fix(ci): let Scorecard publish by making top-level workflow permissions read-only#125
fix(ci): let Scorecard publish by making top-level workflow permissions read-only#125seonghobae wants to merge 1 commit into
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…ns read-only The Scorecard supply-chain security run on master fails because ossf/scorecard-action refuses to publish results when the workflow grants security-events: write at the top level. Move to top-level 'permissions: read-all'; the analysis job keeps its own id-token/security-events write grants, so SARIF upload is unaffected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hw6V6hgwiNNe74eSCFymtP
OpenCode Review Overview
Pull request overviewOpenCode reviewed the current-head bounded evidence and found no blocking issues. FindingsNo blocking findings. SummaryApproval sufficiency: bounded evidence supplied affirmative approval evidence for changed files, coverage/docstring posture, risk surfaces, and current-head verification; approval is not based merely on the absence of known blockers.
Changed-File Evidence Mapflowchart LR
PR["PR changed files"] --> Evidence["OpenCode bounded evidence"]
Evidence --> S1["Workflow: scorecard.yml"]
S1 --> I1["GitHub Actions review job"]
I1 --> R1["Review risk: Workflow: scorecard.yml"]
R1 --> V1["actionlint plus required checks"]
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Pull request overview
OpenCode reviewed the current-head bounded evidence and found no blocking issues.
Findings
No blocking findings.
Summary
Approval sufficiency: bounded evidence supplied affirmative approval evidence for changed files, coverage/docstring posture, risk surfaces, and current-head verification; approval is not based merely on the absence of known blockers.
Verification posture: CodeGraph evidence was initialized and bounded current-head evidence reviewed for changed-file evidence including .github/workflows/scorecard.yml.
Linter/static: workflow/static review evidence is bounded by the current-head GitHub Checks gate and changed-file evidence.
TDD/regression: coverage execution evidence and focused changed hunks were reviewed from bounded-review-evidence.md.
Coverage: coverage execution evidence reports test coverage as not applicable because no supported changed source files or package manifests were found.
Docstring coverage: coverage execution evidence reports docstring coverage as not applicable because no supported changed source files or package manifests were found.
DAG: CodeGraph/source-backed behavior map connects .github/workflows/scorecard.yml to the affected review, runtime, or workflow path and required checks.
PoC/execution: coverage-evidence job executed on the current head and reported PASS.
DDD/domain: workflow and repository-governance invariants were reviewed against changed files in bounded evidence.
CDD/context: CodeGraph evidence, changed-file history, and focused hunks were reviewed from bounded-review-evidence.md.
Similar issues: changed-file history evidence was reviewed for comparable local precedents.
Claim/concept check: bounded evidence, repository source, current-head workflow evidence, and, where numeric, scientific, statistical, or literature-backed claims are affected, original-paper/formula evidence and parameter-recovery expectations were used for claims.
Standards search: standards and external-source checks are delegated to configured OpenCode web_search/Context7/DeepWiki sources when applicable; no evidence-backed standards blocker is present in bounded evidence.
Compatibility/convention: changed workflow/script conventions, object naming, and reserved-word safety for schema/API/config/code surfaces were checked in bounded evidence.
Breaking-change/backcompat: deployment evidence and changed-file history were checked for backward-compatibility risk.
Performance: changed surfaces were checked for performance risk in bounded evidence.
Developer experience: changed automation, review, test, setup, and maintenance surfaces were checked for helpful or obstructive DX impact in bounded evidence.
User experience: connected user, operator, API, CLI, documentation, review-comment, status-check, rendering, and workflow-reader behavior was checked for contradictions against code, docs, and tests in bounded evidence.
Visual/DOM: Playwright visual, DOM locator, ARIA snapshot, console, and responsive evidence were checked when a web UI surface was present; for non-web surfaces, API/CLI/log/docs/workflow interaction evidence was reviewed instead.
Accessibility/i18n: accessibility, localization, and human-readable text surfaces were checked where UI, CLI, API message, docs, logs, or review text changed.
Supply-chain/license: dependency, package, model, container, and external-tool changes were checked in bounded evidence.
Packaging: package, build, test, lint, and security contracts were checked in bounded evidence.
Security/privacy: workflow-token, review-gate, and repository-automation security/privacy boundaries were checked in bounded evidence.
- Result: APPROVE
- Reason: The PR addresses a security issue by making the workflow permissions read-only for Scorecard, ensuring compliance with ossf/scorecard-action requirements. No unresolved issues or failed checks were found.
- Head SHA:
64b438ebe39aacb4935e52c0f9adc094c91e9a32 - Workflow run: 29062950573
- Workflow attempt: 1
Changed-File Evidence Map
flowchart LR
PR["PR changed files"] --> Evidence["OpenCode bounded evidence"]
Evidence --> S1["Workflow: scorecard.yml"]
S1 --> I1["GitHub Actions review job"]
I1 --> R1["Review risk: Workflow: scorecard.yml"]
R1 --> V1["actionlint plus required checks"]
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Closing as superseded by #118. I checked #125 against current Merging or restacking the branch as-is would reintroduce the deleted local workflow files and also roll back newer docs/tests from the current stack. If Scorecard permissions need another change now, it should be made in the central workflow source rather than by reviving the deleted local workflow. |
2 participants
Problem
The
Scorecard supply-chain securityworkflow is the only failing workflow onmaster(latest completed run 28776606120).ossf/scorecard-actionrefuses to publish results when the workflow-levelpermissionsblock grants any write scope — this workflow grantedsecurity-events: writeat the top level, so the run fails before uploading SARIF, and the failure reason is only visible deep in the action output.Fix
permissions:→read-all, per scorecard-action's publish restriction.analysisjob keeps its existing job-levelid-token: write+security-events: write, so OIDC publishing and SARIF upload to code scanning are unaffected.No other workflow in this repo uses scorecard-action; the remaining workflows' permissions are untouched.
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