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This was referenced Nov 21, 2026
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Summary
Independently restrict validated administrative bearer tokens to operator-approved source networks,
before downstream middleware, user creation, and API authorization. UAA validates issuance and its
own token use, but Cloud Controller must enforce usage independently because it validates JWTs offline.
uaa.admin,cloud_controller.admin,cloud_controller.admin_read_only,cloud_controller.global_auditor, andzones.<id>.adminin both scopes and authorities.X-Real-IPonly on the actual configured Unix-domain socket.CF-NotAuthorizedHTTP 403and clear validated context without invoking downstream handling.
Configuration:
admin_token_network_policy.{enabled,allowed_cidrs,trusted_proxies,additional_protected_scopes}.Ordinary and unauthenticated requests retain existing behavior. Feature docs describe trust and rollout.
Validation
forged headers, actual socket identity, and forwarded-chain bounds.
git diff --checkpass.Draft validation gap: full application middleware specs have not executed locally. The application
dependencies are absent (
mock_redisis the first load failure;bundle checkreports many missinggems), and installed Ruby is 4.0.7 rather than this repository's 4.0.9. CI/full application integration,
actual Nginx/Puma header spoofing, Unix-socket permissions, and public/internal/upload ingress need review.
No deployment was changed. Real CIDRs, NAT/VPN egress, and trusted ingress topology remain operator inputs.
Coordinated changes
Deploy the matching Nginx source-header fixes before enabling Unix-socket header trust: canonical
X-Real-IPmust be overwritten, legacyX-Real_IPremoved, and upload forwarding sanitized.This is not cryptographic sender constraint or an exhaustive escalation boundary.