Conversation
An agent that uses its canvas the way ent#438 intends accumulates dozens: one per report, per topic, per run. The Workspace could only ever ADD to that pile — the client-portal surface had no delete at all, the only ordering was "newest updated", and nothing bounded the table. Two decisions, both by operator ruling 2026-09-08, recorded because each had a plausible alternative: **Deleting is owner-or-admin.** The answer ent#548 gives for files — the owner deletes the shared artifact. This NARROWS the platform DELETE route, which accepted any user with agent access; safe because no UI called it, so no workflow depended on the wider gate. A canvas is one shared surface with no per-user copy, so a non-owner has no "hide it from my list" middle ground: per AC #2 they see no control at all rather than one that 403s. Agents keep clearing their own (`clear_canvas`, the #918 self-gate). **The bound is a per-agent CAP, not a retention window.** ent#438 recorded "no retention window" because the composite key bounds rows per canvas — but `canvas_id` is agent-chosen, so the COUNT was unbounded; the axis was missed, not decided. `CANVAS_MAX_PER_AGENT` (100, env-tunable) is checked inside `upsert_canvas`'s insert branch, in the same transaction as the INSERT, so it is not a check-then-act race. Updating an existing canvas is NEVER refused — a cap that froze updates would punish exactly the agent that reuses ids — and the refusal is a named 409 telling the agent to retire one, never an eviction: deleting a person's surfaces on a timer is the #1638 failure direction. Both surfaces resolve permission through `db.can_user_share_agent`, the same predicate `assert_agent_owner` uses, so Agent Detail and the Workspace cannot disagree about who owns an agent. The Workspace learns it from `PortalAgentCard.can_manage_canvases` — the portal's only capability channel (#2128), since a portal principal cannot read `/api/settings/feature-flags` — and it fails closed. `pinned` (dual-track: `agent_canvases_pinned` + Alembic 0058, NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, no backfill) is written only by the human pin route and is deliberately absent from every agent-facing tool: `audience` is the agent's decision about who may read, `pinned` is the reader's about what they see first, and an agent that could pin itself to the top would defeat the ordering. A pin survives the agent rewriting the canvas. Living with many is `CanvasPanel.vue`, shared by both surfaces (one rendering layer, per ent#475): search once the list passes six, a height-bounded strip so a long list does not cost the rail its other tabs, and a Manage mode giving each row its age, stale mark, pin and delete. Decidable rules are pure in `canvasUtils.js` — vitest runs `environment: 'node'` with no mount harness, so a rule inside the SFC is one no test can reach. Bulk delete is a POST, not a body-carrying DELETE (bodies on DELETE are permitted-but-unreliable and this one is not optional), declared above the parameterized routes on both routers (Invariant #4), and it reports the ids that EXISTED rather than the ids requested so "3 of 5 removed" is sayable. Three pre-existing guards failed and each was right to: `empty_canvas` was missing the new field (a real bug in this change, fixed), the self-gate guard needed to learn the new gate's name, and the positional-read guard needed its synthetic row extended — that one exists precisely because `_row_to_summary` reads by index. Tests: 20 new backend cases (cap refusal + update-at-cap, pin ordering and survival, bulk scoping, the permission matrix on both surfaces, route ordering, dual-track migration parity, and that the MCP tools cannot pin) and ~24 vitest cases for the pure rules. Verified against a real database: the cap refuses the 4th of 3, updates still succeed at the cap, a pin outranks recency and survives a rewrite, and bulk delete returns only the ids that existed. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdxGmvuKuqaWJZ6pKUgaUJ
…ment the lifecycle Closes the three acceptance criteria the first commit left open: * AC #1 asked for the deletion to be audited and only the BULK route was — the single-canvas route is the one a person actually clicks. Logged only when something was removed, since the route is idempotent and a repeat click would otherwise fill the trail with events where nothing happened. * AC #8: deleting the DEFAULT canvas is allowed, comes back empty on the next write, and frees a slot against the cap. `main` is the id both the MCP tools and the voice panel fall back to, so it is the one most likely to be deleted by accident and the one whose deletion must strand nobody. * AC #9: the user doc gains a "Removing canvases" section stating the permission rule, the cap, and that nothing is ever deleted to make room. Also records a latent pre-existing mismatch found while testing: `empty_canvas` returns None timestamps while `models.Canvas` requires strings, so `Canvas(**empty_canvas(...))` raises. Not live — its only caller declares no `response_model` — but adding one there would turn the voice teardown poll into a 500. Left as a comment where the next person to reach for that will meet it, rather than fixed out of scope. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdxGmvuKuqaWJZ6pKUgaUJ
…he test imports it Two ent#553 tests passed in isolation and failed in a full-suite run: `test_the_cap_refuses_a_new_canvas_by_name` and `test_deleting_the_default_canvas_frees_a_slot_against_the_cap`. Order-dependence, not a defect in the feature. They patched `db.canvas.CANVAS_MAX_PER_AGENT` via a fresh `import db.canvas`. Some earlier test in the suite evicts that module from `sys.modules`, so the fresh import hands back a NEW module object while the live `db._canvas_ops` is still an instance of the OLD class — whose `upsert_canvas` reads the OLD module's globals. The patch lands somewhere nothing consults, the cap stays at its default of 100, and the "refuses the 4th of 3" assertions fail. `_set_cap` patches the bound method's own `__globals__`, which is whichever module dict the running code actually closes over — correct whether or not an eviction happened, so it does not depend on knowing which test pollutes. Same failure and same fix as #2589, where the identical shape bit `mark_stale_activities_failed`. Worth noting the class: a monkeypatch on a module attribute is only as good as the assumption that the live object came from that module object, and in a suite that evicts modules that assumption is not free. The feature is unchanged — this touches only the test file. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdxGmvuKuqaWJZ6pKUgaUJ
…eachable Two review items from #2619. **Alembic head fork (#2068 class).** `0058_agent_canvases_pinned` shared `down_revision = 0057` with #2608's `0058_portal_file_dismissals`, which has since landed on `dev` — two heads, and `alembic upgrade head` resolves its single target before applying anything, so EVERY revision merged since the fork stops arriving, not just one. Re-parented onto `0058_portal_file_dismissals` and renumbered to `0059` so the prefix keeps being a usable ordering cue; the id is not applied anywhere yet, so the rename costs nothing. `check_alembic_heads.py` reports 1 head. **`CANVAS_MAX_PER_AGENT` was inert (#1039 class).** The refusal message names the number, but the variable was read only from `os.getenv` in `models.py` and appeared in no compose file — so an operator following the refusal's own advice would raise a lever that never reaches the container. Wired into `docker-compose.yml`, `.prod.yml` and `.hosted.yml` (the last two launch standalone, no base merge / no `env_file`) plus `.env.example`. Related to #2619 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bd71qsYbFodvofba8P69eP
…ecycle # Conflicts: # src/backend/client_portal/service.py # src/backend/models.py # src/backend/routers/canvas.py # src/backend/services/canvas_service.py
…t#553 The raw-colour ratchet became enforceable on dev while this branch was open (#2605/#2609), and the merge brings it here: this PR's delete/pin/ search chrome takes `components/canvas/CanvasPanel.vue` from 25 to 46 `raw_gray`, so `tests/unit/rawColorRatchet.spec.js` fails the frontend build. That growth is the honest kind. The design-system contract SPELLS the neutral ink ladder as `gray-N` — surfaces gray-50/100/800/900, borders gray-200/300/700/800, ink gray-300/400/500/600 — and there is no semantic token for a neutral, which is exactly why the spec's own comment says gray is ratcheted but never held to zero for new files. The rule it does hold new code to is `raw_nongray`, and this file stays at **0**. Re-frozen in its OWN commit with the increase named in the baseline's `refrozen` block, which is what the ratchet's error message asks for — not absorbed silently into the feature diff. The entry is hand-edited rather than regenerated so #2605's provenance block survives; no other file's ceiling moves (verified: nothing grew, nothing is stale, no un-baselined file carries `raw_nongray`). Related to #553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bd71qsYbFodvofba8P69eP
… on ownership (ent#553)
Three review findings, all in the same direction — the backend was right and
the user-facing half did not arrive — plus the two smaller ones.
1. **The stated bound now reaches the user.** `canvasLimit` was a `ref(0)`
nothing ever assigned, so `canvasHeadroom(n, 0)` returned `{label: null}` and
the early warning could not render at any count. The ceiling rides
`GET /api/settings/feature-flags` as `canvas_max_per_agent` — the established
home for a value the browser needs to render a surface, and where
`platform_default_model` / `install_source` already set the precedent for a
non-boolean. Not a new route (Invariant #13 would owe three surfaces for one
integer) and not an envelope around the canvas list (the MCP tool and the
Workspace both read it as a bare array). It is a CONSTANT, not per-agent
state, and the client already holds the count. `0` still means "not told" and
still renders nothing, so an older backend is unchanged.
2. **The Workspace canvas writes are audited.** The three portal routes recorded
nothing while their operator twins have logged since they shipped, and
`docs/user-docs/agents/agent-canvas.md` tells users deletion is audited — so
the claim was false for exactly the client-facing surface. `_audit_canvas_change`
is the shared helper; the actor is `actor_email` (the documented #848
inline-auth path) rather than a fabricated `User`, which is honest because
`_require_canvas_manager` is platform-only and owner-or-admin, so a real
Trinity user is always behind it. Ids and counts only (G-04). The three
routes become `async def` to await it, matching their operator twins, which
already call the same sync db functions from an async handler.
Pinning is audited too, on BOTH surfaces — the operator route was the one
recording nothing. A pin decides which canvas an entire roster sees first, so
it is an administrative act on a shared surface, not a per-viewer preference.
3. **`canManage` comes from the parent.** It was hardcoded `true` on the
argument that the server decides. It does — but a merely-shared user was then
shown Manage → Delete / Pin and got a 403, which is the failing-control
problem `can_manage_canvases` exists to prevent on the Workspace. Agent
Detail passes `agent.can_share`, the same predicate `ReportsPanel` five lines
above already reads and the same one `_gate_human_removal` enforces. The prop
defaults FALSE, so a caller that forgets it hides an affordance rather than
offering one that refuses.
4. **`get_agent_card` resolves `can_manage_canvases`.** It omitted it, so the
same owner read `true` in the sidebar and `false` on the agent's own page —
the disagreement #2160's own docstring says that function exists to prevent.
5. **An agent genuinely cannot pin its own canvas now.** The user doc said so;
`_gate_human_removal` allowed it (right for delete — an agent tidying up
after itself — and wrong for pin), and "no MCP tool exposes it" is a property
of the client, not of the route. `_gate_pin` is humans-only, which makes the
documented sentence true rather than aspirational.
Tests: the audit guard now walks the portal routes as well as `routers.canvas`
(it only ever inspected the latter, which is why three unaudited routes passed
it), plus pin-audit parity, the humans-only pin gate beside the still-permitted
agent self-delete, the feature-flags constant being the same object the refusal
is raised from, the agent-card/roster agreement, and four frontend wiring cases.
1025 backend / 2538 frontend tests green.
Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RSjVEjay9ztC1oDXXkh9uN
… (ent#553)
Found re-reviewing my own audit fix. Adding the rows was right; the attribution
was wrong, and a row that lands under the wrong actor is worse than the missing
row it replaced — nothing fails, so the wrong answer is believed.
`_audit_canvas_change` passed `actor_email` only. But
`platform_audit_service._resolve_actor` derives `actor_type` from
`actor_user` / `actor_agent_name` / `mcp_scope` / `mcp_key_id` and never from
the email, so an email-only call falls through to its last branch:
_resolve_actor(None, None, None, None) -> ("system", "trinity-system", None)
So every Workspace canvas delete and pin was recorded as `actor_type="system"`,
`actor_id="trinity-system"` — a named operator's action attributed to the
platform, invisible to any `actor_type=user` query and to the audit UI's
per-actor filter. Verified against the real resolver, not by reading the call.
The `actor_email`-only path I cited (#848 inline auth) is right where the caller
genuinely has no `users` row. That is not this route: `_require_canvas_manager`
is platform-only and resolves through `db.can_user_share_agent`, so a row exists
by construction. It now resolves that row and passes `actor_user`, producing the
same `("user", <id>, <email>)` shape the operator twin has always written —
which is the point, since auditing the two surfaces differently buys little more
than auditing one of them.
Best-effort by construction: the action has already happened, so a lookup that
raises or misses must not drop the row. It falls back to the email-only call
with a WARNING, since a miss would mean the gate admitted someone the user table
does not know.
Tests: the regression is pinned against the REAL `_resolve_actor` (both the
shape the fix must not return to and the shape it produces now), plus a source
guard that the helper resolves a row, passes `actor_user`, keeps the email as a
fallback and cannot raise. Removing `actor_user=` reds it.
31 passed on the ent#553 file; 953 across canvas / portal / audit.
Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RSjVEjay9ztC1oDXXkh9uN
Resolve src/frontend/raw-color-baseline.json: keep dev's #2662 notes, totals patched to the merged tree's real values (per-file entries unchanged on both sides; scanner + ratchet test verified). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015owqMKD5QDjzZrUTF2Joht
The two cap tests imported the class from `db.canvas` while `_set_cap` already patches the cap through `upsert_canvas.__globals__` — because an earlier test can evict and re-import the module. The same eviction gives the test a different class object than the one the live code raises, and `pytest.raises` then reports the correct refusal as an unexpected exception. Seen once in a full local run after the dev merge (both tests pass in isolation and under CI's three seeds); resolve the class from the same globals the cap comes from. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015owqMKD5QDjzZrUTF2Joht
…atch (ent#553 review)
`CanvasPanel.vue` gated the chip strip on `visible.length > 1 || manage`,
where `visible` is the FILTERED list. Searching down to exactly one canvas
hid the strip while the previously selected canvas stayed on screen, and the
auto-select watcher — keyed off the unfiltered `props.canvases` — never
selected the match. Proven by execution: 7 canvases, query "Topic 3" → strip
false, no-match message false. The one canvas the user just searched for was
unreachable.
Fix:
- `canvasSelectorVisible({visible, manage, query})` — with a query, any hit
shows the strip; without one, a single canvas is no choice (unchanged).
- `canvasAutoSelect(visible, selectedId, query)` — while a query is active
the selection follows the matches; no-op with no query or when the current
selection already matches.
- `CanvasPanel.vue` consumes both: `v-if="selectorVisible"` and a watcher on
`[visible, query]`.
Tests:
- `canvasUtils.spec.js`: the two pure rules.
- `canvasPanelSelectorGate.spec.js`: slices the `selectorVisible` computed out
of the SFC and RUNS it against the ejection's numbers; pins that the
template reads the computed, not a re-derived length test, and that the
watcher calls `canvasAutoSelect`.
- `test_ent553_canvas_lifecycle.py`: the second review ask — the per-agent
cap reaches the wire as a 409 through the real router → service → db
chain (only the Redis rate limiter stubbed), names the remedy, and the same
PUT against an existing id stays an update.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015owqMKD5QDjzZrUTF2Joht
message_router.py defined _sanitize_filename twice at module scope. The first definition is a one-line delegator to services.upload_service. sanitize_filename; the second is the full hardened implementation added for Issue #487. Python binds the later definition, so the delegator was dead code (pyflakes F811: redefinition of unused _sanitize_filename). Removing it also drops the now-unused sanitize_filename import. No behavior change: the Issue #487 implementation was already the one that ran.
…t#553 review) `query` has exactly one writer — the search input's `v-model` — and that input was `v-if="showSearch"` with `showSearch = ordered.length > 6`. Seven canvases, type "Topic 3", delete the one match: six canvases, the box unmounts, `visible` still filters on the stale query, the strip collapses, and the panel says *No canvas matches "Topic 3"* with no control left to clear it. Every remaining canvas is unreachable via the chips until navigation. Also reachable with no operator action: the agent's own `clear_canvas` plus a rail refresh while a query is typed. The rule is pure — `canvasSearchVisible(count, threshold, query)` — and keeps the box while a query is active regardless of the count: the typed intent survives the shrink, and the no-match line keeps the one control that clears it. Resetting `query` when the box would flip off was the other option and was rejected: it erases a search the user was mid-way through because a sibling canvas went away. The gate spec that pinned the previous ejection drove `visible`/`query` in isolation from `showSearch`, which is why it could not see this one. It now slices the real `showSearch` computed out of the SFC and RUNS it against the ejection's own numbers (7 → 6 with "Topic 3" typed → box stays; 6 with no query → box gone), and pins that the input is gated on that computed and is the sole writer of `query`. Mutation-checked: reverting the gate to the old length test reds three cases. Four mechanical items from the same review ride along: - requirements/core-agent.md: the ent#438 "deliberately no retention window: bounded by construction" line now says why that reasoning was wrong (rows are bounded per canvas, the count was not) and what bounds it instead; FR-18..FR-22 record delete / bulk / cap / pin / search, which had no requirements entries at all. - raw-color-baseline.json: the `_ent553_note` naming CanvasPanel.vue's 25 → 46 raw_gray was added in 2794388 and dropped by the dev merge aa248f7; re-added so the growth is named in the file. - routers/canvas.py `# mcp:` header now says pin and bulk-delete are unexposed on purpose, and why — Invariant #13's deliberate-vs-forgotten signal. - feature-flows/agent-canvas.md: the two search-state rules and the defect class they close. Verified: vitest 2696 passed (121 files); canvas backend suites 101 passed; raw-colour ratchet and loading-gate ratchet unchanged. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#553 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RS8FBA7oEtAAv6GamZKong
…Q 334→431 The user docs were last regenerated for v0.9.0 (2026-08-17). 331 commits landed since; this pass reads every feature flow, router and view touched in that window and brings the 138-page tree back to the code. Rewritten around the current product: the Workspace (chat tabs + pinned Main, the composer with typeahead/model tiers/files/voice, the rail, voice mode, canvas vocabulary), subscriptions (5h/7d headroom, pressure, weekly- limit warning, mid-turn failover), hosted install (pull-only compose, TRINITY_IMAGE_TAG, DigitalOcean 1-Click, compose-file pairing, unless- stopped, /mcp via nginx, a full .env reference per compose), asks and deliverables, durable loops, schedule delivery to a Workspace user, rooms in OSS core, Library assign/unassign, fan_out receipts and polling, MCP key scopes, platform settings encrypted at rest, telemetry second cut, guardrail hooks under managed settings, Codex API-key auth, Telegram HTML rendering, the .gitignore push sweep, the dashboard widget allowlist, and the abilities agent-dev 1.16.0 skills. Surfaces that no longer exist are removed rather than left described: the Dashboard "Tag Clouds" / "Activity Feed" sections, the browser Terminal tab (hidden since March — agent-terminal.md now documents SSH), the Agents page, the network graph, the Chat-tab voice overlay, the per-agent /workspace page, the OAuth "click the provider button" flow, and an "Operations → Restart All" control that never had a button. FAQ: every page refreshed against the updated feature docs, 97 questions added, the index regenerated from headings. README index, UI tour, overview, and the video library (v0.9.0 review was missing) updated. Verified: 0 broken relative links, no issue numbers or codenames outside the historical dev-announcements archive, public-safety greps clean, and the CI enterprise-docs guard pattern returns nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016CvKzfEstE5mGZURBUcdGb
…ack under its own cap /sync-feature-flows over the last five dev commits (#2638, #2703, #2571, two left the feature's *home* doc stale while the change was documented elsewhere. fan-out.md (FANOUT-001 home, untouched since April) — #2670 only landed in mcp-orchestration.md, so the doc that owns routers/fan_out.py still said "POST only". Now documents GET /api/agents/{name}/fan-out/{fan_out_id}, build_fan_out_batch_status status derivation, the on_started hook, FanOutBatchTask/FanOutBatchStatus, get_fan_out_executions and its dual-scope reason, the bounded client.ts::fanOut() + get_fan_out_result MCP tool (receipt rationale summarized, pointer to mcp-orchestration.md). Drift repaired while there: db/schedules.py:NNN paths -> the #1481 db/schedules/ package, migration ordinal #30 -> #33 (verified against MIGRATIONS), tool registration via addAllTools, X-MCP-Key-* headers documented as inert per #2389. subscription-auto-switch.md — the #2638 prose was complete but its three catalog tables were not reconciled: Files (subscription_headroom_service, execution_envelope, client_portal/service, the #2638 test; the toggle lives in SubscriptionsPanel.vue + stores/subscriptions.js, not views/Settings.vue), System Setting (subscription_api_key_fallback), API Endpoints (GET/PUT /settings/api-key-fallback). feature-flows.md — 547 -> 444 lines. Recent Updates trimmed 137 -> 20 rows, matching its own "newest ~20" header (#1360); one-line rows added for #2638, #2703, #2670, which had none. 17 flow docs had no Documented Flows category row — subscription-auto-switch.md among them, reachable only via a June Recent Updates row the trim would have removed — so every one of the 190 flow docs now has a category row. Skill Injection row refreshed for delivery-on-assign (#2703). Three links that were already broken in HEAD (AUDIT-001-execution-origin-tracking, skills-crud, mcp-skill-tools) are left as-is. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01168enK9QL4DNuVSN6taw2E
…ecycle Conflict: src/frontend/raw-color-baseline.json (the `totals` block only). The two sides moved different counters for unrelated reasons, so the resolution takes both rather than choosing a side: - dev (#2718) fixed a scanner false positive — a `#` followed by hex digits in rendered copy (issue references like `(#526)`) was read as a colour — dropping hardcoded_colors 456 -> 447 across 8 files. Nothing on this branch touches those files. - this branch adds the canvas delete/pin/search chrome, which raises semantic_tokens 4020 -> 4030. Merged totals are therefore hardcoded_colors 447 (dev's) and semantic_tokens 4030 (this branch's); raw_nongray, raw_gray and files_with_violations were identical on both sides and merged cleanly. `totals` is informational — the ratchet compares PER-FILE counts — but it is kept honest anyway. Verified with the gate itself: `npx vitest run tests/unit/rawColorRatchet.spec.js` → 14 passed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q19uRCksdn4DiRAJ55rfpZ
… — mechanical, per the merge-train note on the PR Blends the two Fable 5.1 rename conflicts (scheduling.md step 4, chat-and-sessions.md model FAQ) keeping both sides' additions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012tCskBCnoydX8YAWFmm8TN
… lines (#2746) — mechanical, per the merge-train note on the PR test_2110_widget_type_parity forbids backticking a fictional widget type on any line that says "widget type(s)", even in a sentence denying it exists. Unbackticks the three names at trinity-plugin.md:191 and faq/advanced-features.md:59; content unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012tCskBCnoydX8YAWFmm8TN
This was referenced Sep 14, 2026
This was referenced Sep 14, 2026
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Integration surface for #2743, #2752, #2753, #2619, #2746. Never merged; members merge individually once green.
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