This document defines HIDEBAF's security design goals, vulnerability reporting pipelines, and cryptographic threat vectors.

HIDEBAF relies on standard cryptographic algorithms (AES-256-GCM and scrypt) to secure archives.

• Brute-Force Protection: Passwords undergo a high cost factor function (scrypt key derivation) to increase the time needed to compute possible keys. If Paranoid Mode is enabled, the work factor increases from $16384$ to $65536$, making brute-force attempts resource-intensive.
• Offline Attacks & Self-Destruct: While standard KDF functions slow down online attacks, offline key verification can be targeted by automated script brute-forcers. To mitigate this risk, the Self-Destruct module tracks unsuccessful verification attempts and overwrites the entire archive (payload and slots headers) with decoy image data upon reaching the maximum try limit (default 5 attempts).
• Data Tampering Protection: GCM (Galois/Counter Mode) authenticated tags are appended to each ciphertext sector to verify data integrity before decryption. If any segment of the ciphertext is modified, verification fails, halting the decryption process.

If you identify a security vulnerability in HIDEBAF's implementation, please report it privately:

• Do not open a public issue on GitHub. This helps prevent vulnerability disclosures before a patch is ready.
• Reporting Email: Submit detailed vulnerability reports, including proof-of-concepts, to: DRAGON_YG@outlook.com

1. Acknowledgement: Reports are reviewed within 48 hours.
2. Analysis: The vulnerability is verified on the target codebase.
3. Patch Preparation: Updates are prepared and tested.
4. Coordinated Disclosure: A release version is published, and the advisory is disclosed.