DockLiner Security Analysis

Authentication

BLAKE3-512 password hashes stored in app/core/config.py USERS JSON array.
Root user root with password qwer.1234 has a hardcoded hash; non-resettable.
Session cookies (dockliner_user, dockliner_login) with httponly and samesite="lax".
Rate limiting: 5 login attempts per minute per IP.

Single-user model. No roles, no multi-tenant isolation.
All authenticated users have full access to all projects, tokens, Docker commands, and audit logs.

FastAPI/Pydantic validates request schemas. No SQL injection via ORM.
Project names must be unique (DB constraint).
GitHub repo URLs are stored as plain strings; no URL validation beyond nullable=True.
RateLimitService caps deploy attempts: 3 per minute per project per IP.

Docker daemon runs on localhost only. No remote Docker host support.
docker scout quickview may expose registry login requirements in stderr (see below).
Container operations (stop, remove, image remove) are unrestricted once authenticated.
docker system prune -f runs automatically after every deploy — irreversible.

GitHub tokens stored in SQLite (access_tokens.token) as plaintext. No encryption at rest.
.env files written to disk in projects/<name>/ directories.
SECRET_KEY defaults to "change-me" if not set via env.

Docker Scout login leak: docker scout quickview stderr may contain marketing text about Docker ID/login if not authenticated. This is returned in the security summary output field. Not a secret leak, but noisy.
Plaintext tokens: access_tokens.token is stored in plaintext in SQLite. Anyone with DB file access can read tokens.
No HTTPS enforcement: Cookies are httponly but not secure. Suitable for localhost only.
Docker prune on every deploy: DeployService.deploy_project() calls DockerService.system_prune() unconditionally. This removes unused images, networks, and volumes system-wide.