TablePilot is a local-first tool — by default it processes files on the operator's own machine and never uploads data to a remote host. Still, the analysis service (analysis_service/) exposes an HTTP surface, and a vulnerability there could affect any deployment that runs the service on a shared host.

Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security reports. Instead, use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting:

1. Go to https://github.com/Phoenix0531-sudo/TablePilot/security/advisories/new
2. Fill in the affected endpoint or component, a reproduction, and the impact.
3. Mark the advisory private until a fix is coordinated.

You should receive an initial response within 7 days.

In scope:

• The FastAPI analysis service in analysis_service/app/ — path traversal via filename / dataset, unsafe deserialization of uploaded files, SSRF via the optional local_ai remote, and any endpoint that writes outside DATA_DIR.
• The Docker image / docker-compose.yml — container escape, running as root, exfiltration via env vars.

Out of scope:

• The Qt / C++ desktop shell reading local user files (it runs as the user already; local privilege is assumed).
• local_ai calling a local model (e.g. ollama) — that path is operator-chosen and runs on localhost; only an attacker controlling the LOCAL_LLM_BASE_URL env var would be in scope, and that is an operator configuration issue, not a TablePilot vulnerability.

Only the latest release in the v1.x line receives security fixes. See https://github.com/Phoenix0531-sudo/TablePilot/releases for the current latest. The service component version (v0.5.0 at the time of writing) is independent of the repo release version and is documented in analysis_service/app/main.py.