Early and moving fast. The registry, CLI and score engine work and are tested. The registry and website run on Cloudflare; see docs/DEPLOY.md.
A package registry that stock bun, npm and pnpm talk to unmodified, plus apm, a thin CLI that checks before your package manager installs, runs or publishes. apm never manages the runtime.
| npm pain | apm |
|---|---|
| A hacked version can't be pulled (72h unpublish, dependents rule) | yank (hidden from new installs, lockfiles keep working) and revoke (410 + critical advisory in bun audit / npm audit), any time, with a fresh 2FA or passkey check. A version under 72 hours old is revoked at once, even when other packages depend on it (they are what it would attack); an older one is yanked now and fully revoked after 24h, or sooner if a second owner confirms |
| Account compromised: rotate tokens, hunt versions by hand | apm incident --since <time> revokes every token and every version published since then (preview with --dry-run, 30-day cap) |
| No trustworthy safety signal | Per-version score of what is suspicious: install-time network and processes, credential files read, the environment sent out, request bins, remote shells, obfuscation, new publisher, risky new dependencies, typosquat names. What a package can do (network, environment, files, processes, eval) is listed as capabilities, not scored, and a package can declare them in package.json. Every point has file:line evidence. Popularity is not an input. What it reads and cannot catch: docs/SCORE.md |
| Publishing is a chore and leaks secrets | apm publish packs with your PM, lists files, blocks secrets and missing main/types/bin, previews the score, --bump patch. The registry repeats the checks server-side |
| Manifest confusion | Metadata is served from the tarball's package.json; a publish whose request hides install scripts is refused |
| Typosquats, no name check | Domain-search-style name check; new names one edit from popular packages are refused |
| No cooldown by default | apm add warns about a version under 24h old, in the package or its tree (--strict refuses it); https://<registry>/~safe/ leaves such versions out for any client |
| A score that blocks, or one that is ignored | A score informs, it does not block: apm add, apm x, the registry's resolve and scan answers and the Bun scanner warn about a score under 40, an incomplete analysis, a version apm cannot score or has not scored yet, and a dependency the registry could not look up, with the score, the top reasons (file and line) and a link, then install. --strict (or APM_STRICT=1, APM_SCANNER_STRICT=1, the ~safe/ view) refuses them instead. Revoked and yanked versions, and ones an apm reviewer confirmed malicious, are refused in every mode |
| Coverage | Proxies the public registry: every npm package gets scored on demand; names that exist upstream can't be published here |
packages/registry: the registry, a Cloudflare Worker (npm wire protocol, apm API, upstream proxy) written as Effect services over Postgres (Neon via Hyperdrive), R2 and a queuepackages/infra: the Alchemy stack that deploys the registry and the website, plus the deploy and smoke scriptspackages/core: score engine, secret scanner, typo distance, tarball readerpackages/cli:apm, released as standalone binaries bypackages/infra/release-cli.tspackages/bun-scanner: optional Bun security scanner (in-repo only, not published to a registry yet) that makes stockbun installrefuse revoked and confirmed-malicious versions and warn about low-scoring ones (APM_SCANNER_STRICT=1refuses those too)apps/web: Next.js + shadcn UI (search with name check, package pages), deployed as a Worker through OpenNextapps/docs: the documentation site at https://docs.apmjs.dev, built with Blume and served as static assets (cd apps/docs && bun run dev)tests/acceptance: over 180 tests that drive real bun, npm and pnpm against the registry's Worker build in Miniflare, on Postgres 18
How it fits together: docs/ARCHITECTURE.md.
An agent needs no MCP server and no account. Before adding a package it fetches GET https://apmjs.dev/api/explain?package=<name> and follows the verdict; one line in AGENTS.md or CLAUDE.md sets that up. The same answers: /package/<name>.md, /openapi.json, /llms.txt and apm explain <pkg> --json. To publish, sign in at https://apmjs.dev/publish and paste its prompt into your agent: it runs the apm CLI, and you approve each version with your passkey. An optional read-only MCP server is at https://apmjs.dev/mcp. Details: docs/AGENTS.md.
curl -fsSL https://apmjs.dev/install | shOne prebuilt binary for macOS or Linux; it needs no git or Bun. The script checks the binary's SHA-256 against the checksum written into it at release and installs nothing if they differ, then installs to ~/.apm/bin/apm and prints the PATH line to add. To read it first: curl -fsSL https://apmjs.dev/install -o install.sh, then sh install.sh. How it is built and released: bun packages/infra/release-cli.ts (docs/DEPLOY.md).
The registry needs Postgres installed locally (initdb on PATH or under /usr/lib/postgresql), or a server in APM_TEST_DATABASE_URL.
bun install
bun run registry # the Worker in Miniflare on :4873; APM_UPSTREAM=off disables the npm proxy
APM_LEGACY_AUTH=1 APM_NAME_POLICY=open bun run registry # what tools/seed-demo.ts needs
APM_REGISTRY=http://127.0.0.1:4873/ bun tools/seed-demo.ts # optional demo data
cd apps/web && APM_REGISTRY=http://127.0.0.1:4873/ bun run dev
bun packages/cli/src/main.ts help
bun scripts/score.ts # acceptance suite; prints failing count
bun run typecheck && bun run lintResearch, plan and council reviews: research/.
- A malicious or unsafe package: open a package report.
- A vulnerability in apm itself: report it privately, as described in SECURITY.md.
MIT. See LICENSE. Contributions: CONTRIBUTING.md.