fix: return browser-open command instead of spawning it (CodeQL command-injection)#308
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gaurav-singh-9227 merged 2 commits intoMay 28, 2026
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Restrict openBrowser() to https URLs on *.browserstack.com so attacker-influenced URL data cannot reach `cmd /c start` on Windows or the equivalent open/xdg-open calls on macOS/Linux. Closes the CodeQL js/command-line-injection alert (#2). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolves CodeQL js/command-line-injection (alert #2) at src/tools/applive-utils/start-session.ts. Instead of the server calling childProcess.spawn() with a user-influenced launch URL, it now returns the platform-appropriate open command as text. The host agent prompts the user before executing it, so the server never spawns a process and the command-injection surface is eliminated. The URL is still validated (https + *.browserstack.com allowlist) before being surfaced. Applies the same conversion to the identical openBrowser/spawn in live-utils/start-session.ts for parity. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
gaurav-singh-9227
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ruturaj-browserstack
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May 28, 2026
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What
Resolves CodeQL
js/command-line-injection(critical, alert #2) atsrc/tools/applive-utils/start-session.ts.Approach
Instead of the MCP server spawning a browser process itself with a user-influenced launch URL (
childProcess.spawn(...)), the server now returns the platform-appropriate open command as text. The host AI agent surfaces that command, asks the user for permission, and runs the same command.The server never spawns a process, so the command-injection surface is eliminated rather than merely guarded. The URL is still validated (
https:+*.browserstack.comallowlist) before being surfaced; untrusted/malformed URLs are refused.Changes
src/tools/applive-utils/start-session.ts— the file flagged by alert add MCP server badge #2.openBrowser()→getOpenBrowserCommand(); returns the command in the tool response.src/tools/live-utils/start-session.ts— the identicalopenBrowser/spawnin the Live-session path, converted for parity (CodeQL flagged only applive, but both shared the same vulnerable code).Verification
tsc --noEmit→ cleaneslinton changed files → cleanvitest→ 77/77 pass🤖 Generated with Claude Code