diff --git a/docs/production-deployment/temporal-proxy/encrypt-payloads.mdx b/docs/production-deployment/temporal-proxy/encrypt-payloads.mdx
index 418c66b92c..ae6a596ec8 100644
--- a/docs/production-deployment/temporal-proxy/encrypt-payloads.mdx
+++ b/docs/production-deployment/temporal-proxy/encrypt-payloads.mdx
@@ -20,8 +20,9 @@ import { ReleaseNoteHeader } from '@site/src/components';
 
 The proxy can encrypt Workflow and Activity payloads on the hop to an upstream and decrypt them on responses, set under
 the top-level `encryption` block. It is off by default. Workers and Clients keep exchanging cleartext with the gateway;
-the proxy seals payloads before they leave and opens them on the way back, so the upstream Temporal Service only ever
-stores ciphertext. Encryption is transparent, requiring no change to Worker or Client code.
+the proxy seals codec-capable Payloads before they leave and opens them on the way back. New Payloads sent through the
+proxy reach the upstream Temporal Service as ciphertext. Encryption is transparent, requiring no change to Worker or
+Client code.
 
 It uses envelope encryption: a short-lived data encryption key (DEK) encrypts each payload with AES-256-GCM, and a KMS
 key you own wraps the DEK. The wrapped DEK and a reference to the key that wrapped it travel with the payload, so the
@@ -45,8 +46,8 @@ flowchart LR
 
     App -->|cleartext request| Seal
     Seal -->|wrap DEK| KMS
-    Seal -->|ciphertext| Upstream
-    Upstream -->|ciphertext response| Open
+    Seal -->|Payloads: ciphertext<br/>other fields: cleartext| Upstream
+    Upstream -->|Payloads: ciphertext<br/>other fields: cleartext| Open
     KMS -->|unwrap DEK| Open
     Open -->|cleartext response| App
 ```
@@ -77,6 +78,26 @@ encryption:
 - `cacheSize` bounds the in-memory cache of decrypted DEKs, which avoids a KMS call on every message. It must be
   non-negative.
 
+:::note Scope of fail-closed behavior
+
+Fail-closed applies to outbound codec-capable Payloads on calls that pass through a proxy where `encryption.enabled` is
+`true`. If the proxy cannot encrypt one of these Payloads, such as when the KMS is unavailable, it fails the request
+before sending it upstream. It does not fall back to plaintext.
+
+The proxy cannot enforce encryption for a Client, Worker, Web UI, or CLI that connects directly to the upstream Temporal
+Service. Restrict credentials and network paths when all application traffic must pass through the proxy.
+
+On responses, the proxy decrypts Payloads that carry its encryption metadata. It passes other Payloads through unchanged
+so data written before proxy adoption remains readable during a migration. This behavior continues until existing
+plaintext data ages out under the Namespace's retention period.
+
+Fail-closed does not mean that every request field is encrypted. Search Attributes remain unencrypted so the Temporal
+Service can index them. Failure messages and call stacks are not codec-capable Payloads by default. See
+[Codecs and Encryption](/production-deployment/data-encryption) for encryption coverage and
+[Failure Converter](/failure-converter) for failure encoding.
+
+:::
+
 `default` and each `overrides` entry are key policies with the same shape:
 
 | Field         | Meaning                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
diff --git a/docs/production-deployment/temporal-proxy/index.mdx b/docs/production-deployment/temporal-proxy/index.mdx
index 0377cd00c3..b4c2c79b44 100644
--- a/docs/production-deployment/temporal-proxy/index.mdx
+++ b/docs/production-deployment/temporal-proxy/index.mdx
@@ -78,8 +78,10 @@ For each request, the gateway:
 
 The per-upstream proxy then rewrites the local Namespace to the name the upstream expects, attaches that upstream's TLS
 and credentials, forwards to the Temporal Service, and translates the Namespace back on responses. When payload
-encryption is enabled, it also seals payloads on the way out and opens them on the way back, so the upstream only ever
-stores ciphertext.
+encryption is enabled, it also seals codec-capable Payloads on the way out and opens them on the way back. New Payloads
+sent through the proxy reach the upstream as ciphertext. See
+[Encrypt payloads](/production-deployment/temporal-proxy/encrypt-payloads) for the scope and limits of this fail-closed
+behavior.
 
 ### Terms