Sync with upstream - #17
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* Fix workspace check Signed-off-by: Artyom Savchenko <armisav@gmail.com> * Fix workspace validation Signed-off-by: Artyom Savchenko <armisav@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Artyom Savchenko <armisav@gmail.com>
…(#10990) Signed-off-by: Denis Bykhov <bykhov.denis@gmail.com>
…(#10995)
* fix(github): honour the force flag in checkRefreshToken
`checkRefreshToken` accepts a `force` parameter but never reads it, so the
only caller that passes `force = true` (worker.ts, when re-syncing a user)
behaves exactly like the non-forced call and skips the refresh entirely.
Gate the refresh on `force || expired` instead of on expiry alone. As a
side effect a record with a `refreshToken` but a null `expiresIn` is now
validated when forced, instead of being reported as valid unchecked.
Signed-off-by: koreanjoker <namug014@gmail.com>
* fix(github): return undefined from getOctokit when the token is dead
When `checkRefreshToken` reports failure, `getOctokit` cleared
`record.octokit` and then fell straight through to constructing a new
Octokit from the very token that was just rejected. The method therefore
never returned `undefined` for a revoked user, so the
`(await getOctokit(...)) ?? container.container.octokit` installation-token
fallback that the sync code already writes at 13 call sites was
unreachable.
Return `undefined` after clearing the client so the existing fallback can
take effect.
Signed-off-by: koreanjoker <namug014@gmail.com>
* fix(github): preserve accounts when deserialising a user secret
`updateUser` serialises the whole `GithubUserRecord` — `accounts`
included — into the integration secret, but `secretToUserRecord` placed a
literal `accounts: {}` after the spread of the parsed payload, discarding
whatever was stored.
Every consumer of a record loaded through `getAccount` therefore saw an
empty map. `revokeUserAuth` iterates `Object.entries(record.accounts)`, so
its body never ran and the re-authorisation notice was never written to
any workspace.
Read `accounts` back from the parsed payload, keeping `{}` as the fallback
for records written before the field existed.
Signed-off-by: koreanjoker <namug014@gmail.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: koreanjoker <namug014@gmail.com>
…ons (#10997) * fix(account): authorize mergeSpecifiedPersons / canMergeSpecifiedPersons Both operations decoded the caller token and discarded the result, so any authenticated caller could merge any two persons by uuid. Merging re-points the secondary person's social ids onto the primary one, and neither login nor password recovery require a social id to be verified, so this reached as far as taking over an arbitrary account. Authorize both behind verifyMergePersonsAuthority: - global admin tokens and the tool/workspace services pass, matching the account level mergeSpecifiedAccounts; - everybody else must maintain the workspace their token carries, and both persons must be within its reach: a person holding an account elsewhere, and the platform wide system and guest accounts, are refused; - a login capable social id may not move onto an account the caller does not own. doMergePersons only refuses verified secondary social ids, which leaves the unverified ones a maintainer could mint for themselves. canMergeSpecifiedPersons answers false instead of throwing: it is the predicate the merge dialog polls, and it awaits it without a catch. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ANdoXbdn5k2hZy734EwKe7 Signed-off-by: Don Kendall <dkendall@ledoweb.com> * test(account): cover merge persons authorization Nineteen cases over both operations: the reported attack shape, the maintainer to owner escalation through an unverified email, foreign accounts on either side of the merge, the platform guest account, and the paths that must keep working (workspace contacts, members, tool service and admin tokens). Removing the authorization check fails eight of them. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ANdoXbdn5k2hZy734EwKe7 Signed-off-by: Don Kendall <dkendall@ledoweb.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Don Kendall <dkendall@ledoweb.com>
* Clean up commented tools Signed-off-by: Artyom Savchenko <armisav@gmail.com> * Clean up Signed-off-by: Artyom Savchenko <armisav@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Artyom Savchenko <armisav@gmail.com>
…nto sync-uptrace-27-jul
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