Skip to content

πŸ›‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix framework secrets leakage via execa - #419

Open
google-labs-jules[bot] wants to merge 3 commits into
mainfrom
sentinel-fix-execa-extendenv-10851826948655853487
Open

πŸ›‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix framework secrets leakage via execa#419
google-labs-jules[bot] wants to merge 3 commits into
mainfrom
sentinel-fix-execa-extendenv-10851826948655853487

Conversation

@google-labs-jules

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
πŸ’‘ Vulnerability: Environment variable redaction via sanitizeEnvironment is bypassed when calling execa because it defaults to extendEnv: true, effectively re-injecting sensitive secrets from process.env.
🎯 Impact: Framework secrets such as SALMONLOOP_API_KEY may be leaked to subprocesses running untrusted commands.
πŸ”§ Fix: Ensure env is explicitly sanitized using sanitizeEnvironment (merging with process.env to retain PATH) and extendEnv: false is passed to all execa invocations to disable auto-merging of the unsanitized environment.
βœ… Verification: Ran formatting and full test suite successfully.


PR created automatically by Jules for task 10851826948655853487 started by @YoungSx

Environment variable redaction via `sanitizeEnvironment` is bypassed when calling `execa` without `extendEnv: false`, because it defaults to `true` and re-injects sensitive secrets from `process.env`.
This commit fixes `src/core/tools/capability/runner.ts` and `src/cli/authorization/non-interactive.ts` to properly pass `extendEnv: false` while merging custom `env` with `process.env` so that `PATH` is not stripped.
@google-labs-jules

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor Author

πŸ‘‹ Jules, reporting for duty! I'm here to lend a hand with this pull request.

When you start a review, I'll add a πŸ‘€ emoji to each comment to let you know I've read it. I'll focus on feedback directed at me and will do my best to stay out of conversations between you and other bots or reviewers to keep the noise down.

I'll push a commit with your requested changes shortly after. Please note there might be a delay between these steps, but rest assured I'm on the job!

For more direct control, you can switch me to Reactive Mode. When this mode is on, I will only act on comments where you specifically mention me with @jules. You can find this option in the Pull Request section of your global Jules UI settings. You can always switch back!

New to Jules? Learn more at jules.google/docs.


For security, I will only act on instructions from the user who triggered this task.

Environment variable redaction via `sanitizeEnvironment` is bypassed when calling `execa` without `extendEnv: false`, because it defaults to `true` and re-injects sensitive secrets from `process.env`.
This commit fixes `src/core/tools/capability/runner.ts` and `src/cli/authorization/non-interactive.ts` to properly pass `extendEnv: false` while merging custom `env` with `process.env` so that `PATH` is not stripped.

This also includes the linting fixes applied automatically by eslint/oxfmt.
Environment variable redaction via `sanitizeEnvironment` is bypassed when calling `execa` without `extendEnv: false`, because it defaults to `true` and re-injects sensitive secrets from `process.env`.
This commit fixes `src/core/tools/capability/runner.ts` and `src/cli/authorization/non-interactive.ts` to properly pass `extendEnv: false` while merging custom `env` with `process.env` so that `PATH` is not stripped.

This also includes the linting fixes applied automatically by eslint/oxfmt, and respects architectural boundaries by importing `sanitizeEnvironment` through the facade in CLI code.
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Labels

None yet

Projects

None yet

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

0 participants