feat(export): --verify re-reads a bundle and checks it against its own manifest (J2) - #9
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…own manifest (J2) The other half of the evidence story: J1 produces a signature, this checks one — and checks the member digests whether or not a signature exists. Exits non-zero on any problem, so it drops into CI. The digest half is pure stdlib, the same check docs/AUDIT.md documents by hand; only the optional signature check shells out to minisign, adding no dependency. Four member verdicts, not two: ok / mismatch / missing (listed but absent) / unlisted (present but in no manifest). A file ADDED to a bundle is exactly as suspicious as one altered, and a check over only the listed members would wave it through. `present-unverified` is a third signature state and deliberately NOT a failure. Without a public key the signature genuinely cannot be checked, and one shipped inside the bundle proves nothing about that bundle. A reviewer without the key must still be able to check digests; reporting "I cannot check this" the same way as "this is forged" would destroy the distinction that matters most. Verified end to end against a real signed bundle and minisign 0.12: clean + pubkey signature verified · OK, 4 member digests match exit 0 clean, no pubkey present-unverified · OK, with a note to pass --pubkey exit 0 tampered member signature STILL verified, MISMATCH audit.log exit 1 smuggled extra file UNLISTED extra-note.txt exit 1 missing / corrupt zip reported as an error, never a traceback exit 1 The tampered-member case is the one worth reading twice: the signature stays valid because the manifest was not touched, and the digest is what fails. It is the chain, not either half alone. The console surface is deliberately narrow — GET /api/audit-verify checks <out>/audit-bundle.zip only, a path derived from server state and never from the request. An endpoint taking a caller-supplied path would be an arbitrary-file reader, and localhost is not a reason to ship one; verifying a bundle that has left the machine is the CLI's job, because that is where the reviewer is. Pinned by a test asserting the endpoint takes no parameters. 20 new tests. 299 pass, coverage 73%. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Roadmap J2. J1 produces a signature; this checks one — and checks the member digests whether or
not a signature exists. Exits non-zero on any problem, so it drops into CI.
Verified end to end against minisign 0.12
--pubkeyMISMATCH audit.logUNLISTED extra-note.txtThe tampered-member row is worth reading twice. The signature stays valid because the manifest
was not touched — the digest is what fails. It is the chain that catches it, not either half
alone. That is also what makes the signature worth having: it is the reason to trust the digest.
Two design calls
Four member verdicts, not two —
ok/mismatch/missing(listed but absent) /unlisted(present but in no manifest). A file added to a bundle is exactly as suspicious as one altered,
and a check over only the listed members would wave it straight through.
present-unverifiedis a third signature state and not a failure. Without a public key thesignature genuinely cannot be checked, and one shipped inside the bundle proves nothing about that
bundle. A reviewer without the key must still be able to check digests — reporting "I cannot check
this" the same way as "this is forged" would destroy the distinction that matters most.
Console surface, deliberately narrow
GET /api/audit-verifychecks<out>/audit-bundle.ziponly — a path derived from server state,never from the request. An endpoint taking a caller-supplied path would be an arbitrary-file reader,
and localhost is not a reason to ship one. Verifying a bundle that has already left the machine is
the CLI's job, because that is where the reviewer is. Pinned by a test asserting the endpoint takes
no parameters.
Flagging it against the two-surfaces invariant: this is a narrowed twin, not a full one, and the
roadmap item now says why.
20 new tests · 299 pass · coverage 73% ·
ruffclean.🤖 Generated with Claude Code