Create and verify ASiC-S and ASiC-E (Associated Signature Containers) with RFC 3161 timestamps in .NET.
Prove that data existed at a specific point in time using trusted Timestamp Authorities (TSA) like DigiCert — without needing your own signing certificate.
ASiC containers are ZIP files (per ETSI EN 319 162) that bundle your files with cryptographic timestamps:
- ASiC-S (Simple) — A single file with a timestamp token
- ASiC-E (Extended) — Multiple files with an ASiCManifest XML listing each file's digest, timestamped together
This proves that this exact data existed at this exact time, signed by a trusted third party. The format is recognized by the EU eIDAS regulation for legal validity.
dotnet add package AsicSharpdotnet tool install -g AsicSharp.Cliusing AsicSharp.Configuration;
using AsicSharp.Services;
// Standalone (no DI)
using var httpClient = new HttpClient();
var options = new AsicTimestampOptions
{
TimestampAuthorityUrl = WellKnownTsa.DigiCert
};
var tsaClient = new TsaClient(httpClient, options);
var asicService = new AsicService(tsaClient, options);
// Create a timestamped container (single file → ASiC-S)
var data = File.ReadAllBytes("contract.pdf");
var result = await asicService.CreateAsync(data, "contract.pdf");
File.WriteAllBytes("contract.pdf.asics", result.ContainerBytes);
Console.WriteLine($"Timestamped at: {result.Timestamp:O}");
// Create an ASiC-E container (multiple files)
var files = new List<(string FileName, byte[] Data)>
{
("contract.pdf", File.ReadAllBytes("contract.pdf")),
("annex.pdf", File.ReadAllBytes("annex.pdf"))
};
var extended = await asicService.CreateExtendedAsync(files);
File.WriteAllBytes("bundle.asice", extended.ContainerBytes);
// Verify any container (auto-detects ASiC-S or ASiC-E)
var verification = asicService.VerifyFile("contract.pdf.asics");
Console.WriteLine($"Valid: {verification.IsValid}");
Console.WriteLine($"Timestamp: {verification.Timestamp:O}");
Console.WriteLine($"TSA: {verification.TsaCertificate?.Subject}");
// Renew timestamp for long-term archival (adds archive timestamp per ETSI EN 319 162-1 §5.4)
var renewed = await asicService.RenewFileAsync("contract.pdf.asics");
File.WriteAllBytes("contract.pdf.asics", renewed.ContainerBytes);
Console.WriteLine($"Renewed at: {renewed.Timestamp:O}");The byte[] API above holds the payload and the finished container in memory at once. For large
files, three members avoid that entirely — the payload is hashed in chunks and copied straight
into the container:
// Create without materialising the payload or the container
await using (var input = File.OpenRead("huge-archive.zip"))
await using (var output = File.Create("huge-archive.zip.asics"))
{
var result = await asicService.CreateToStreamAsync(input, "huge-archive.zip", output);
Console.WriteLine($"Wrote {result.BytesWritten:N0} bytes, stamped {result.Timestamp:O}");
}
// Verify in place, without copying the container into a byte[]
await using (var container = File.OpenRead("huge-archive.zip.asics"))
{
var verification = asicService.Verify(container);
Console.WriteLine($"Valid: {verification.IsValid}");
}
// Extract straight back out to a stream
await using (var container = File.OpenRead("huge-archive.zip.asics"))
await using (var restored = File.Create("restored.zip"))
{
var fileName = await asicService.ExtractToStreamAsync(container, restored);
Console.WriteLine($"Extracted {fileName}");
}Streaming a 64 MB payload allocates roughly 300 KB, against 128 MB+ for the byte[] path.
Three things to know:
- All three require a seekable stream.
CreateToStreamAsyncreads the payload twice, because the TSA must see its hash before the first byte can be written; on the read side,ZipArchivedoes not reject a forward-only stream — it silently buffers the whole thing, which would defeat the purpose. A non-seekable stream throwsArgumentException; thebyte[]overloads are the fallback. CreateToStreamAsynccannot add a CAdES signature and throwsNotSupportedExceptionifSigningCertificateis set, since signing needs the whole payload in memory.CreateAsync(Stream, …)is not one of these. It buffers the stream into abyte[]internally; it saves you the read, not the memory. ASiC-E creation and renewal arebyte[]-only.
// In Startup / Program.cs
builder.Services.AddAsicSharp(options =>
{
options.TimestampAuthorityUrl = WellKnownTsa.DigiCert;
options.HashAlgorithm = HashAlgorithmName.SHA256;
});
// Or bind from configuration
builder.Services.AddAsicSharp(
builder.Configuration.GetSection("AsicTimestamp"));// appsettings.json
{
"AsicTimestamp": {
"TimestampAuthorityUrl": "http://timestamp.digicert.com",
"HashAlgorithm": "SHA256",
"RequestSignerCertificates": true,
"UseNonce": true,
"Timeout": "00:00:30",
"MaxFileSize": 10485760
}
}A single TSA is a single point of failure. Set TimestampAuthorityUrls and each URL is tried in
order until one answers; the request only fails once every one of them has. The URL that actually
answered comes back on AsicCreateResult.TimestampAuthorityUrl, which may not be the first you
listed.
{
"AsicTimestamp": {
"TimestampAuthorityUrls": [
"http://timestamp.digicert.com",
"http://timestamp.sectigo.com",
"https://freetsa.org/tsr"
],
"HashAlgorithm": "SHA256"
}
}When TimestampAuthorityUrls is non-empty, the singular TimestampAuthorityUrl is ignored.
| Option | Default | What it does |
|---|---|---|
TimestampAuthorityUrl |
DigiCert | The TSA to use. Ignored when TimestampAuthorityUrls is set. |
TimestampAuthorityUrls |
(empty) | TSAs to try in order, falling through on failure. |
HashAlgorithm |
SHA256 |
Hash for timestamping. SHA384 and SHA512 also supported. |
RequestSignerCertificates |
true |
Ask the TSA to embed its certificate chain in the token. Keep it on — without it, a token cannot be verified offline. |
UseNonce |
true |
Send a random nonce and validate it in the response, so a captured token cannot be replayed as an answer to a new request. |
Timeout |
30 s | HTTP timeout per TSA request. |
MaxFileSize |
10 MB | Reject any single data file larger than this, on creation and per ZIP entry on read. null disables the limit. |
SigningCertificate |
null |
When set, a detached CAdES signature (META-INF/signature.p7s) is added, asserting who vouches for the data as well as when it existed. |
// In your service
public class MyService
{
private readonly IAsicService _asicService;
public MyService(IAsicService asicService)
{
_asicService = asicService;
}
public async Task TimestampDocument(byte[] data, string fileName)
{
var result = await _asicService.CreateAsync(data, fileName);
// result.ContainerBytes, result.Timestamp, result.DataHash
}
}# Timestamp a single file (ASiC-S)
asicts stamp contract.pdf
asicts stamp contract.pdf --tsa http://timestamp.digicert.com --algorithm SHA256
# Timestamp multiple files (ASiC-E)
asicts stamp contract.pdf annex.pdf terms.txt
# Verify a container (auto-detects ASiC-S or ASiC-E)
asicts verify contract.pdf.asics
asicts verify bundle.asice --verbose
# Renew timestamp for long-term archival
asicts renew contract.pdf.asics
asicts renew bundle.asice --tsa http://timestamp.sectigo.com
# Extract files from any container
asicts extract contract.pdf.asics --output ./extracted/
asicts extract bundle.asice --output ./extracted/
# List known TSA servers
asicts info| Target | Status |
|---|---|
| .NET 10.0 | ✅ |
| .NET 8.0 | ✅ |
| .NET Standard 2.1 | ✅ (.NET Core 3.0+) |
| TSA | URL | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| DigiCert | http://timestamp.digicert.com |
Default, widely trusted |
| Sectigo | http://timestamp.sectigo.com |
Formerly Comodo |
| GlobalSign | http://timestamp.globalsign.com/tsa/r6advanced1 |
|
| FreeTSA | https://freetsa.org/tsr |
Free & open |
| Apple | http://timestamp.apple.com/ts01 |
|
| Entrust | http://timestamp.entrust.net/TSS/RFC3161sha2TS |
document.pdf.asics (ZIP)
├── mimetype → "application/vnd.etsi.asic-s+zip"
├── document.pdf → Your original file (unchanged)
└── META-INF/
├── timestamp.tst → RFC 3161 timestamp token (covers the data file)
├── timestamp-002.tst → (After renewal) Archive timestamp covering timestamp.tst
└── signature.p7s → (Optional) CMS/CAdES signature
bundle.asice (ZIP)
├── mimetype → "application/vnd.etsi.asic-e+zip"
├── contract.pdf → Data file 1
├── annex.pdf → Data file 2
└── META-INF/
├── ASiCManifest.xml → Lists all files with their digests
├── timestamp.tst → RFC 3161 timestamp token (covers the manifest)
├── timestamp-002.tst → (After renewal) Archive timestamp covering timestamp.tst
└── signature.p7s → (Optional) CMS/CAdES signature
The timestamp in ASiC-E covers the ASiCManifest XML, which in turn contains cryptographic digests of every data file — so all files are transitively timestamped.
Because the proof runs through the manifest, AsicCreateResult.DataHash is the manifest's hash on
this profile, not any file's. Use FileNames and FileHashes when you mean a specific file — these
are the very digests written into the manifest, and both are populated for ASiC-S too, so you never
have to branch on the profile:
var result = await asicService.CreateExtendedAsync(files);
foreach (var name in result.FileNames!)
Console.WriteLine($"{name} {result.FileHashes![name]}");
Console.WriteLine($"Manifest hash (what the token covers): {result.DataHash}");Both are null on a result from RenewAsync, which adds a timestamp token and touches no data file.
Timestamp tokens have a validity period tied to the TSA certificate's lifetime (typically 5-10 years). For long-term archival, renew the timestamp before the original TSA certificate expires. Per ETSI EN 319 162-1 §5.4, each archive timestamp covers the previous token's bytes, creating a chain:
timestamp.tst → Covers data (or manifest)
timestamp-002.tst → Covers timestamp.tst bytes
timestamp-003.tst → Covers timestamp-002.tst bytes
Verification walks the full chain, ensuring each link is valid. The original timestamp proves when the data existed; renewal timestamps extend the proof indefinitely.
If you need to prove who timestamped the data (not just when), provide a signing certificate:
services.AddAsicSharp(options =>
{
options.SigningCertificate = new X509Certificate2("cert.pfx", "password");
});This adds a CMS/CAdES detached signature (META-INF/signature.p7s) alongside the timestamp.
IsValid is the conjunction of every step. One failing VerificationStep makes the whole
container invalid, and Error is then the "; "-joined Detail of each failing step (null when
valid). Error is a diagnostic message, not a stable code — don't parse it. Step names, by
contrast, are contract: tests assert them and asicts verify -v prints them verbatim.
Valid means unaltered, not trusted. No X509Chain is built for the TSA certificate, so a
self-issued TSA still yields IsValid == true. The certificate is handed to you on
TsaCertificate precisely so that the trust decision stays yours.
The Verify method returns detailed step-by-step results:
var result = asicService.Verify(containerBytes);
foreach (var step in result.Steps)
{
Console.WriteLine($"{(step.Passed ? "✓" : "✗")} {step.Name}: {step.Detail}");
}
// ✓ Container structure: Valid ZIP archive
// ✓ MIME type: application/vnd.etsi.asic-s+zip
// ✓ Data file: contract.pdf (125432 bytes)
// ✓ Timestamp token decode: Token decoded, timestamp: 2026-02-28T14:30:00Z
// ✓ Timestamp signature: Valid, signed by: CN=DigiCert Timestamp 2024, O=DigiCert
// ✓ Data hash match: Hash in timestamp matches data file
// The data itself, without a second Extract() call — ASiC-S only, null for ASiC-E
if (result.DataBytes is not null)
File.WriteAllBytes("recovered.pdf", result.DataBytes);An ASiC-E timestamp covers the ASiCManifest, and the manifest lists one hash per data file. A ZIP entry the manifest never references is therefore covered by no proof of existence at all — yet the referenced files' proofs are untouched, so the container still verifies.
Those entries are reported rather than ignored:
var result = asicService.VerifyFile("bundle.asice");
// IsValid says "nothing listed in the manifest was altered"
Console.WriteLine($"Valid: {result.IsValid}");
// ... which is not the same as "every file here was timestamped"
if (result.UnreferencedFileNames is { Count: > 0 } uncovered)
Console.WriteLine($"Not covered by the timestamp: {string.Join(", ", uncovered)}");UnreferencedFileNames is empty when every entry is referenced and null for ASiC-S, which has no
manifest. It deliberately does not affect IsValid, since third-party containers may
legitimately carry extra entries — if your policy is that every byte must be covered, enforce it on
this list. ExtractAll already refuses to hand back uncovered entries, so a verify-then-extract
caller cannot surface unstamped bytes as though they were timestamped.
Everything this library throws derives from AsicTimestampException, so one catch covers all of
it:
AsicTimestampException
├── TimestampAuthorityException — every configured TSA URL failed
├── InvalidAsicContainerException — the container is unreadable or structurally wrong
└── AsicVerificationException — a verification operation could not be completed
try
{
var result = await asicService.CreateFromFileAsync("contract.pdf");
}
catch (TimestampAuthorityException ex)
{
// No TSA answered — retry later, or add fallbacks via TimestampAuthorityUrls
Console.Error.WriteLine($"No timestamp authority available: {ex.Message}");
}
catch (AsicTimestampException ex)
{
Console.Error.WriteLine($"Timestamping failed: {ex.Message}");
}Note what does not throw:
VerifyandVerifyFilereport, they do not throw. A corrupt ZIP, a missing entry, an undecodable token — all come back asIsValid == falsewith a failed step. The only exceptions areArgumentExceptionfor empty input andFileNotFoundExceptionfor a missing file.GetContainerTypenever throws. Anything unrecognized isAsicContainerType.None.- Bad arguments still throw
ArgumentExceptionfrom the create, extract and renew paths — an empty payload, a file name containing a path separator, or data overMaxFileSize.
- ETSI EN 319 162-1 — Associated Signature Containers (ASiC) baseline (ASiC-S)
- ETSI EN 319 162-2 — Associated Signature Containers extended (ASiC-E)
- ETSI TS 102 918 — ASiCManifest XML schema
- RFC 3161 — Internet X.509 PKI Time-Stamp Protocol
- RFC 5652 — Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
- EU eIDAS Regulation — Electronic identification and trust services
MIT — see LICENSE