fix(connect): reject remote plaintext hubs - #411
Conversation
release: promote dev into main for v2.32.1
# Conflicts: # package.json
[WRONG BRANCH] merge dev into main for the v2.33.0 release
Promotes the dev integration line onto main. The resulting tree is byte-identical to origin/dev, including package.json at 2.34.0. The package.json conflict is resolved to dev's side, NOT to main's stale 2.33.0. Earlier promotions (lidge-jun#2553, lidge-jun#2507) kept the target's version so the release bump would land on its own "release: vX.Y.Z" commit. That is no longer legal: this very delta adds tests/release-version-line.test.ts, which fails when the in-tree version sits behind the highest release tag. With v2.34.0-preview.20260827 now published, 2.33.0 orders behind it, so a promotion carrying the stale line turns CI red on every shard that runs the suite. The consequence for the release step is that scripts/release.ts skips the bump (release.ts:568, currentVersion === version), so v2.34.0 gets tagged on this merge commit rather than on a separate release commit. The workflow creates the tag itself after publishing and validates expected-sha against the checked-out commit, so the tag still names exactly the audited tree.
[WRONG BRANCH] promote dev onto main for v2.34.0
[WRONG BRANCH] promote dev onto main for v2.35.0
[WRONG BRANCH] promote dev onto main for v2.36.0
[WRONG BRANCH] promote dev to main for the v2.37.0 release
[WRONG BRANCH] promote dev onto main for v2.38.0
[WRONG BRANCH] promote dev onto main for v2.39.0
release: promote dev to main for v2.40.0
…rkflow call (lidge-jun#3262) Both v2.40.0 release dispatches (33615174183 preview, 33615177849 main) died at startup_failure: a workflow_call cannot grant its callee more than the calling job holds, and dev-version-bump.yml's job declares contents+pull- requests write. lidge-jun#3129 wired the call but never dispatched a release, so this is its first live run. The caller job now declares exactly the callee's two permissions; no other job in release.yml gains anything. Co-authored-by: jun <jun@lidge.dev> (cherry picked from commit 7ce0ba5)
…400-relfix release: carry the release.yml permissions fix onto main for v2.40.0
Codex Review SummaryThis comment shows the latest Codex review activity on this pull request.
ℹ️ About Codex in GitHubYour team has set up Codex to review pull requests in this repo. Reviews are triggered when you
Codex reacts with 👀 while any review is running, comments if it has suggestions, and reacts with 👍 once all reviews finish with no findings. |
|
✅ Deterministic PR hygiene checks passed. |
|
Important
This repository does not receive automatic reviews because it has fewer than 10 stars. ⚙️ Run configurationConfiguration used: Path: .coderabbit.yaml Review profile: ASSERTIVE Plan: Team Run ID: Thanks for using CodeRabbit! It's free for OSS, and your support helps us grow. If you like it, consider giving us a shout-out. Comment |
github-actions
Bot
changed the title
✅ READY
Hygiene✅ Deterministic PR hygiene checks passed. |
![chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/in/1144995?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
There was a problem hiding this comment.
💡 Codex Review
Here are some automated review suggestions for this pull request.
Reviewed commit: 651ae4b5d0
ℹ️ About Codex in GitHub
Your team has set up Codex to review pull requests in this repo. Reviews are triggered when you
- Open a pull request for review
- Mark a draft as ready
- Comment "@codex review".
If Codex has suggestions, it will comment; otherwise it will react with 👍.
Codex can also answer questions or update the PR. Try commenting "@codex address that feedback".
| if (!isHubTransportPermitted(parsed.origin)) { | ||
| throw new HubClientError( | ||
| "insecure_http_refused", | ||
| "Hub URLs require loopback or HTTPS; plaintext remote HTTP is not permitted", | ||
| ); |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
This blanket rejection makes the documented remote-hub topology unusable: docs-site/src/content/docs/guides/remote-hub.md:71-99 binds and probes the data listener as http://100.64.0.10:10100, while its only HTTPS Serve mapping targets the management-only ingress (:104-125), which explicitly rejects /readyz and /v1/* in src/server/index.ts:840-844. Consequently the plaintext data URL now fails here before discovery, whereas the documented HTTPS URL cannot provide discovery or catalog/model traffic, so clients cannot connect or sync without an undocumented additional proxy. Preserve the security boundary by provisioning and documenting a separate authenticated HTTPS route to the data listener (including translated guides), then use that route in the connection instructions.
AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L343-L344
Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.
luvs01
changed the title
2 participants
Motivation
/readyzresponse from a non-loopbackhttp://hub could cause the client to adopt an attacker-controlled HTTPS management URL and send the operator's admin token to it.Description
isHubTransportPermittedand enforce it innormalizeHubOriginso non-loopback plaintexthttp:origins are rejected before any/readyzdiscovery or credential-bearing request.tests/client-connect.test.tsto allow loopback HTTP (localhost/127.0.0.1/::1) but assert rejection of remote plaintext discovery and that admin key issuance still demands HTTPS.fix(connect): reject remote plaintext hubs).Testing
node_modules/.bin/bun test tests/client-connect.test.ts, which passed.node_modules/.bin/bun run typecheck.node_modules/.bin/bun run privacy:scan.node_modules/.bin/bun run testwas executed for broader verification but the parallel full suite reported unrelated pre-existing transient failures and timeouts in other areas; focused coverage and the security regression are green.git diff --checkand commit completed successfully.Codex Task