Report it privately through GitHub: the repository's Security tab, then Report a vulnerability. Do not open a public issue for it. If private reporting is not available, open an issue that asks for a private contact and leave out the details.
Please include:
- the borg version (the release, or
cargo install --list) and the operating system; - which part is affected (the hooks,
borg-mesh,borg-web, an adapter, the relay setup); - the steps or a test case that shows it, and what an attacker gains.
We aim to answer within a week. Fixes go into the next release; the changelog names the issue once a fixed release is out.
Only the newest release gets security fixes.
Borg handles three kinds of trust:
- Your machine. Hooks run as you, with your agent's input. A way to make borg run a command, write
outside its stores, or read a repo routed
offis a vulnerability. - The mesh. Membership is a member list signed by an admin, every lesson line is signed by the
machine that wrote it, and steering directives are checked against the member list. A way for a
non-member or a revoked key to join or inject lines, or for a member without the
steerrole to steer drones, is a vulnerability. So is lesson or presence content reaching a relay or n0 in clear text. - What leaves the machine. Raw episodes, transcripts,
localcollectives andoffrepos never sync. Anything that makes them travel is a vulnerability. A secret that survivesredactin a reasoning excerpt or in presence is a bug worth reporting privately too.
Not in scope: what a relay sees by design (node ids, IP addresses, traffic volume; see
Running your own relay), what the model provider receives for a
model step (Privacy), and lessons that quote a secret the model wrote into them
(read lessons.jsonl before you share a collective that handled secrets).