feat(client): add explicit insecure HTTP opt-in across integrations

[frf12]

Which issue or RFC does this PR close?

Closes #1534.

Rationale for this change

A remote PowerContext Server can be reachable from an Agent machine while PowerContext-owned hooks and clients reject its non-loopback HTTP URL. Users currently discover this late, and environment-only workarounds are not durable across sessions. The default should remain secure, with an explicit, visible opt-in for controlled plaintext deployments.

What changes are included in this PR?

• Add endpoint-bound client transport consent, strict boolean parsing, common/host environment configuration and non-secret per-host persistence.
• Add --server-url and --allow-insecure-http/--no-allow-insecure-http to all eight setup targets and setup select; resolve the effective URL before installation, prompt with default No only in a TTY, and never prompt in JSON/noninteractive mode.
• Save endpoint and consent in ~/.config/powercontext/clients.json (or POWERCONTEXT_CLIENT_CONFIG_FILE), preserving unrelated hosts and rolling back paired native writes on failure.
• Keep installed native MCP and hook endpoints aligned for Codex, Claude Code and WorkBuddy; synchronize Hermes/OpenClaw native settings.
• Apply the policy to standalone Python hooks, DSH/Pi/OpenCode/OpenClaw clients, the Python Client, LangChain, LangGraph, Pydantic AI and Bub. Rebuild shipped DSH/OpenCode bundles.
• Prevent saved/native permission for endpoint A from authorizing endpoint B after an environment/settings override. Explicit false remains authoritative.
• Add read-only native transport diagnostics. Explicitly insecure HTTP is degraded; unsupported or ambiguous native configuration is not reported as safe.
• Document the transport boundary for MiniMax and generic Agent Plugin, whose native MCP transport belongs to the host; add bilingual remote-installation guidance and refresh integration pages.

Are there any user-facing changes?

Yes. HTTPS and IPv4/IPv6 loopback HTTP remain available by default; non-loopback HTTP needs explicit consent. This intentionally tightens DSH/OpenClaw paths that previously accepted remote plaintext HTTP without consent.

Example:

powercontext setup claude-code --server-url http://192.0.2.10:8000 --allow-insecure-http --json

The flag does not disable TLS certificate verification, configure credentials, change Server binding/authentication, or override host-owned MCP policy. doctor returns a nonzero status for degraded plaintext transport even when the endpoint is reachable.

Codex uses its installed .mcp.json as the common hook/MCP endpoint; rerun setup after an update replaces it. DSH's standard empty patch is supported, but custom runtime overlays require manual alignment/removal before setup: the installer fails before mutation rather than silently saving an endpoint that the native override would ignore. Unsupported JSON5/includes and ambiguous cached endpoints are reported as unknown.

How was this change tested?

• Full Python/doctest run: python -m pytest --doctest-modules, deselecting the four baseline failures listed below: 2,205 passed, 64 skipped, 4 deselected; three packaging cases failed during dependency download (pypi.org TLS EOF for hatchling/hatch-vcs), not test assertions about the implementation. Re-ran all three package suites with UV_FROZEN=true UV_INDEX_URL=https://pypi.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/simple python -m pytest tests/langchain_middleware/test_packaging.py tests/langgraph_adapter/test_packaging.py tests/pydantic_ai_adapter/test_packaging.py -q: 3 passed.
• Targeted setup/native-policy suites: 180 passed; final native/setup profile and rollback regressions: 51 passed. Core/SDK tests and wheel checks passed; Bub evaluation-adapter tests: 13 passed.
• TypeScript package suites: DSH 220, Pi 77, OpenCode 52, OpenClaw 65; includes DSH live-server cases and Pi CLI loading. Rebuilt the shipped bundles and ran applicable package typechecks.
• prek run -a, ruff check, ruff format --check, ty check, ty check integrations/pydantic-ai/src, and git diff --check: passed.
• Website pnpm lint and pnpm build: passed; 785 public pages and internal links verified. Integration-manifest consistency checks passed.
• Separately reproduced all four deselected failures on a clean detached c33df8d baseline with baseline source imports verified: three Receiver systemd service tests hit the Linux-only guard on macOS; the installed OpenCode 1.2.15 rejects the test's deliberate invalid/model before its capture callback. These unrelated cases are unchanged.

Acceptance boundaries: validated on macOS with Python 3.12; no production deployment or blanket fresh-session acceptance across every real Agent/native MCP implementation is claimed. TLS verification regression tests are mocked rather than a live certificate-handshake test.

AI usage statement

OpenAI Codex assisted with implementation, tests, documentation, and parallel code review under human-provided requirements. Review findings led to additional endpoint-binding, environment-refusal, native-diagnostics and persistence-rollback regressions.