diff --git a/agents/anyplot/code/validate.py b/agents/anyplot/code/validate.py
index 04254ca5620..886eb0635fb 100644
--- a/agents/anyplot/code/validate.py
+++ b/agents/anyplot/code/validate.py
@@ -330,6 +330,30 @@
 # (`dataclasses._FuncBuilder`), and numpy's file opener (`numpy.lib._datasource.open`).
 ESCAPE_ATTRIBUTES: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
     {
+        # Frame, generator, coroutine, traceback and code-object introspection (security review of
+        # 2026-10-14): a generator's frame reaches the interpreter's builtins without a dunder name.
+        "gi_frame",
+        "gi_code",
+        "gi_yieldfrom",
+        "cr_frame",
+        "cr_code",
+        "cr_await",
+        "cr_origin",
+        "ag_frame",
+        "ag_code",
+        "ag_await",
+        "f_back",
+        "f_builtins",
+        "f_globals",
+        "f_locals",
+        "f_code",
+        "f_trace",
+        "f_generator",  # Python 3.14: the generator or coroutine that owns a frame
+        "tb_frame",
+        "tb_next",
+        "co_code",
+        "co_consts",
+        "co_names",
         # Native code and raw memory through a value, not an import (second opinion of 2026-10-14):
         # `np.zeros(1).ctypes._ctypes.CDLL(None)` reaches libc, `from_address` reads and writes any
         # address, `as_strided` views memory outside an array, `.dump` pickles an array to a file;
diff --git a/changelog.d/validator-frame-introspection.md b/changelog.d/validator-frame-introspection.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..33095dec737
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changelog.d/validator-frame-introspection.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+### Fixed
+
+- **The plot-code validator refuses frame and generator introspection.** A security review
+  of 2026-10-14 found that a generator's frame (`gi_frame`, then `f_builtins`) reached the
+  interpreter's builtins without a dunder name, which the SECURITY profile allowed. Frame,
+  generator, coroutine, traceback and code-object attributes (`gi_frame`, `gi_code`,
+  `cr_frame`, `f_back`, `f_builtins`, `f_globals`, `f_locals`, `tb_frame`, `co_consts` and
+  their siblings) are now refused on any object. The renderer's gVisor sandbox (read-only,
+  no egress, no secrets in its environment) bounded the exposure; catalogue eligibility is
+  unchanged (285 matplotlib and 287 seaborn files). (#12169)
diff --git a/tests/unit/agents/code/test_validate.py b/tests/unit/agents/code/test_validate.py
index b86092b39c4..73da90ac7fb 100644
--- a/tests/unit/agents/code/test_validate.py
+++ b/tests/unit/agents/code/test_validate.py
@@ -407,6 +407,7 @@ def test_a_reader_call_says_where_the_data_comes_from(self) -> None:
     "import cmath\nz = cmath.exp(1j)\n",
     "v = df._values\n",  # a private attribute of a value, not of an imported module
     "top = df.main.max()\n",  # a column called main: calendar.main is banned on the calendar module only
+    "up = df['close'] >= df['open']\n",  # OHLC columns: a key named like a builtin is data, not a reach for it
 ]
 ESCAPES = [
     ("import warnings\nline = warnings.formatwarning('', UserWarning, 'f', 1)\n", "banned-call"),
@@ -464,6 +465,16 @@ def test_a_reader_call_says_where_the_data_comes_from(self) -> None:
     ("import matplotlib\nrun = matplotlib.subprocess\n", "banned-attribute"),
     ("import matplotlib\nm = matplotlib.os\n", "banned-attribute"),
     ("import warnings\nw = warnings.sys\n", "banned-attribute"),
+    # Frame and generator introspection (security review of 2026-10-14): each name alone is refused.
+    ("g = (i for i in range(1))\nframe = g.gi_frame\n", "banned-attribute"),
+    ("g = (i for i in range(1))\ncode = g.gi_code\n", "banned-attribute"),
+    ("names = frame.f_builtins\n", "banned-attribute"),
+    ("names = frame.f_globals\n", "banned-attribute"),
+    ("caller = frame.f_back\n", "banned-attribute"),
+    ("names = frame.f_locals\n", "banned-attribute"),
+    ("frame = error.tb_frame\n", "banned-attribute"),
+    ("frame = coroutine.cr_frame\n", "banned-attribute"),
+    ("values = code.co_consts\n", "banned-attribute"),
     # Native code and raw memory through a value (second opinion of 2026-10-14): these passed before.
     ('lib = np.zeros(1).ctypes._ctypes.CDLL(None)\nlib.system(b"id")\n', "banned-attribute"),
     (
@@ -501,6 +512,18 @@ def test_allowed(self, body: str) -> None:
     def test_escape_is_caught(self, body: str, rule: str) -> None:
         assert rule in security_rules(body)
 
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+        "name",
+        [
+            *("gi_frame", "gi_code", "gi_yieldfrom", "cr_frame", "cr_code", "cr_await", "cr_origin"),
+            *("ag_frame", "ag_code", "ag_await", "f_back", "f_builtins", "f_globals", "f_locals"),
+            *("f_code", "f_trace", "f_generator", "tb_frame", "tb_next", "co_code", "co_consts", "co_names"),
+        ],
+    )
+    def test_every_introspection_attribute_is_refused(self, name: str) -> None:
+        """Each spelling of the 2026-10-14 frame and generator denylist, so a typo cannot reopen one."""
+        assert "banned-attribute" in security_rules(f"value = thing.{name}\n")
+
     def test_a_private_module_in_an_import_path_is_named_and_logged_by_its_known_prefix(self) -> None:
         findings = validate_security(plot("import scipy.fft._backend as backend\n"), library="matplotlib")