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sec: harden portlet-only gated methods in RoleAjax#36345

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sec/role-ajax-portlet-gate-hardening
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sec: harden portlet-only gated methods in RoleAjax#36345
mbiuki wants to merge 5 commits into
mainfrom
sec/role-ajax-portlet-gate-hardening

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@mbiuki

@mbiuki mbiuki commented Jun 28, 2026

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Summary

Follow-on to #36344. Hardens four RoleAjax DWR methods that used only validateRolesPortletPermissions() as their authorization gate.

After reviewing the actual code, the scope is narrower than the issue assumed:

Method Before After
saveRolePermission Portlet check only — no admin gate + getAdminUser() added
saveRoleLayouts getAdminUser() present but after DB reads Moved before DB reads
updateLayout Already correctly ordered No change
deleteLayout Already correctly ordered No change

saveRolePermission was the only method genuinely missing the admin check. saveRoleLayouts had it in the right place logically (before writes) but after two DB reads — tightened to fire before any data access.

Changes

RoleAjax.java

  • saveRolePermission: add getAdminUser() immediately after portlet-access check
  • saveRoleLayouts: move existing getAdminUser() call from after DB reads to immediately after portlet-access check; remove now-unused User user = assignment

Test plan

  • Non-admin user with roles portlet access receives DotSecurityException on saveRolePermission via DWR
  • Non-admin user with roles portlet access receives DotSecurityException on saveRoleLayouts via DWR
  • CMS Administrator can save role layouts and role permissions normally via the admin UI
  • updateLayout and deleteLayout behavior unchanged

References

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

saveRolePermission had no admin check at all — only the portlet-access
gate. Added getAdminUser() to enforce the same admin requirement used by
addNewRole/updateRole/deleteRole/lockRole/unlockRole.

saveRoleLayouts already called getAdminUser() but after two DB reads.
Moved the call to immediately after the portlet check so the admin gate
fires before any data access, consistent with the pattern in updateLayout
and deleteLayout.

updateLayout and deleteLayout were already correctly ordered — no change.

Closes: dotCMS/private-issues#643

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@mbiuki mbiuki self-assigned this Jun 28, 2026
@github-actions github-actions Bot added the Area : Backend PR changes Java/Maven backend code label Jun 28, 2026
@mbiuki mbiuki added Team : Scout Team : Security Issues related to security and privacy and removed Area : Backend PR changes Java/Maven backend code labels Jun 28, 2026
@claude

claude Bot commented Jun 28, 2026

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Claude finished @mbiuki's task in 1m 50s —— View job


Rollback Safety Analysis

  • Reading rollback-unsafe categories reference
  • Getting full PR diff
  • Analyzing diff against unsafe categories
  • Posting results and applying label

Result: ✅ Safe To Rollback

The label AI: Safe To Rollback has been applied.

Analysis

The diff touches 5 files. Each was checked against all rollback-unsafe categories:

File Change Category Check Verdict
ToolGroupResource.java Adds .requiredRoles(Role.CMS_ADMINISTRATOR_ROLE) — tightens auth on _addtouser endpoint M-3 (REST contract): method still exists, same URL, same response shape — no contract breakage ✅ Safe
RoleAjax.java Adds getAdminUser() call after portlet-permission check in saveRoleLayouts and saveRolePermission Pure auth enforcement — no DB schema change, no data transformation, no ES mapping change ✅ Safe
MainSuite2b.java Adds two new test classes to the integration suite Test-only change ✅ Safe
ToolGroupResourceTest.java New integration test Test-only change ✅ Safe
RoleAjaxSecurityTest.java New integration test Test-only change ✅ Safe

Category-by-category verdict

Category Applicable?
C-1 Structural Data Model Change ❌ No DB schema touched
C-2 Elasticsearch Mapping Change ❌ No ES mapping code touched
C-3 Content JSON Model Version Bump ❌ No CURRENT_MODEL_VERSION or ImmutableContentlet change
C-4 DROP TABLE / DROP COLUMN ❌ No DDL statements
H-1 One-Way Data Migration ❌ No runonce task, no UPDATE … SET across rows
H-2 RENAME TABLE / RENAME COLUMN ❌ None
H-3 PK Restructuring ❌ None
H-4 New ContentType Field Type ❌ None
H-5 Binary Storage Provider Change ❌ None
H-6 DROP PROCEDURE / FUNCTION ❌ None
H-7 NOT NULL Column Without Default ❌ None
H-8 VTL Viewtool Contract Change ❌ No viewtool methods changed
M-1 Non-Broadening Column Type Change ❌ None
M-2 Push Publishing Bundle Format ❌ None
M-3 REST/GraphQL API Contract Change ❌ The _addtouser endpoint tightens access control but its URL, HTTP method, and response schema are unchanged. Rolling back to N-1 simply restores the previous (weaker) auth — no client breakage.
M-4 OSGi Plugin API Breakage ❌ No public interface or service registration changed

All changes are pure security hardening at the Java auth layer. No storage model, index mapping, data migration, or API contract is altered. Rolling back to N-1 restores the previous auth behavior with no data loss or structural incompatibility.

@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Jun 28, 2026

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🤖 dotBot Review (Bedrock)

Reviewed 5 file(s); 1 candidate(s) → 1 confirmed, 0 uncertain (unverified, kept for review).

Confirmed findings

  • 🟡 Medium dotcms-integration/src/test/java/com/dotcms/rest/api/v1/portlet/ToolGroupResourceTest.java:95 — Test verifies HTTP 200 but doesn't confirm layout was persisted
    The test asserts HTTP 200 status after POST but lacks validation that the layout was actually added to the admin role. No database or RoleAPI check exists to verify persistence, creating risk of false positives if endpoint returns success without persisting changes.

us.deepseek.r1-v1:0 · Run: #28394797390 · tokens: in: 18423 · out: 4822 · total: 23245 · calls: 8 · est. ~$0.051

@mbiuki mbiuki requested review from nollymar and wezell June 28, 2026 18:30
@mbiuki mbiuki moved this to Next Sprint in dotCMS - Product Planning Jun 28, 2026
@mbiuki

mbiuki commented Jun 28, 2026

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Versions Affected

Exploitable range: v21.02 → v26.06.22-03 (current latest)

Gap Introduced First vulnerable release
RoleAjax.saveRolePermission (portlet-only gate, no admin check) March 2012 v3.0
ToolGroupResource._addtouser (enabling step) December 2020 v21.02

No patched release has been cut yet — this PR is part of the fix.

…#642)

Any authenticated backend user could call PUT /api/v1/toolgroups/{id}/_addtouser
to self-assign arbitrary layouts, including the admin Settings layout containing
the roles/users portlets. Combined with the pre-existing DWR addUserToRole check
(getAdminUser()), this broke the full privilege-escalation + RCE chain.

Adds .requiredRoles(Role.CMS_ADMINISTRATOR_ROLE) to the _addtouser InitBuilder so
non-admin callers receive a 403/SecurityException before any layout operation runs.

Also adds regression tests:
- ToolGroupResourceTest: verifies 403 for non-admin, success for admin
- RoleAjaxSecurityTest: verifies addUserToRole blocks a non-admin who already holds
  roles-portlet access (post-step-1 state), confirming independent defense-in-depth

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@mbiuki

mbiuki commented Jun 29, 2026

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CI Re-run Results ✅

All checks passed on the re-run (run #28331839580).

The previous failures (QuartzUtils DB deadlock, StoryBlockMap NPE, E2E/Postman timeouts) were confirmed as pre-existing flaky infrastructure issues unrelated to this PR's changes.

This PR is clear to merge.

Suite Result
Integration Tests - MainSuite 1a ✅ pass
Integration Tests - MainSuite 1b ✅ pass
Integration Tests - MainSuite 2a/2b/3a ✅ pass
Integration Tests - Junit5 Suite 1 ✅ pass
Integration Tests - OpenSearch Upgrade ✅ pass
E2E Tests - Nx Playwright ✅ pass
Postman Tests - GraphQL ✅ pass
All other Postman/Karate/CLI/JVM suites ✅ pass

@mbiuki mbiuki closed this Jun 29, 2026
@github-project-automation github-project-automation Bot moved this from Next Sprint to Done in dotCMS - Product Planning Jun 29, 2026
@mbiuki mbiuki reopened this Jun 29, 2026
@wezell

wezell commented Jun 29, 2026

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@mbiuki @sfreudenthaler we should do a pass over all the DWR endpoints to make sure there are no other vulnerabilities. These all predate any of our security hardening efforts. Here is a list of these endpoints.

https://github.com/dotCMS/core/blob/main/dotCMS/src/main/webapp/WEB-INF/dwr.xml

@github-actions github-actions Bot added Area : Backend PR changes Java/Maven backend code and removed AI: Safe To Rollback labels Jun 29, 2026
@AfterClass
public static void cleanUp() throws Exception {
if (testLayout != null) {
APILocator.getRoleAPI().removeLayoutFromRole(

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🟠 [High] Test cleanup removes layout from role without verifying existence

In ToolGroupResourceTest's cleanUp(), lines 58-59 attempt to remove testLayout from adminUser's role via roleAPI.removeLayoutFromRole(), but the test setup (prepare()) never adds this layout to the role. This results in a guaranteed DotDataException during teardown when trying to remove a non-existent layout-role association. Test infrastructure code should either: 1) Add the layout to the role during setup before removal, or 2) Check if the association exists before attempting removal.

prepare() never adds testLayout to adminUser's role; only the admin
success test does via the API call. Wrapping in try-catch prevents a
guaranteed DotDataException on teardown when that test is skipped or
fails before the association is created.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

final User loggedInUser = new WebResource.InitBuilder(webResource)
.requiredBackendUser(true)
.requiredRoles(Role.CMS_ADMINISTRATOR_ROLE)

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🟠 [High] Over-restrictive role requirement in ToolGroupResource

The PR adds CMS_ADMINISTRATOR_ROLE to @RolesAllowed annotation, requiring admin privileges for a method that should be accessible to non-admin users with proper portlet permissions. This breaks existing access control logic by introducing an unnecessary admin role requirement, as evidenced by the test cases in ToolGroupResourceTest which don't validate admin-only access.

@mbiuki

mbiuki commented Jun 29, 2026

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CI Results — Run 28387215869

Overall: ❌ Failure (pre-existing flaky tests, unrelated to this PR)

Job Summary

Job Result
Initialize ✅ Pass
PR Build / Initial Artifact Build ✅ Pass
PR Test / Integration Tests - MainSuite 2b ❌ Fail (flaky tests)
All other test jobs (27/30) ✅ Pass
Finalize / Final Status ❌ Fail (downstream of MainSuite 2b)

Flaky Test Failures in MainSuite 2b

The 5 failures are all pre-existing, unrelated to this PR:

  • PermissionAPITest.issue560 / issue781 / test_templateLayout_parentPermissionableIsHost — intermittent DotSecurityException and hostname uniqueness constraint errors
  • StoryBlockMapTest.* (10 tests) — NPE: HttpSession.getAttribute() is null (known flaky test, also failed in prior runs)
  • ShortyServletAndTitleImageTest.test_ShortyServlet_With_AuthenticatedUser — unrelated infrastructure failure

The PR's new tests passed cleanly:

  • ToolGroupResourceTest — verifies _addtouser now enforces CMS Administrator access
  • RoleAjaxSecurityTest — verifies addUserToRole blocks non-admin self-escalation

Assessment

This PR is ready to merge. All failures are pre-existing flaky tests with no connection to the security hardening changes in RoleAjax.java and ToolGroupResource.java.

Note: The ai-automatic-review / bedrock-harness check flagged .requiredRoles(Role.CMS_ADMINISTRATOR_ROLE) as "over-restrictive" — this is a false positive. Restricting _addtouser to CMS Administrators is the intentional security fix closing the privilege escalation path documented in private-issues#642.

@mbiuki

mbiuki commented Jun 30, 2026

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Vulnerability Introduction Timeline

RoleAjax.saveRolePermission — admin check accidentally removed

Date Commit Author Event
pre-2016 (pre-repo) getAdminUser() admin guard present in saveRolePermission
2018-01-18 95391d6613 Daniel Silva Guard accidentally deleted in "Fix more jenkins tests" (#13427) — drive-by cleanup removed the security check
2025-11-04 3babaf0d17 Partial portlet-level mitigation added (private-issues#482) — requires Roles portlet access but not admin
PR #36345 Full fix: getAdminUser() restored — not yet in any release

Note: saveRoleLayouts was not vulnerable — getAdminUser() was always present. This PR only moves it to fail-fast before DB reads.

Affected Versions

  • First vulnerable release: 5.0.0 (2018-08-08) — check removed Jan 2018, first release Aug 2018
  • 4.x LTS unaffected — ran on a separate branch that did not receive commit 95391d6613
  • All affected: 5.0.0v26.06.22-03 (current latest) — ~8 years of exposure
  • Partial mitigation from: v25.11.07-1 (exploitability requires Roles portlet access, which PR sec: enforce admin check on layout assignment and role grant endpoints #36344 now closes)
  • Fully fixed in: not yet released

Combined Attack Chain Exposure Window

Both vulnerabilities (_addtouser from 2020 + saveRolePermission from 2018) were independently exploitable but chained together in the full RCE path documented in private-issues#642. The chain as described required both to be present — so the combined exploit window is 21.02 → present.

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AI: Safe To Rollback Area : Backend PR changes Java/Maven backend code Team : Scout Team : Security Issues related to security and privacy

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