fix: shield asset-lock funding from all funds accounts incl. CoinJoin (#4073) - #4184
fix: shield asset-lock funding from all funds accounts incl. CoinJoin (#4073)#4184bfoss765 wants to merge 17 commits into
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughShielded asset-lock funding now supports an optional BIP32 funding path that restricts UTXO selection to one account. Typed insufficient-funds errors propagate through wallet, FFI, JNI, Kotlin, and Swift APIs. The Swift example app accepts the path for Core funding. ChangesAsset-lock funding path
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~60 minutes Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant SwiftApp
participant SwiftSDK
participant JNI
participant WalletFFI
participant PlatformWallet
SwiftApp->>SwiftSDK: Submit Core asset-lock with fundingPath
SwiftSDK->>JNI: Marshal UTF-8 path
JNI->>WalletFFI: Pass path pointer and length
WalletFFI->>PlatformWallet: Select one funding account
PlatformWallet-->>WalletFFI: Return result code and message
WalletFFI-->>SwiftSDK: Return asset-lock result
Possibly related PRs
Suggested reviewers: 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
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The fix is correct and still reproduces on tip (the #4073 symptom is live in
Minor: the SwiftExampleApp funding picker still gates on the single BIP44 account, so the UI blocks the exact scenario this fixes (follow-up); the upstream-behavior pin tests (router/gap-limit) will trip on any rust-dashcore pin change — deliberate?; tracker refs ("finding 5b52d9844055") → PR description. |
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Two additional architecture blockers after checking the existing comments:
The existing typed-error and Swift BIP44-only preflight comments are correct and are not duplicated here. |
…vacy-domain funding gate (dashpay#4184) Addresses two must-fix reviewer findings on PR dashpay#4184. 1. FFI error arm for the asset-lock shortfall (dashpay#4073 request 3). `AssetLockInsufficientFunds` never crossed the FFI: with no arm in `From<PlatformWalletError>` it flattened to `ErrorUnknown(99)`, hiding a typed shortfall behind the catch-all and forcing hosts to string-match the Display text. Add: - `ErrorAssetLockInsufficientFunds = 26` (sibling of ErrorCoreInsufficientFunds = 22; existing codes unchanged), mapped in the From impl (the structured available/required duffs still travel in the message), plus a Rust test that the error crosses as code 26 (not 99) with the message verbatim. - Kotlin `DashSdkError.PlatformWallet.AssetLockInsufficientFunds` (26 ->) and Swift `.errorAssetLockInsufficientFunds`; cbindgen emits the C constant. The Display text is UNCHANGED ("asset lock coin selection is short: ...") so dash-wallet's existing substring matcher keeps working while it migrates to the typed code. 2. Privacy-domain co-spend gate. Largest-first could union ordinary BIP44/BIP32, CoinJoin, and DashPay-receiving funds into one L1 tx (with BIP44 change), irreversibly linking those domains. Default funding now stays within a single privacy domain: - Domains: Transparent {BIP44,BIP32} > CoinJoin > DashPay-receiving. Transparent is the only default-eligible domain because it holds the primary account and is the sole source of change (key-wallet derives change only on Standard accounts) — so any non-transparent spend inherently crosses into it. - New `CrossDomainConsent` (Denied default / Allowed opt-in) threaded through the builder, orchestration, `shielded_fund_from_asset_lock`, the JNI bridge, and the `platform_wallet_manager_shielded_fund_from_asset_lock` FFI (`allow_cross_domain: bool`). Wrapper methods keep every existing caller on the safe default. - Cross-domain refusal returns the typed `AssetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired` (FFI code 27; Kotlin/Swift mapped) carrying transparent/union/required duffs. - Watch-only DashpayExternalAccount exclusion preserved via the domain classifier (returns None); identity-funding single-BIP44 carve-out preserved. Tests: single-domain success without consent; cross-domain refused without consent (typed error) and succeeds with consent; existing union/CoinJoin/DashPay tests moved to the consented path. cargo test -p platform-wallet --lib = 504 passed; --features shielded = 634 passed; -p platform-wallet-ffi --lib = 198 passed. clippy clean on all three crates. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Both must-fix items and both architecture blockers are addressed and pushed. On the reservation-ledger blocker: implemented upstream as you specified — a rust-dashcore key-wallet PR (opening shortly) adds |
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…the signer wire Replace end-to-end message sniffing for the signer's "missing key" failure with a typed discriminator (dashpay#4060 finding 7): - rs-sdk-ffi: DashSDKSignerErrorCode { Generic = 0, SigningKeyUnavailable = 1, AuthenticationFailed = 2 (reserved) }; SignCompletionCallback and dash_sdk_sign_async_completion gain error_code: i32 (before error_message). SignResult stays Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> (a new rs-dpp ProtocolError variant would carry serialization blast radius), so code 1 rides the single Rust-owned machine prefix DASH_SDK_SIGNER_ERR_KEY_UNAVAILABLE_PREFIX through ProtocolError::Generic — typed at both ABI edges, one constant bridging the string segment. This is an internal coordinated ABI change: every piece versions together in this monorepo. - rs-platform-wallet-ffi: PlatformWalletFFIResultCode:: ErrorSigningKeyUnavailable = 31 (codes 26-28 are reserved for dashpay#4185's reservation-token errors and 29/30 for dashpay#4184's asset-lock errors on sibling branches — documented in the enum as dashpay#4184 does). The From<dpp::ProtocolError> conversion restores the typed code from the prefix FIRST (before the loose keyword sniffs), and the From<PlatformWalletError> blanket impl restores it on the catch-all only (dedicated retry-semantics codes are never overridden) — covering the Sdk(dash_sdk::Error::Protocol(..)) wrapping path. - JNI/Kotlin: SignerNative.completeSign(token, signature, errorCode, errorMessage); KeystoreSigner passes SIGNER_ERROR_CODE_KEY_UNAVAILABLE on the null-key branch (keeping the MESSAGE_MARKER text for the transition window) and Generic everywhere else. DashSdkError maps 31 → PlatformWallet.SigningKeyUnavailable; the dashpay#4191 marker sniff on the catch-all codes remains as a deprecated old-native fallback with a removal note tied to the next minor release. - Swift: KeychainSigner trampolines forward the code (missing-row / missing-scalar outcomes classify as 1); PlatformWalletResultCode gains errorSigningKeyUnavailable = 31 → PlatformWalletError .signingKeyUnavailable (Kotlin parity). - Tests: rs-sdk-ffi completion-code tests (prefix present for code 1, absent for generic), platform-wallet-ffi prefix→31 tests on both conversion points, Kotlin code-31 + fallback-marker tests, Swift mapping and trampoline-classifier tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Consolidated re-verification (two independent passes). The pushed substance checks out: typed codes 29/30 with by-ref mapping so the shielded entry point can't drift, Kotlin mappings + tests, the privacy-domain consent gate is thorough (transparent-vs-union precheck, fee-band reclassification, default-deny at every entry), and filing rust-dashcore#912 for the reservation ledger is the right split. The Rust asset-lock suite passes 8/8 locally. Remaining blockers:
Minor: the new |
blocker) PlatformWalletResultCode gained cases 29/30 (errorAssetLockInsufficientFunds, errorAssetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired) but PlatformWalletError had no matching cases, so init(result:) — which switches over result.code with no default — became non-exhaustive and the Swift package no longer compiled. Add the two matching cases (assetLockInsufficientFunds, assetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired) to PlatformWalletError, extend the errorDescription associated-value binding, and map both codes in init(result:). Semantics/messages mirror the Kotlin DashSdkError.PlatformWallet counterparts (codes 29/30). Verified: swiftc -typecheck of PlatformWalletResult.swift against a stub DashSDKFFI module built from the cbindgen-generated header now passes; removing the fix reproduces "switch must be exhaustive". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ShieldedFundFromAssetLockView built its funding picker from BIP44 accounts only and never set allowCrossDomain, so the all-funds/cross-domain flow could not be exercised or consented to on iOS. Add a minimal "Allow cross-domain funds" toggle (transparent-only by default) wired through to shieldedFundFromAssetLock(allowCrossDomain:), so the code-30 gate is reachable. A tracked TODO on crossDomainConsentSection records the intended fuller UX (submit false, catch errorAssetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired, show the transparent/union/ required breakdown, then retry with true) as a follow-up to file — the PR is held for rust-dashcore#912 before that lands. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
dashpay#4184) - Remove the "finding <hash>" tracker references from build.rs comments (rationale text kept); these belong in the PR description, not the source. - Add an ABI/release-note line to the platform-wallet-ffi README recording the C-ABI break: platform_wallet_manager_shielded_fund_from_asset_lock gained a trailing `bool allow_cross_domain` parameter, plus result codes 29/30. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
`PlatformWalletResultCode` jumped from 25 straight to 98, so the three deferred build->broadcast/release codes this PR owns (26 StaleReservationToken, 27 ReservationTokenConsumed, 28 ReservationWalletMismatch) fell through to `.errorUnknown` on iOS, erasing their distinct retry semantics. Add the three raw codes to `PlatformWalletResultCode`, matching cases to `PlatformWalletError`, and map them in both `init(ffi:)` and `init(result:)`. The `init(result:)` switch (no default) stays exhaustive — the same non-exhaustive-switch class shumkov flagged on dashpay#4184. Messages pass the Rust `Display` string straight through, matching the Kotlin SDK's mapping verbatim. Verified with `swiftc -parse` (the DashSDKFFI xcframework — cbindgen header + cdylib — is built separately by build_ios.sh and is not present in this checkout, so a full `swift build` type-check isn't possible here). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Actionable comments posted: 1
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
Inline comments:
In
`@packages/swift-sdk/SwiftExampleApp/SwiftExampleApp/Views/ShieldedFundFromAssetLockView.swift`:
- Around line 275-302: Update the canSubmit logic in
ShieldedFundFromAssetLockView so enabling allowCrossDomain no longer requires
the selected BIP44 balance to cover the full lock amount. Permit submission when
cross-domain consent is enabled, while preserving the existing balance
validation when it is disabled and letting Rust perform the authoritative
union-funds check.
🪄 Autofix (Beta)
Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
- Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
- Create a new PR with the fixes
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📒 Files selected for processing (19)
packages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/errors/DashSdkError.ktpackages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/ffi/FundingNative.ktpackages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/wallet/PlatformWalletManager.ktpackages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/test/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/errors/DashSdkErrorTest.ktpackages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/README.mdpackages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/error.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/shielded_send.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/error.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/lib.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/test_support.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/asset_lock/build.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/asset_lock/mod.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/asset_lock/orchestration.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/shielded/fund_from_asset_lock.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/shielded/seed_pool.rspackages/rs-unified-sdk-jni/src/funding.rspackages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletManagerShieldedFunding.swiftpackages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletResult.swiftpackages/swift-sdk/SwiftExampleApp/SwiftExampleApp/Views/ShieldedFundFromAssetLockView.swift
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Addressed the independent findings; the reservation race stays held for rust-dashcore#912.
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⚠️ Outside diff range comments (1)
packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/shielded_send.rs (1)
1079-1085: 📐 Maintainability & Code Quality | 🟡 Minor | ⚡ Quick winUpdate the stale error-reference comment.
AssetLockCrossDomainConsentRequiredis no longer present inPlatformWalletError/ the FFI code mapping, so this comment should only coverAssetLockInsufficientFundsand drop the cross-domain consent rationale.🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate. In `@packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/shielded_send.rs` around lines 1079 - 1085, The error-preservation comment in the result handling block should no longer reference AssetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired or cross-domain consent behavior. Update it to document only preservation of AssetLockInsufficientFunds as a dedicated FFI error code, while retaining the existing generic-error distinction and message-prefix rationale.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
Inline comments:
In `@packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/shielded/fund_from_asset_lock.rs`:
- Line 153: Limit shielded asset-lock funding to the primary account until
reservation bookkeeping supports the selected funding_path, or carry that
account/path through every reservation and release operation in the asset-lock
build flow. Update the funding_path handling in the shielded builder and the
reservation logic in build.rs so rejected or concurrent secondary-account builds
cannot reserve, release, or reselect inputs under the primary
BIP44/account-index path.
---
Outside diff comments:
In `@packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/shielded_send.rs`:
- Around line 1079-1085: The error-preservation comment in the result handling
block should no longer reference AssetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired or
cross-domain consent behavior. Update it to document only preservation of
AssetLockInsufficientFunds as a dedicated FFI error code, while retaining the
existing generic-error distinction and message-prefix rationale.
🪄 Autofix (Beta)
Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
- Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
- Create a new PR with the fixes
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📒 Files selected for processing (19)
packages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/errors/DashSdkError.ktpackages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/ffi/FundingNative.ktpackages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/wallet/PlatformWalletManager.ktpackages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/asset_lock/build.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/error.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/shielded_send.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/error.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/asset_lock/build.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/asset_lock/orchestration.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/asset_lock/sync/recovery.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/invitation.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/registration.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/platform_addresses/fund_from_asset_lock.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/shielded/fund_from_asset_lock.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/shielded/seed_pool.rspackages/rs-unified-sdk-jni/src/funding.rspackages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletManagerShieldedFunding.swiftpackages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletResult.swiftpackages/swift-sdk/SwiftExampleApp/SwiftExampleApp/Views/ShieldedFundFromAssetLockView.swift
💤 Files with no reviewable changes (3)
- packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletResult.swift
- packages/kotlin-sdk/sdk/src/main/kotlin/org/dashfoundation/dashsdk/errors/DashSdkError.kt
- packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/error.rs
…the signer wire Replace end-to-end message sniffing for the signer's "missing key" failure with a typed discriminator (dashpay#4060 finding 7): - rs-sdk-ffi: DashSDKSignerErrorCode { Generic = 0, SigningKeyUnavailable = 1, AuthenticationFailed = 2 (reserved) }; SignCompletionCallback and dash_sdk_sign_async_completion gain error_code: i32 (before error_message). SignResult stays Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> (a new rs-dpp ProtocolError variant would carry serialization blast radius), so code 1 rides the single Rust-owned machine prefix DASH_SDK_SIGNER_ERR_KEY_UNAVAILABLE_PREFIX through ProtocolError::Generic — typed at both ABI edges, one constant bridging the string segment. This is an internal coordinated ABI change: every piece versions together in this monorepo. - rs-platform-wallet-ffi: PlatformWalletFFIResultCode:: ErrorSigningKeyUnavailable = 31 (codes 26-28 are reserved for dashpay#4185's reservation-token errors and 29/30 for dashpay#4184's asset-lock errors on sibling branches — documented in the enum as dashpay#4184 does). The From<dpp::ProtocolError> conversion restores the typed code from the prefix FIRST (before the loose keyword sniffs), and the From<PlatformWalletError> blanket impl restores it on the catch-all only (dedicated retry-semantics codes are never overridden) — covering the Sdk(dash_sdk::Error::Protocol(..)) wrapping path. - JNI/Kotlin: SignerNative.completeSign(token, signature, errorCode, errorMessage); KeystoreSigner passes SIGNER_ERROR_CODE_KEY_UNAVAILABLE on the null-key branch (keeping the MESSAGE_MARKER text for the transition window) and Generic everywhere else. DashSdkError maps 31 → PlatformWallet.SigningKeyUnavailable; the dashpay#4191 marker sniff on the catch-all codes remains as a deprecated old-native fallback with a removal note tied to the next minor release. - Swift: KeychainSigner trampolines forward the code (missing-row / missing-scalar outcomes classify as 1); PlatformWalletResultCode gains errorSigningKeyUnavailable = 31 → PlatformWalletError .signingKeyUnavailable (Kotlin parity). - Tests: rs-sdk-ffi completion-code tests (prefix present for code 1, absent for generic), platform-wallet-ffi prefix→31 tests on both conversion points, Kotlin code-31 + fallback-marker tests, Swift mapping and trampoline-classifier tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…vacy-domain funding gate (dashpay#4184) Addresses two must-fix reviewer findings on PR dashpay#4184. 1. FFI error arm for the asset-lock shortfall (dashpay#4073 request 3). `AssetLockInsufficientFunds` never crossed the FFI: with no arm in `From<PlatformWalletError>` it flattened to `ErrorUnknown(99)`, hiding a typed shortfall behind the catch-all and forcing hosts to string-match the Display text. Add: - `ErrorAssetLockInsufficientFunds = 26` (sibling of ErrorCoreInsufficientFunds = 22; existing codes unchanged), mapped in the From impl (the structured available/required duffs still travel in the message), plus a Rust test that the error crosses as code 26 (not 99) with the message verbatim. - Kotlin `DashSdkError.PlatformWallet.AssetLockInsufficientFunds` (26 ->) and Swift `.errorAssetLockInsufficientFunds`; cbindgen emits the C constant. The Display text is UNCHANGED ("asset lock coin selection is short: ...") so dash-wallet's existing substring matcher keeps working while it migrates to the typed code. 2. Privacy-domain co-spend gate. Largest-first could union ordinary BIP44/BIP32, CoinJoin, and DashPay-receiving funds into one L1 tx (with BIP44 change), irreversibly linking those domains. Default funding now stays within a single privacy domain: - Domains: Transparent {BIP44,BIP32} > CoinJoin > DashPay-receiving. Transparent is the only default-eligible domain because it holds the primary account and is the sole source of change (key-wallet derives change only on Standard accounts) — so any non-transparent spend inherently crosses into it. - New `CrossDomainConsent` (Denied default / Allowed opt-in) threaded through the builder, orchestration, `shielded_fund_from_asset_lock`, the JNI bridge, and the `platform_wallet_manager_shielded_fund_from_asset_lock` FFI (`allow_cross_domain: bool`). Wrapper methods keep every existing caller on the safe default. - Cross-domain refusal returns the typed `AssetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired` (FFI code 27; Kotlin/Swift mapped) carrying transparent/union/required duffs. - Watch-only DashpayExternalAccount exclusion preserved via the domain classifier (returns None); identity-funding single-BIP44 carve-out preserved. Tests: single-domain success without consent; cross-domain refused without consent (typed error) and succeeds with consent; existing union/CoinJoin/DashPay tests moved to the consented path. cargo test -p platform-wallet --lib = 504 passed; --features shielded = 634 passed; -p platform-wallet-ffi --lib = 198 passed. clippy clean on all three crates. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
blocker) PlatformWalletResultCode gained cases 29/30 (errorAssetLockInsufficientFunds, errorAssetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired) but PlatformWalletError had no matching cases, so init(result:) — which switches over result.code with no default — became non-exhaustive and the Swift package no longer compiled. Add the two matching cases (assetLockInsufficientFunds, assetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired) to PlatformWalletError, extend the errorDescription associated-value binding, and map both codes in init(result:). Semantics/messages mirror the Kotlin DashSdkError.PlatformWallet counterparts (codes 29/30). Verified: swiftc -typecheck of PlatformWalletResult.swift against a stub DashSDKFFI module built from the cbindgen-generated header now passes; removing the fix reproduces "switch must be exhaustive". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ShieldedFundFromAssetLockView built its funding picker from BIP44 accounts only and never set allowCrossDomain, so the all-funds/cross-domain flow could not be exercised or consented to on iOS. Add a minimal "Allow cross-domain funds" toggle (transparent-only by default) wired through to shieldedFundFromAssetLock(allowCrossDomain:), so the code-30 gate is reachable. A tracked TODO on crossDomainConsentSection records the intended fuller UX (submit false, catch errorAssetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired, show the transparent/union/ required breakdown, then retry with true) as a follow-up to file — the PR is held for rust-dashcore#912 before that lands. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
dashpay#4184) - Remove the "finding <hash>" tracker references from build.rs comments (rationale text kept); these belong in the PR description, not the source. - Add an ABI/release-note line to the platform-wallet-ffi README recording the C-ABI break: platform_wallet_manager_shielded_fund_from_asset_lock gained a trailing `bool allow_cross_domain` parameter, plus result codes 29/30. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…re-scope The dashpay#4184 re-scope dropped AssetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired (code 30) but left references behind: a DashSdkErrorTest mapping (broke :sdk:test compile), the rs-platform-wallet-ffi README ABI note, and a shielded_send.rs comment. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ntracts (dashpay#4184) Address maintainer/CodeRabbit review findings on the dashpay#4184 asset-lock funding re-scope. 1. Reserve the selected-account inputs (correctness / double-spend). `build_asset_lock_tx_from_selected_account` seeded inputs via `add_inputs` with NO ReservationSet, so a re-scoped shielded build reserved nothing — a concurrent normal Core send (the BIP44 `build_asset_lock_with_signer` path) or a CoinJoin mix could reselect the same UTXOs in the build->broadcast->reconcile window (the wallet write lock + `shield_guard` only serialize shielded builds). Point the key-wallet builder's `set_funding` at the SELECTED funds account instead of `add_inputs`, so the chosen inputs are reserved in that account's OWN reservation ledger (the same single-account machinery the BIP44 builder uses) and held across build->broadcast. Release on a rejected broadcast is now path-aware (`release_asset_lock_funding_reservation`): shielded funding releases from the account named by `funding_path` (possibly CoinJoin/DashPay); every other funding type from the BIP44 account. Adds two tests: a selected-account build reserves its CoinJoin input across broadcast, and a rejected selected-account broadcast releases it. 2. Restore `WalletOperation` for the generic shielded-funding failure arm (was regressed to `Unknown(99)`): `platform_wallet_error_code_or_wallet_operation` keeps typed codes but maps the catch-all to `ErrorWalletOperation`, at both the fund and resume-fund FFI entry points. 3. JNI: read `fundingPath` with a strict reader that throws on a genuine JNI read error instead of silently degrading a money-source param to the default BIP44 account; JVM null still means "absent". 4. Rewrite the stale multi-account-union/consent docs in `orchestration.rs` (FromWalletBalance) to the as-built single-path design. 5. Swift example: the funding-account picker now surfaces non-Standard funds accounts (CoinJoin/DashPay) with type labels, and `canSubmit` no longer gates on the selected Core account's balance when an explicit `fundingPath` is supplied — so a CoinJoin path is exercisable end-to-end. Validation: cargo build -p platform-wallet -p platform-wallet-ffi -p rs-unified-sdk-jni --features shielded; cargo test -p platform-wallet --features shielded (639 passed); cargo test -p platform-wallet-ffi --features shielded (215+26+6 passed); ./gradlew :sdk:assemble -x lint (BUILD SUCCESSFUL). Swift not built locally (no xcframework). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
review blocker 2) Reviewer (thepastaclaw) blocker 2 — build.rs:423-424: build_asset_lock_tx_from_selected_account passed the BIP44 change account (&bip44_acc) as set_funding's `acc`, but set_funding calls funds_acc.next_change_address(Some(&acc.account_xpub)) on the SELECTED funds account before the set_change_address override. For an explicitly selected Standard BIP32 account with no pre-generated unused internal address, that derived [1, index] from the wrong (BIP44) xpub and recorded it under the BIP32 account's own path, poisoning that pool so a later normal BIP32 send could use a change entry whose signer key does not match the address. Now resolve the wallet-level Account whose account-level derivation path equals funding_path and pass ITS xpub to set_funding, while keeping the separate BIP44 set_change_address override. Default BIP44 funding resolves to bip44_acc (unchanged); non-Standard (CoinJoin/DashPay) accounts fail change derivation regardless, so the xpub is immaterial and the bip44_acc fallback preserves prior behavior. Also (thepastaclaw nitpick, test_support.rs): move the DashPay fixture rustdoc so it attaches to split_funded_wallet_manager_dashpay rather than foreign_contact_account_xpub. Blocker 1 (build.rs:427-473, owner-guarded reservation rollback on the pre-broadcast abandonment path) is NOT addressed here: the pinned key-wallet rev 70d4bf8 exposes no owner-guarded release primitive (ReservationSet has only reserve/reserved/release keyed by outpoint; release_reservation is unconditional) and no reservation token, so the required release_if_owner(token) mechanism (rust-dashcore#916 / dashpay#4185) cannot be implemented against this pin without an upstream dependency change — the very atomic-reservation fix this PR is held for. Deferred pending that adoption rather than substituting an unconditional release on the money path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…adcast path build_signed reserves the selected inputs in the funding account's ReservationSet and normally holds them from build through broadcast. But several post-signing, pre-broadcast error paths could return without rolling that reservation back, stranding the inputs until the reservation-TTL backstop (~24 blocks) and causing false shortfalls / withheld coins in the meantime (dashpay#4184 review, thepastaclaw): - build_asset_lock_tx_from_selected_account (shielded selected-account path): the credit-account lookups, peek_next_path, the external signer.public_key round-trip, and mark_first_pool_index_used are all fallible after build_signed. Derive the credit key in an inner future and, on any error, release the reservation on the selected funds account (matched by funding_path, mirroring release_asset_lock_funding_reservation) before propagating. - build_asset_lock_transaction (non-shielded / upstream builder path): the two defensive credit-key arms after build_asset_lock_with_signer abandon a signed+reserved tx; release on the BIP44 account at account_index. - broadcast_funded_asset_lock invitation durability branch: when the funding-index persist/flush fails we abort before broadcast; release the reservation via release_asset_lock_funding_reservation before bailing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…on window Addresses the outstanding review findings on dashpay#4184 at a9e418a. Reservation lifecycle, delegated (non-shielded) builder — blocker. `build_asset_lock_with_signer` reserves the transaction's inputs inside `build_signed` and rolls that back only when *input* signing fails. Its credit-output loop runs afterwards, and a failure there returns `Err` with a fully-signed transaction abandoned and its inputs still reserved. That reservation cannot be rolled back from platform-wallet at this pin: the error carries no transaction to hand `release_reservation`, and the account's `ReservationSet` is `pub(crate)` to key-wallet. The abandon path is therefore removed rather than rolled back. Of the loop's fallible steps only the external `signer.public_key` round-trip is genuinely reachable — resolving the credit account, `peek_next_path` and `mark_first_pool_index_used` cannot fail once `peek_next_funding_address` has resolved and peeked that same account earlier in the call under the same held wallet write lock. So the signer round-trip now happens up front, before anything is reserved, and the builder receives a `PrefetchedCreditKeySigner` that answers the repeat request from cache. `peek_next_funding_address` returns the peeked path alongside the address to feed it. Standard BIP32 regression coverage. Adds the test the reviewer asked for around the `set_funding` xpub lookup: it exhausts a selected BIP32 account's pre-generated unused internal entries so `next_change_address` must derive a fresh one, builds through that account's explicit path, and asserts every internal-pool entry is still signable at its own recorded path. Reverting the lookup to the BIP44 xpub fails it. SwiftExampleApp funding picker. Picker rows were all tagged with a bare `accountIndex`, which account families reuse — BIP44 #0, BIP32 #0 and CoinJoin #0 collided, so SwiftUI could not tell which row was chosen and a non-BIP44 row without a BIP44 counterpart fed an invalid change account to Rust. The picker is now restricted to BIP44 accounts (the mandatory change sink, listed even at zero balance so the dashpay#4073 case still works) and the other funds accounts are shown read-only. Public API documentation. `account_index` / `fundingAccountIndex` is documented as the change sink that doubles as the default input source, rather than unconditionally as the input source, across the Rust FFI, Swift and Kotlin surfaces — it contradicted the `funding_path` docs immediately below it. Tests: platform-wallet 511/511 (2 new), platform-wallet-ffi 205/205 + 26 + 6; cargo fmt applied; clippy clean on both crates (only pre-existing warnings in recovery.rs / withdrawal.rs). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…the signer wire Replace end-to-end message sniffing for the signer's "missing key" failure with a typed discriminator (dashpay#4060 finding 7): - rs-sdk-ffi: DashSDKSignerErrorCode { Generic = 0, SigningKeyUnavailable = 1, AuthenticationFailed = 2 (reserved) }; SignCompletionCallback and dash_sdk_sign_async_completion gain error_code: i32 (before error_message). SignResult stays Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> (a new rs-dpp ProtocolError variant would carry serialization blast radius), so code 1 rides the single Rust-owned machine prefix DASH_SDK_SIGNER_ERR_KEY_UNAVAILABLE_PREFIX through ProtocolError::Generic — typed at both ABI edges, one constant bridging the string segment. This is an internal coordinated ABI change: every piece versions together in this monorepo. - rs-platform-wallet-ffi: PlatformWalletFFIResultCode:: ErrorSigningKeyUnavailable = 31 (codes 26-28 are reserved for dashpay#4185's reservation-token errors and 29/30 for dashpay#4184's asset-lock errors on sibling branches — documented in the enum as dashpay#4184 does). The From<dpp::ProtocolError> conversion restores the typed code from the prefix FIRST (before the loose keyword sniffs), and the From<PlatformWalletError> blanket impl restores it on the catch-all only (dedicated retry-semantics codes are never overridden) — covering the Sdk(dash_sdk::Error::Protocol(..)) wrapping path. - JNI/Kotlin: SignerNative.completeSign(token, signature, errorCode, errorMessage); KeystoreSigner passes SIGNER_ERROR_CODE_KEY_UNAVAILABLE on the null-key branch (keeping the MESSAGE_MARKER text for the transition window) and Generic everywhere else. DashSdkError maps 31 → PlatformWallet.SigningKeyUnavailable; the dashpay#4191 marker sniff on the catch-all codes remains as a deprecated old-native fallback with a removal note tied to the next minor release. - Swift: KeychainSigner trampolines forward the code (missing-row / missing-scalar outcomes classify as 1); PlatformWalletResultCode gains errorSigningKeyUnavailable = 31 → PlatformWalletError .signingKeyUnavailable (Kotlin parity). - Tests: rs-sdk-ffi completion-code tests (prefix present for code 1, absent for generic), platform-wallet-ffi prefix→31 tests on both conversion points, Kotlin code-31 + fallback-marker tests, Swift mapping and trampoline-classifier tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolves the two blocking review findings and the live suggestions on dashpay#4261. Blocking — advance dashpay#3968's reissue frontier to 38. Code 37 is allocated to dashpay#4204, so the branch-specific guidance in the non-conforming section and in the 27/28 detail section could still have sent dashpay#3968 to 37 and recreated the collision with ErrorShieldedInviteAlreadyClaimed. Both references now say 38+, and both state that the reserved 28 and 30 are not available either. Blocking — 28 and 30 were labelled RESERVED in the table and the frontier paragraph but "free" in the code-30 section and the collision history. Rule 1 lets a contributor claim a gap this file marks free, so the two labels gave two different allocation frontiers. Everything now says reserved-not-free and cites rule 1 explicitly. Open-PR inventory: verified 2026-08-03 against each PR's file list and the error.rs at its head. Adds dashpay#3417, dashpay#3549, dashpay#3992 and dashpay#4243 (all touch the crate without claiming an integer; dashpay#4243 maps new wallet errors onto the existing ErrorInvalidParameter). Removes dashpay#4240 and dashpay#4251, whose heads touch no file under this crate; removes dashpay#4258, merged on 2026-08-03; records dashpay#4264 as closed with its work carried by dashpay#4243. Also in this pass: - dashpay#4204's Swift mirror is recorded as PARTIALLY fixed. At d78b940 the raw case and its init(ffi:) arm exist, but PlatformWalletError has no typed case and its exhaustive init(result:) has no arm, so the Swift package does not compile as written. Rule 5's Swift clause is not yet satisfied there. - The preamble no longer claims duplicate discriminants are always silent. Two different names on one integer is an E0081 after a merge (that is how the code-32 collision surfaced); the silent case is a meaning moving to a new integer, or an un-updated host mirror. - Code 13 ErrorArithmeticOverflow does have an in-tree producer (shielded_send.rs); the row said it had none. - dashpay#3968 is no longer described as simply un-rebased: its head does contain the 2026-08-01 base, it is behind the current base, and a rebase alone fixes nothing because git sees no conflict — the branch must edit its own enum. - Provenance re-read on 2026-08-03 from GitHub rather than carried forward, now as a table with a note per PR. dashpay#4183 and dashpay#4184 were rebased onto 5d68612 today and keep 31 and 29 respectively; their stale in-enum reservation comments were corrected in the same rebase, so the code-30 section now lists dashpay#4204 as the only branch still carrying one. - markdownlint: MD018 (18 occurrences) and MD004 (mixed bullet styles) are both clean; MD013 is down to long table rows only.
…the signer wire Replace end-to-end message sniffing for the signer's "missing key" failure with a typed discriminator (dashpay#4060 finding 7): - rs-sdk-ffi: DashSDKSignerErrorCode { Generic = 0, SigningKeyUnavailable = 1, AuthenticationFailed = 2 (reserved) }; SignCompletionCallback and dash_sdk_sign_async_completion gain error_code: i32 (before error_message). SignResult stays Result<Vec<u8>, ProtocolError> (a new rs-dpp ProtocolError variant would carry serialization blast radius), so code 1 rides the single Rust-owned machine prefix DASH_SDK_SIGNER_ERR_KEY_UNAVAILABLE_PREFIX through ProtocolError::Generic — typed at both ABI edges, one constant bridging the string segment. This is an internal coordinated ABI change: every piece versions together in this monorepo. - rs-platform-wallet-ffi: PlatformWalletFFIResultCode:: ErrorSigningKeyUnavailable = 31 (codes 26-28 are reserved for dashpay#4185's reservation-token errors and 29/30 for dashpay#4184's asset-lock errors on sibling branches — documented in the enum as dashpay#4184 does). The From<dpp::ProtocolError> conversion restores the typed code from the prefix FIRST (before the loose keyword sniffs), and the From<PlatformWalletError> blanket impl restores it on the catch-all only (dedicated retry-semantics codes are never overridden) — covering the Sdk(dash_sdk::Error::Protocol(..)) wrapping path. - JNI/Kotlin: SignerNative.completeSign(token, signature, errorCode, errorMessage); KeystoreSigner passes SIGNER_ERROR_CODE_KEY_UNAVAILABLE on the null-key branch (keeping the MESSAGE_MARKER text for the transition window) and Generic everywhere else. DashSdkError maps 31 → PlatformWallet.SigningKeyUnavailable; the dashpay#4191 marker sniff on the catch-all codes remains as a deprecated old-native fallback with a removal note tied to the next minor release. - Swift: KeychainSigner trampolines forward the code (missing-row / missing-scalar outcomes classify as 1); PlatformWalletResultCode gains errorSigningKeyUnavailable = 31 → PlatformWalletError .signingKeyUnavailable (Kotlin parity). - Tests: rs-sdk-ffi completion-code tests (prefix present for code 1, absent for generic), platform-wallet-ffi prefix→31 tests on both conversion points, Kotlin code-31 + fallback-marker tests, Swift mapping and trampoline-classifier tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…-> 37 and mirror it (dashpay#4204) 32 is allocated to `ErrorTransactionBuild` (dashpay#4247, also carried by dashpay#4256) in ERROR_CODE_REGISTRY.md (dashpay#4261). This variant took 32 without a registry row, so the two collide as a hard `E0081: discriminant value 32 assigned more than once` the moment both land — reproduced on a real integration merge, not hypothetical. 27-36 are all claimed (27 ErrorShutdownIncomplete via the merged dashpay#4268; 29 dashpay#4184; 31 dashpay#4183; 32/33 37 is the allocation frontier. The code was also unmirrored on BOTH hosts, which is the more dangerous half: Swift is exhaustive, so it surfaced as .errorUnknown and lost its identity; Kotlin fell through to Generic(32), and in any tree carrying "shielded invite already claimed" as "reservation wallet mismatch". That matters on the claim-recovery path specifically — the error is raised from four sites in shielded/operations.rs, three inside the recovery function. Adds the typed Kotlin PlatformWallet.ShieldedInviteAlreadyClaimed (terminal, inherited isRetryable = false), the Swift enum case + init(ffi:) arm, a DashSdkErrorTest assertion pinning 37, and refreshes the stale Swift reservation comment the registry asked the next toucher to drop. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rebased onto
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… on base's upstreamed router fix (dashpay#4074) Rebase of PR dashpay#4074 (fix/kotlin-sdk-assetlock-multi-account) onto feat/kotlin-sdk-and-example-app. The platform-wallet asset-lock changes are preserved; the PR's OWN rust-dashcore customization is dropped because the base branch now carries the same fix upstream. What this brings to the asset-lock code path (packages/rs-platform-wallet): - Multi-account funding builder `build_asset_lock_tx_from_all_funding_accounts` that unions spendable UTXOs across BIP44 + CoinJoin + DashPay funds accounts (dashpay#4073), with LargestFirst coin selection pinned for the many-small-denomination CoinJoin shape. - Exclusion of watch-only `DashpayExternalAccount` UTXOs from the union — those are a contact's coins the local mnemonic can't sign; selecting one yields an invalid input signature. The receiving (ours) DashPay account stays included. - `NoUtxosAvailable` mapped to the typed asset-lock insufficient-funds error. - Regression tests covering the router-fix persistence path (CoinJoin + DashpayReceivingFunds legs) and the watch-only exclusion, plus split-funded test fixtures (`split_funded_wallet_manager`, `..._dashpay`, `..._many_coinjoin`). Why the PR's rust-dashcore vendoring/[patch] is DROPPED: The PR originally shipped the asset-lock transaction-router fix by pinning rust-dashcore at 1860089e and redirecting it via a `[patch]` to a bfoss765 fork (rev e8c7335 = 1860089e + the router fix + a CoinJoin gap-limit 30->100 bump). The base branch's rust-dashcore rev 19690d31 now contains BOTH fixes upstream: * `TransactionRouter::get_relevant_account_types(AssetLock)` includes CoinJoin, DashpayReceivingFunds, and DashpayExternalAccount (via `fund_bearing_account_types()`); * `DEFAULT_COINJOIN_GAP_LIMIT = 100`. So the fork [patch], the pinned 1860089e rev, and the leftover `third_party/rust-dashcore` are all obsolete and removed. Cargo.toml/Cargo.lock are taken as-is from base (rust-dashcore resolves from dashpay @ 19690d31, no patch table). Because base's fix debits CoinJoin/DashPay asset-lock spends via the normal `check_core_transaction` scan, the PR's earlier broadcast-time `debit_router_omitted_asset_lock_spends` mitigation is gone — as it already was in the PR's final state (dashpay/dash-wallet#1507). History note: the PR's 10 original commits touched the same four files the base branch had independently rewritten (+928 lines), and included add-then-remove churn (the interim mitigation) plus vendor-then-git-patch churn that base's upstreamed fix makes moot. They are collapsed into this single commit to keep the rebased history coherent. Verified: `cargo check -p platform-wallet --all-targets`, `-p rs-unified-sdk-jni`, `-p platform-wallet-ffi` all green; `cargo test -p platform-wallet --lib` = 502 passed / 0 failed, including the router-fix and watch-only-exclusion regression tests, against base's 19690d31. Original commits folded in: 9be2e14, 5376235, e1593f4, da97eec (app-code only; vendoring dropped), ce482fd (app-code only; vendored gap-limit dropped), 380645a, b43caed (dropped: pure [patch] plumbing), a5ea9e5, 77561d2, 189e068. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…vacy-domain funding gate (dashpay#4184) Addresses two must-fix reviewer findings on PR dashpay#4184. 1. FFI error arm for the asset-lock shortfall (dashpay#4073 request 3). `AssetLockInsufficientFunds` never crossed the FFI: with no arm in `From<PlatformWalletError>` it flattened to `ErrorUnknown(99)`, hiding a typed shortfall behind the catch-all and forcing hosts to string-match the Display text. Add: - `ErrorAssetLockInsufficientFunds = 26` (sibling of ErrorCoreInsufficientFunds = 22; existing codes unchanged), mapped in the From impl (the structured available/required duffs still travel in the message), plus a Rust test that the error crosses as code 26 (not 99) with the message verbatim. - Kotlin `DashSdkError.PlatformWallet.AssetLockInsufficientFunds` (26 ->) and Swift `.errorAssetLockInsufficientFunds`; cbindgen emits the C constant. The Display text is UNCHANGED ("asset lock coin selection is short: ...") so dash-wallet's existing substring matcher keeps working while it migrates to the typed code. 2. Privacy-domain co-spend gate. Largest-first could union ordinary BIP44/BIP32, CoinJoin, and DashPay-receiving funds into one L1 tx (with BIP44 change), irreversibly linking those domains. Default funding now stays within a single privacy domain: - Domains: Transparent {BIP44,BIP32} > CoinJoin > DashPay-receiving. Transparent is the only default-eligible domain because it holds the primary account and is the sole source of change (key-wallet derives change only on Standard accounts) — so any non-transparent spend inherently crosses into it. - New `CrossDomainConsent` (Denied default / Allowed opt-in) threaded through the builder, orchestration, `shielded_fund_from_asset_lock`, the JNI bridge, and the `platform_wallet_manager_shielded_fund_from_asset_lock` FFI (`allow_cross_domain: bool`). Wrapper methods keep every existing caller on the safe default. - Cross-domain refusal returns the typed `AssetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired` (FFI code 27; Kotlin/Swift mapped) carrying transparent/union/required duffs. - Watch-only DashpayExternalAccount exclusion preserved via the domain classifier (returns None); identity-funding single-BIP44 carve-out preserved. Tests: single-domain success without consent; cross-domain refused without consent (typed error) and succeeds with consent; existing union/CoinJoin/DashPay tests moved to the consented path. cargo test -p platform-wallet --lib = 504 passed; --features shielded = 634 passed; -p platform-wallet-ffi --lib = 198 passed. clippy clean on all three crates. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cross-PR collision: the split-build-broadcast branch (dashpay#4185) already allocates 26-28 for the reservation-token errors on the same base, and both PRs would merge without textual conflict, silently misclassifying errors on whichever lands second. Codes 26-28 are now documented as reserved for dashpay#4185. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review round 2: the pre-selection consent gate compares fee-exclusive totals, so a transparent balance in [target, target+fee) passed the gate and then died in selection as plain insufficient-funds — the host never learned that consent would unlock the spend. The selection-failure mapping now converts the shortfall to AssetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired when consent is denied and the union covers what selection reported missing. Adds the fee-band test and the denied-both-short test the review found uncovered. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
blocker) PlatformWalletResultCode gained cases 29/30 (errorAssetLockInsufficientFunds, errorAssetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired) but PlatformWalletError had no matching cases, so init(result:) — which switches over result.code with no default — became non-exhaustive and the Swift package no longer compiled. Add the two matching cases (assetLockInsufficientFunds, assetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired) to PlatformWalletError, extend the errorDescription associated-value binding, and map both codes in init(result:). Semantics/messages mirror the Kotlin DashSdkError.PlatformWallet counterparts (codes 29/30). Verified: swiftc -typecheck of PlatformWalletResult.swift against a stub DashSDKFFI module built from the cbindgen-generated header now passes; removing the fix reproduces "switch must be exhaustive". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ShieldedFundFromAssetLockView built its funding picker from BIP44 accounts only and never set allowCrossDomain, so the all-funds/cross-domain flow could not be exercised or consented to on iOS. Add a minimal "Allow cross-domain funds" toggle (transparent-only by default) wired through to shieldedFundFromAssetLock(allowCrossDomain:), so the code-30 gate is reachable. A tracked TODO on crossDomainConsentSection records the intended fuller UX (submit false, catch errorAssetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired, show the transparent/union/ required breakdown, then retry with true) as a follow-up to file — the PR is held for rust-dashcore#912 before that lands. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
dashpay#4184) - Remove the "finding <hash>" tracker references from build.rs comments (rationale text kept); these belong in the PR description, not the source. - Add an ABI/release-note line to the platform-wallet-ffi README recording the C-ABI break: platform_wallet_manager_shielded_fund_from_asset_lock gained a trailing `bool allow_cross_domain` parameter, plus result codes 29/30. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…optional derivation path (drop multi-account union + consent gate) Replace the multi-account union + privacy-domain consent gate with a single account-by-derivation-path selection. The caller either accepts the default (unmixed BIP44 account) or passes one explicit BIP32 path (e.g. the DIP-9 CoinJoin account) as a nullable String, threaded Kotlin -> JNI -> FFI -> Rust as Option<DerivationPath>. No union across accounts, no consent prompt. - rs-platform-wallet: drop build_asset_lock_tx_from_all_funding_accounts, CrossDomainConsent/PrivacyDomain, and AssetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired; add build_asset_lock_tx_from_selected_account (single account by path, change routed to the BIP44 account since non-Standard accounts cannot derive change); collapse the four *_with_consent wrapper pairs into a single funding_path arg. - rs-platform-wallet-ffi: swap allow_cross_domain bool for funding_path (ptr+len UTF-8 BIP32 string); drop error code 30. - rs-unified-sdk-jni / kotlin-sdk: allowCrossDomain: Boolean -> fundingPath: String?; drop DashSdkError.PlatformWallet.AssetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired. - Replace the union/consent tests with single-path tests (explicit CoinJoin path, default BIP44, no-union proof, typed shortfall, watch-only refusal). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…g path (drop cross-domain consent + code 30) Mirror the Kotlin re-scope (2d86a29) on the second consumer of the same C ABI. The FFI dropped the allow_cross_domain bool for a nullable funding_path (ptr+len UTF-8 BIP32 string) and removed error code 30, so the old Swift signature no longer compiles. - PlatformWalletManagerShieldedFunding.swift: allowCrossDomain: Bool -> fundingPath: String? = nil; marshal the optional path as raw UTF-8 bytes via a new withOptionalFundingPath helper (nil/empty -> nil ptr + 0 len), mirroring withOptionalSurplusOutput, and pass funding_path_ptr/ funding_path_len to the C function. - PlatformWalletResult.swift: drop the errorAssetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired (code 30) FFI case and the assetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired PlatformWalletError case and their mappings. - SwiftExampleApp ShieldedFundFromAssetLockView: replace the cross-domain consent toggle with an optional funding-path text field; pass fundingPath (nil when blank) to the SDK call. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…re-scope The dashpay#4184 re-scope dropped AssetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired (code 30) but left references behind: a DashSdkErrorTest mapping (broke :sdk:test compile), the rs-platform-wallet-ffi README ABI note, and a shielded_send.rs comment. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ntracts (dashpay#4184) Address maintainer/CodeRabbit review findings on the dashpay#4184 asset-lock funding re-scope. 1. Reserve the selected-account inputs (correctness / double-spend). `build_asset_lock_tx_from_selected_account` seeded inputs via `add_inputs` with NO ReservationSet, so a re-scoped shielded build reserved nothing — a concurrent normal Core send (the BIP44 `build_asset_lock_with_signer` path) or a CoinJoin mix could reselect the same UTXOs in the build->broadcast->reconcile window (the wallet write lock + `shield_guard` only serialize shielded builds). Point the key-wallet builder's `set_funding` at the SELECTED funds account instead of `add_inputs`, so the chosen inputs are reserved in that account's OWN reservation ledger (the same single-account machinery the BIP44 builder uses) and held across build->broadcast. Release on a rejected broadcast is now path-aware (`release_asset_lock_funding_reservation`): shielded funding releases from the account named by `funding_path` (possibly CoinJoin/DashPay); every other funding type from the BIP44 account. Adds two tests: a selected-account build reserves its CoinJoin input across broadcast, and a rejected selected-account broadcast releases it. 2. Restore `WalletOperation` for the generic shielded-funding failure arm (was regressed to `Unknown(99)`): `platform_wallet_error_code_or_wallet_operation` keeps typed codes but maps the catch-all to `ErrorWalletOperation`, at both the fund and resume-fund FFI entry points. 3. JNI: read `fundingPath` with a strict reader that throws on a genuine JNI read error instead of silently degrading a money-source param to the default BIP44 account; JVM null still means "absent". 4. Rewrite the stale multi-account-union/consent docs in `orchestration.rs` (FromWalletBalance) to the as-built single-path design. 5. Swift example: the funding-account picker now surfaces non-Standard funds accounts (CoinJoin/DashPay) with type labels, and `canSubmit` no longer gates on the selected Core account's balance when an explicit `fundingPath` is supplied — so a CoinJoin path is exercisable end-to-end. Validation: cargo build -p platform-wallet -p platform-wallet-ffi -p rs-unified-sdk-jni --features shielded; cargo test -p platform-wallet --features shielded (639 passed); cargo test -p platform-wallet-ffi --features shielded (215+26+6 passed); ./gradlew :sdk:assemble -x lint (BUILD SUCCESSFUL). Swift not built locally (no xcframework). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
review blocker 2) Reviewer (thepastaclaw) blocker 2 — build.rs:423-424: build_asset_lock_tx_from_selected_account passed the BIP44 change account (&bip44_acc) as set_funding's `acc`, but set_funding calls funds_acc.next_change_address(Some(&acc.account_xpub)) on the SELECTED funds account before the set_change_address override. For an explicitly selected Standard BIP32 account with no pre-generated unused internal address, that derived [1, index] from the wrong (BIP44) xpub and recorded it under the BIP32 account's own path, poisoning that pool so a later normal BIP32 send could use a change entry whose signer key does not match the address. Now resolve the wallet-level Account whose account-level derivation path equals funding_path and pass ITS xpub to set_funding, while keeping the separate BIP44 set_change_address override. Default BIP44 funding resolves to bip44_acc (unchanged); non-Standard (CoinJoin/DashPay) accounts fail change derivation regardless, so the xpub is immaterial and the bip44_acc fallback preserves prior behavior. Also (thepastaclaw nitpick, test_support.rs): move the DashPay fixture rustdoc so it attaches to split_funded_wallet_manager_dashpay rather than foreign_contact_account_xpub. Blocker 1 (build.rs:427-473, owner-guarded reservation rollback on the pre-broadcast abandonment path) is NOT addressed here: the pinned key-wallet rev 70d4bf8 exposes no owner-guarded release primitive (ReservationSet has only reserve/reserved/release keyed by outpoint; release_reservation is unconditional) and no reservation token, so the required release_if_owner(token) mechanism (rust-dashcore#916 / dashpay#4185) cannot be implemented against this pin without an upstream dependency change — the very atomic-reservation fix this PR is held for. Deferred pending that adoption rather than substituting an unconditional release on the money path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…adcast path build_signed reserves the selected inputs in the funding account's ReservationSet and normally holds them from build through broadcast. But several post-signing, pre-broadcast error paths could return without rolling that reservation back, stranding the inputs until the reservation-TTL backstop (~24 blocks) and causing false shortfalls / withheld coins in the meantime (dashpay#4184 review, thepastaclaw): - build_asset_lock_tx_from_selected_account (shielded selected-account path): the credit-account lookups, peek_next_path, the external signer.public_key round-trip, and mark_first_pool_index_used are all fallible after build_signed. Derive the credit key in an inner future and, on any error, release the reservation on the selected funds account (matched by funding_path, mirroring release_asset_lock_funding_reservation) before propagating. - build_asset_lock_transaction (non-shielded / upstream builder path): the two defensive credit-key arms after build_asset_lock_with_signer abandon a signed+reserved tx; release on the BIP44 account at account_index. - broadcast_funded_asset_lock invitation durability branch: when the funding-index persist/flush fails we abort before broadcast; release the reservation via release_asset_lock_funding_reservation before bailing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…on window Addresses the outstanding review findings on dashpay#4184 at a9e418a. Reservation lifecycle, delegated (non-shielded) builder — blocker. `build_asset_lock_with_signer` reserves the transaction's inputs inside `build_signed` and rolls that back only when *input* signing fails. Its credit-output loop runs afterwards, and a failure there returns `Err` with a fully-signed transaction abandoned and its inputs still reserved. That reservation cannot be rolled back from platform-wallet at this pin: the error carries no transaction to hand `release_reservation`, and the account's `ReservationSet` is `pub(crate)` to key-wallet. The abandon path is therefore removed rather than rolled back. Of the loop's fallible steps only the external `signer.public_key` round-trip is genuinely reachable — resolving the credit account, `peek_next_path` and `mark_first_pool_index_used` cannot fail once `peek_next_funding_address` has resolved and peeked that same account earlier in the call under the same held wallet write lock. So the signer round-trip now happens up front, before anything is reserved, and the builder receives a `PrefetchedCreditKeySigner` that answers the repeat request from cache. `peek_next_funding_address` returns the peeked path alongside the address to feed it. Standard BIP32 regression coverage. Adds the test the reviewer asked for around the `set_funding` xpub lookup: it exhausts a selected BIP32 account's pre-generated unused internal entries so `next_change_address` must derive a fresh one, builds through that account's explicit path, and asserts every internal-pool entry is still signable at its own recorded path. Reverting the lookup to the BIP44 xpub fails it. SwiftExampleApp funding picker. Picker rows were all tagged with a bare `accountIndex`, which account families reuse — BIP44 #0, BIP32 #0 and CoinJoin #0 collided, so SwiftUI could not tell which row was chosen and a non-BIP44 row without a BIP44 counterpart fed an invalid change account to Rust. The picker is now restricted to BIP44 accounts (the mandatory change sink, listed even at zero balance so the dashpay#4073 case still works) and the other funds accounts are shown read-only. Public API documentation. `account_index` / `fundingAccountIndex` is documented as the change sink that doubles as the default input source, rather than unconditionally as the input source, across the Rust FFI, Swift and Kotlin surfaces — it contradicted the `funding_path` docs immediately below it. Tests: platform-wallet 511/511 (2 new), platform-wallet-ffi 205/205 + 26 + 6; cargo fmt applied; clippy clean on both crates (only pre-existing warnings in recovery.rs / withdrawal.rs). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two mechanical CI-hard failures on bd19a3e: 1. `cargo fmt --check --all` failed on the JNI funding-path bridge (rs-unified-sdk-jni/src/funding.rs). Applied rustfmt's replacement. 2. The wallet clippy job (`--all-features -- --no-deps -D warnings`) failed with `dead_code` on five PR-added asset-lock fixtures in platform-wallet's `test_support`. The module is compiled into the normal lib target under `--all-features` (it is gated `cfg(any(test, feature = "test-utils"))`), so `pub(crate)` helpers consumed only by `#[cfg(test)]` unit tests have no consumer there. Gated `split_funded_wallet_manager`, `DashpayLeg`, `foreign_contact_account_xpub`, `split_funded_wallet_manager_dashpay` and `split_funded_wallet_manager_many_coinjoin` on `cfg(test)`, plus the imports that only they use (`OutPoint`/`TxOut`/`Txid`, `Utxo`). `cfg(test)` — not `cfg(any(test, feature = "test-utils"))` — matches the convention this file already documents on `RejectFirstBroadcaster` and applies to all four mock broadcasters. It cannot break the cross-crate test build: the only external consumer (rs-platform-wallet-ffi's broadcast tests) uses `funded_spv_core_wallet` and `WalletSigner`, both `pub` and both left untouched, while the five gated items are `pub(crate)` and were never reachable from outside. Also addresses the two review suggestions, both additive: - Added `delegated_builder_serves_credit_key_from_prefetch_cache`. The existing failure test's signer rejects every `public_key` call, so it only proves a prefetch failure is reservation-free. The new recording signer answers exactly one request and poisons the rest, pinning that the builder's credit-key request is served from `PrefetchedCreditKeySigner`'s cache and that the prefetched path is exactly the credit path the builder returns. - Added four `parse_optional_derivation_path` tests covering null, zero length with a non-null pointer, a valid account-level path, invalid UTF-8 and malformed syntax — pinning that the funding-path parser fails closed with ErrorInvalidParameter instead of silently falling back to the default BIP44 source. No error codes touched; ErrorAssetLockInsufficientFunds stays 29. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The rest of the wallet-crate docs use the American spelling ~2:1; align the new release-notes bullet with it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…OMAIN-OK The abandon-path rollback added by this PR walks all_funding_accounts() to reach the owning account's release_reservation. dashpay#4247's funding-domain guardrail (wallet::funding_privacy) treats any unannotated use of the wallet-wide funds iterator as a potential cross-account funding union and fails the build — so the two PRs are individually green but fail together, as the v41int13 integration confirmed. The site selects no coins: it looks up the ONE account matching the already-chosen funding_path, releases that account's reservation, and breaks. Annotate it accordingly. Comment only, no behavior change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Shields asset-lock funding from all funds accounts: a multi-account funding builder (
build_asset_lock_tx_from_all_funding_accounts) that unions spendable UTXOs across BIP44 + CoinJoin + DashPay funds accounts with LargestFirst coin selection, excludes watch-onlyDashpayExternalAccountUTXOs (a contact's coins the local mnemonic cannot sign), and mapsNoUtxosAvailableto the typed asset-lock insufficient-funds error, with regression tests for the router-fix persistence path and the watch-only exclusion.Re-opens #4074 which was auto-closed when the #3999 base branch was deleted; rebased onto
v4.1-dev. The PR's own rust-dashcore router customization stays dropped —v4.1-dev's rust-dashcore pin already carries that fix upstream (rust-dashcore#867), which the ported regression tests confirm against the pin. The platform-side changes inrs-platform-walletare NOT inv4.1-devand are all retained; the only conflict was a trivial import union intest_support.rs.Verified:
cargo test -p platform-wallet— 502 tests pass (38 asset-lock).🤖 Generated with Claude Code
Review-response summary (2026-07-21)
AssetLockInsufficientFundsnow crosses as dedicated code 29 (ErrorAssetLockInsufficientFunds), mapped in Kotlin and Swift, with an FFI-level test pinning the numeric code and verbatim message. The Display text is unchanged from what dash-wallet already matches, so no host breakage; hosts should migrate from substring-matching to the typed code at their convenience. Codes 26–28 are deliberately skipped — they're allocated by the reservation-token errors on the split-build-broadcast branch (feat(kotlin-sdk): split build/broadcast with reservation release for BIP70-style deferred submission #4185); a comment in the enum documents the reservation so the two PRs can't collide.allow_cross_domain, default false everywhere, including the resume path); refusal is typed code 30 (ErrorAssetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired) carrying transparent/union/required amounts. The identity-funding carve-out is unchanged — consent is ignored there, pinned by test. Round-2 addition: a fee-band shortfall (transparent covers the amount but not amount+fee, union covers it) is reclassified to consent-required at the selection-failure site, so hosts prompt instead of dead-ending; both the fee-band and denied-both-short paths are now tested.cargo test -p platform-wallet --lib→ 506 passed;--features shielded --lib→ 636 passed;-p platform-wallet-ffi --lib→ 198 passed; clippy clean on all three crates.allowCrossDomain = trueafter explicit user opt-in; dash-wallet will need a consent touchpoint before adopting the next AAR.Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Bug Fixes
Provenance (tracker refs moved from code comments per review)
The
build.rsfunding-eligibility comments previously carried an internal review-tracking tokenfinding 5b52d9844055(4 sites). Removed from the comments (rationale text kept); it tracked the watch-onlyDashpayExternalAccountownership carve-out now expressed through the privacy-domain map.C-ABI note
platform_wallet_manager_shielded_fund_from_asset_lockgained a trailingallow_cross_domain: boolparameter — a C-ABI break — and result codes 29/30 (ErrorAssetLockInsufficientFunds/ErrorAssetLockCrossDomainConsentRequired) are added. Seepackages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/README.md.