 1.10.0 are already released. ## Screenshots Four new images under `static/img/docs/platform/oauth/`: the consent screen for the CLI, and the Tolgee Tools popup before and after signing in together with the consent screen it opens. They were taken against a local instance, so they show `localhost` and a demo project. ## Not in this PR - The configuration reference section. It is generated from a running server at release time and will pick up the new properties then. - A sentence about refusing sibling hosts of the instance domain. That change is not on the platform PR yet. ## Checks `npm run build` (with broken links set to throw), `npm run eslint` and `npm run prettier-check` pass locally.
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What this does
A bare
tolgee loginnow signs the user in through the browser instead of asking for an API key.The CLI runs the OAuth 2.1 authorization code flow with PKCE against the Tolgee instance: it opens the consent page, listens on a loopback port for the redirect, exchanges the code, and stores the token pair as a session in
authentication.json. Every later command sends the access token as a bearer credential, refreshes it before it expires, and replays a request once after a 401.tolgee logoutends the grant on the server before it clears the machine.tolgee login <API Key>behaves exactly as before.Server side
This needs the authorization server from tolgee/tolgee-platform#3944, which registers the
tolgee-cliclient, reports the project a single-project approval is bound to, and enforces PKCE. Against an older instance,tolgee loginsays that the instance does not offer browser login and points at API keys.Behaviour to review
--project-id. A command naming another project is refused with a message that says which project the login covers.pull --watch. The websocket is reconnected with a fresh token; a refused credential is renewed at most once per five minutes against the server, and the watch ends with a clear message when the grant is dead.--extra-headerand.tolgeercheaders go to the authorization endpoints as well. A customAuthorizationheader replaces the session and the CLI says so.Known limits
TOLGEE_API_KEYorapiKeyin.tolgeercstill wins over a stored session;tolgee loginwarns when that is the case.Testing
npm run test:unit(853 tests).npm run tolgee:start && npm run test:e2e(175 tests). The suite covers the browser login end to end, including refresh, logout, the project binding, the credential choice and a run without--api-url. Four tests need theproject_idthe token response gains with #3944; against the publishedtolgee/tolgee:latestthey skip themselves, and they run once that image has it.Summary by CodeRabbit