diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index e7a30445..d4fa7d94 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -8,6 +8,23 @@ new version heading in the same commit.
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [0.448.1] - 2026-09-18
+### Fixed
+- **`Monitor` was an ungoverned shell.** claude-code's `Monitor` tool runs an arbitrary shell command
+  (it streams a long-running script's stdout back as events), and it appeared in neither
+  `gate-hook.sh`'s routing table nor the PreToolUse matcher `claude-launch.sh` writes — so it hit the
+  allow-by-default `*)` arm with no policy check, no approval and no audit row. Live transcripts on two
+  tenants show agents using it to `until ssh -i ~/.ssh/<key> root@<host> …`, to write files and to mint
+  tokens, all of it invisible to the gateway. `Monitor` is now matched and routed to `shell.exec`: its
+  `tool_input.command` has the same shape as Bash's, so the enricher computes the identical facts
+  (host egress, destructive flags) with no server change. Its `ws` form carries no command the gate can
+  classify and is refused locally rather than passed on as a factless `shell.exec`.
+  `scripts/gate-tool-coverage-test.cjs` (new, in `test:governance`) drives the real hook against a stub
+  gate and asserts the matcher and the routing table agree — the pairing nothing checked before.
+  **For admins:** Commands an agent runs through `Monitor` (waiting on a build, tailing a log) are now
+  governed exactly like Bash, so a risky one can pause for your approval and all of them show up in
+  Audit.
+
 ## [0.448.0] - 2026-09-18
 ### Added
 - **A run that only lacks a free account now waits for one instead of crashing.** When every runtime
diff --git a/package-lock.json b/package-lock.json
index 60b78cde..65f95a75 100644
--- a/package-lock.json
+++ b/package-lock.json
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 {
   "name": "agent-os",
-  "version": "0.448.0",
+  "version": "0.448.1",
   "lockfileVersion": 3,
   "requires": true,
   "packages": {
     "": {
       "name": "agent-os",
-      "version": "0.448.0",
+      "version": "0.448.1",
       "license": "MIT",
       "bin": {
         "agent-os": "bin/agent-os"
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index 2e974b9d..bc372f80 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "agent-os",
-  "version": "0.448.0",
+  "version": "0.448.1",
   "description": "A generic, governed operating system for running autonomous agents safely across brands. Ships with a local web console.",
   "license": "MIT",
   "type": "commonjs",
diff --git a/scripts/gate-tool-coverage-test.cjs b/scripts/gate-tool-coverage-test.cjs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..05e95484
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/gate-tool-coverage-test.cjs
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+/*
+ * Gate tool coverage — every tool the hook ROUTES must also be MATCHED by the launcher, and every
+ * exec-capable tool must be routed.
+ *
+ * Why this exists: claude-code's `Monitor` tool runs an arbitrary shell command (it streams a
+ * long-running script's stdout as events). It was in neither `gate-hook.sh`'s routing table nor the
+ * PreToolUse matcher in `claude-launch.sh`, so it was completely ungoverned — no policy, no approval,
+ * no audit — and live transcripts show agents reaching remote hosts over ssh through it. The two lists
+ * have to agree: a tool routed but not matched never reaches the hook (silent bypass), and a tool
+ * matched but not routed hits the `*)` allow-by-default arm.
+ *
+ * Drives the REAL hook as a subprocess against a stub gate, so this pins the wire and not a copy of it.
+ */
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const http = require('http');
+const { execFile } = require('child_process');
+const { promisify } = require('util');
+const execFileP = promisify(execFile);
+
+const ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, '..');
+const HOOK = path.join(ROOT, 'terminal/gate-hook.sh');
+const LAUNCH = fs.readFileSync(path.join(ROOT, 'terminal/claude-launch.sh'), 'utf8');
+const HOOKSH = fs.readFileSync(HOOK, 'utf8');
+
+let pass = 0, fail = 0;
+const assert = (c, name, d) => c ? (pass++, console.log(`  \x1b[32m✓\x1b[0m ${name}`)) : (fail++, console.log(`  \x1b[31m✗ ${name}\x1b[0m${d ? ' — ' + d : ''}`));
+
+// ── 1) the matcher covers every tool the routing table names ──────────────────
+console.log('\n\x1b[1m1) the launcher matcher covers every routed tool\x1b[0m');
+const matcher = (LAUNCH.match(/"matcher":\s*"([^"]+)"[^\n]*PreToolUse|"matcher":\s*"([^"]+)"/) || [])
+  .slice(1).find(Boolean);
+const m = LAUNCH.match(/"PreToolUse":\s*\[\s*\{\s*"matcher":\s*"([^"]+)"/);
+assert(!!m, 'found the PreToolUse matcher in claude-launch.sh', matcher);
+const re = new RegExp(`^(?:${m[1]})$`);
+
+// Tools named on the left of a `CAP=` arm — the literal names, minus the wildcard arms.
+const routed = new Set();
+for (const line of HOOKSH.split('\n')) {
+  const arm = line.match(/^\s{2}([A-Za-z|_*]+)\)\s*$/) || line.match(/^\s{2}([A-Za-z|_]+)\)\s+CAP=/);
+  if (!arm) continue;
+  for (const name of arm[1].split('|')) if (/^[A-Z][A-Za-z]+$/.test(name)) routed.add(name);
+}
+assert(routed.has('Monitor'), 'Monitor is routed by the hook (it runs a shell command)', [...routed].join(','));
+assert(routed.has('Bash') && routed.has('Write'), 'the table was parsed (Bash + Write found)', [...routed].join(','));
+for (const tool of [...routed].sort())
+  assert(re.test(tool), `matcher reaches \`${tool}\` — a routed tool the matcher misses never hits the gate`);
+
+// ── 2) end to end: the hook classifies Monitor as shell.exec ──────────────────
+console.log('\n\x1b[1m2) the hook sends Monitor to the gate as shell.exec\x1b[0m');
+(async () => {
+  const seen = [];
+  const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
+    let body = '';
+    req.on('data', (c) => (body += c));
+    req.on('end', () => {
+      if (req.url === '/api/gate') {
+        seen.push(JSON.parse(body || '{}'));
+        res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
+        res.end(JSON.stringify({ decision: 'allow' }));
+        return;
+      }
+      res.writeHead(404); res.end('{}');
+    });
+  });
+  await new Promise((r) => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', r));
+  const AOS_URL = `http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}`;
+
+  // ASYNC on purpose: execFileSync would block this process's event loop, so the stub server above
+  // could never accept the hook's curl — the hook would wait for a gate that cannot answer and the
+  // test would hang instead of failing.
+  const run = async (event) => {
+    const child = execFileP('bash', [HOOK], {
+      env: { ...process.env, AOS_URL, SESSION: 'ses_t', AGENT: 'tester', AOS_SECRET: 'x', AOS_RUNTIME: 'claude-code' },
+      encoding: 'utf8',
+      timeout: 30000,
+    });
+    child.child.stdin.end(JSON.stringify(event));
+    return (await child).stdout;
+  };
+
+  const out = await run({ tool_name: 'Monitor', tool_input: { command: 'until ssh root@db.internal true; do sleep 2; done', description: 'wait', timeout_ms: 60000 } });
+  const dec = JSON.parse(out).hookSpecificOutput;
+  assert(dec.permissionDecision === 'allow', 'an allowed Monitor comes back allow', out.trim());
+  const call = seen.find((s) => s.args?.tool === 'Monitor');
+  assert(!!call, 'the hook actually called /api/gate for Monitor');
+  assert(call && call.capability === 'shell.exec', 'classified as shell.exec', call && call.capability);
+  assert(call && call.args.input.command.includes('ssh root@db.internal'),
+    'the command text reaches the enricher (so host-egress facts are computable)');
+
+  // The ws form has no command to classify → denied locally, never sent as a factless shell.exec.
+  const wsOut = await run({ tool_name: 'Monitor', tool_input: { ws: { url: 'wss://evil.example.com/x' }, description: 'ws', timeout_ms: 60000 } });
+  const wsDec = JSON.parse(wsOut).hookSpecificOutput;
+  assert(wsDec.permissionDecision === 'deny', 'the ws form is denied', wsOut.trim());
+  assert(!seen.some((s) => s.args?.input?.ws), 'and is never sent to the gate as an empty shell.exec');
+
+  server.close();
+  console.log(`\n${fail ? '\x1b[31m' : '\x1b[32m'}${pass} passed, ${fail} failed\x1b[0m\n`);
+  process.exit(fail ? 1 : 0);
+})();
diff --git a/terminal/claude-launch.sh b/terminal/claude-launch.sh
index 60f91596..4662a78c 100755
--- a/terminal/claude-launch.sh
+++ b/terminal/claude-launch.sh
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ $OUTPUT_STYLE_LINE
   },
   "hooks": {
     "PreToolUse": [
-      { "matcher": "Bash|Edit|Write|MultiEdit|NotebookEdit|Read|Glob|Grep|NotebookRead|mcp__.*", "hooks": [ { "type": "command", "command": "bash '$HOOK'" } ] }
+      { "matcher": "Bash|Monitor|Edit|Write|MultiEdit|NotebookEdit|Read|Glob|Grep|NotebookRead|mcp__.*", "hooks": [ { "type": "command", "command": "bash '$HOOK'" } ] }
     ],
     "Notification": [
       { "hooks": [ { "type": "command", "command": "bash '$NOTIFY_HOOK'" } ] }
diff --git a/terminal/gate-hook.sh b/terminal/gate-hook.sh
index e309f0e0..6783b087 100755
--- a/terminal/gate-hook.sh
+++ b/terminal/gate-hook.sh
@@ -101,6 +101,23 @@ esac
 # names diverge fails loudly at the `*)` arm rather than silently allowing.
 case "$TOOL" in
   Bash|shell|local_shell|exec_command|unified_exec) CAP="shell.exec" ;;
+  # `Monitor` (claude-code) runs a shell command too — it streams a long-running script's stdout as
+  # events. Its `tool_input.command` has the SAME shape as Bash's, so routing it here gives the enricher
+  # the identical facts (ssh/curl host egress, destructive flags) with no change on the server. It was
+  # missing from BOTH this table and the launcher's hook matcher until v0.448.1, so every Monitor call
+  # was ungoverned: live transcripts show agents using it to `until ssh -i ~/.ssh/<key> root@<host> …`
+  # and to write files, with no policy check, no approval and no audit row. This is the same class as the
+  # cross-session-messaging channel in CLAUDE.md — a new release adds a tool that reaches outside the
+  # session, and an allow-by-default `*)` arm lets it through. Re-diff on every claude upgrade.
+  Monitor)
+    # The `ws` form opens a WebSocket instead of running a command, so there is no command to classify
+    # and no host fact the enricher can compute from it. Refuse it rather than pass an empty command to
+    # the gate (which would classify as a bare, factless shell.exec and read as allowed): the governed
+    # way to reach a socket is a Bash command, which is gated on its text.
+    if printf '%s' "$INPUT" | node -e 'let d="";process.stdin.on("data",c=>d+=c).on("end",()=>{let i={};try{i=JSON.parse(d||"{}")}catch(e){};process.exit(!i.command && i.ws ? 0 : 1)})' 2>/dev/null; then
+      emit deny "Agentric: Monitor's WebSocket form (ws) is not governed — the gate can only classify a shell command. Use Monitor with a \`command\` (e.g. a websocat/curl poll), which is gated like any Bash call."
+    fi
+    CAP="shell.exec" ;;
   # File writes go through the gateway too (the enricher decides inside-vs-outside the agent's folder
   # from the path in tool_input). The hook stays dumb transport — it only names the capability.
   # `apply_patch` is Codex's editor tool and DOES fire PreToolUse (verified), so writes are gated there